The GST Council is a unique example of cooperative federalism in fiscal matters. Discuss with reference to its voting structure and recent decisions.

Article 279A, inserted by the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016, created the GST Council [1]. In it, the Centre and the States share taxing powers that they hold at the same time and take decisions on one common tax together. Its voting design and its recent decisions make it a distinctive model of cooperative fiscal federalism, though not one free of strain.

Voting structure: a built-in mutual check

• Composition: the Union Finance Minister (Chair), the Union Minister of State (Revenue/Finance), and a minister nominated by each State [1].
• Weighted voting: the Centre holds ⅓ of the votes and all States together hold ⅔. A decision needs at least ¾ of the weighted votes of members present and voting [1].
• Effect: the States cannot pass a decision without the Centre. The Centre needs the support of about 62.5% of the States' vote weight. Neither side can decide alone, so both are pushed towards consensus.

Recent decisions showing cooperation

• 56th meeting (2025): the slabs were cut to 5% and 18%, with a 40% rate on luxury and sin goods, from 22 September 2025 [2]. States accepted revenue risk to give relief to consumers and MSMEs.
• 57th meeting (8 October 2026): eight Chief Ministers and two Deputy CMs attended [3]. The focus shifted from rates to process reforms: automatic registration under Rule 14A, automatic acceptance of amendments (Rule 19) and system-based cancellation (new Rule 23A) [3]. These are common administrative rules for one national market.

Strains and limits

• Recommendatory, not binding: in Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022), the Supreme Court held that Council recommendations do not bind Parliament or State legislatures. This is because Article 246A gives both levels equal power to make GST laws [4].
• Uneven speed: the 57th meeting's cancellation reform needs amendments to the CGST Act [3]. Matching changes in each State's own GST law are also needed, and some States may act late.
• Asymmetry: the Centre's ⅓ weight works as an effective veto. The States, having given up independent taxing power, depend on the Council for fiscal room.

Through its voting arithmetic and its consensus-led reforms, the Council has turned shared sovereignty into joint decision-making. To strengthen it, the Council could agree common timelines for State amendments and share data more openly. Built this way on persuasion rather than compulsion, the Council supports the constitutional ideal of cooperative federalism.