The independence of the Election Commission depends as much on its appointment process as on its constitutional mandate. Discuss with reference to recent legislative and judicial developments.

Article 324 vests the "superintendence, direction and control" of elections in the Election Commission (EC). However, it leaves the appointment of its members "subject to the provisions of an Act of Parliament" [1]. A mandate is only as strong as the people who exercise it, so the EC's independence depends just as much on who selects them.

Constitutional mandate: the first pillar

• Plenary powers: under Article 324(1), the EC conducts polls and enforces the Model Code of Conduct without executive direction [1].
• Security of tenure: the CEC can be removed only in the same manner as a Supreme Court judge [2].
• Gap: Election Commissioners can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone. The Supreme Court left this asymmetry for Parliament to address [2].

Appointment process: the second pillar

• Legislative vacuum: for decades no law existed, so the executive alone appointed commissioners.
• Judicial correction: in Anoop Baranwal v Union of India (March 2023), the Supreme Court held that appointments "should not be done solely by the Executive". Until Parliament legislated, a committee of the PM, the Leader of Opposition and the CJI would select them [1].
• Legislative response: the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister. This gives the government a 2:1 majority on the committee [1][2].
• Search Committee: a panel led by the Cabinet Secretary shortlists five names, but the Selection Committee may pick someone outside the list [1].

Recent judicial developments

• On 23 September 2026, a two-judge Bench split on whether to refer the challenge to the 2023 Act to a five-judge Constitution Bench. Both judges still jointly asked the CJI to allocate the case to one [3].
• A pending plea seeks recall of one judge's opinion because he did not disclose that his son is the EC's standing counsel [3]. This shows that the courts deciding on EC independence must themselves be seen as neutral.

Way forward

• Rebalance the Selection Committee in line with the Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission (2015). Both recommended including the CJI [2].
• Extend CEC-level removal protection to Election Commissioners through a constitutional amendment [2].

Article 324 gives the EC its powers, but the appointment process decides whether those powers are used without fear or favour. A balanced selection committee, equal tenure safeguards and an early Constitution Bench verdict would give India an EC that is independent and seen to be so. This would secure free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.