Recusal in the Indian judiciary remains a matter of individual conscience rather than codified rule. Critically examine the need for a formal recusal framework in light of recent controversies.

Recusal means a judge stepping aside because of real or apparent bias. In India it rests on the maxim nemo judex in causa sua (no one should judge their own cause) and on the Supreme Court's self-adopted Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997), which says justice must also "be seen to be done" [1]. No rule says when or how a judge must recuse, and recent controversies show the cost of that gap.

Recent controversies exposing the gap

• Undisclosed family link (2026): A plea seeks recall of Justice S.C. Sharma's opinion in the challenge to the CEC and ECs Act, 2023. His son is a standing counsel for the Election Commission, and this was not disclosed across several hearings [2]. The Act gives the government two of three votes on the selection committee [3], so the judges hearing the case must be visibly neutral.
• Judge deciding their own recusal (2019): In Indore Development Authority, Justice Arun Mishra wrote the lead opinion rejecting the plea for his own recusal [4].

Why a formal framework is needed

• Consistent grounds: Today each judge decides alone whether family, financial or prior-view links matter. The UN-backed Bangalore Principles (2002) give a clear "reasonable observer" test and cover family interests [5].
• Mandatory disclosure: Only the judge knows about family links. A declaration at the first hearing would let parties object or waive the objection, so such pleas would not surface only after a ruling [2].
• Independent review: A contested plea could go to another Bench or to the CJI, not to the judge it targets.
• Reasoned orders: Written reasons for recusing or refusing to recuse would build public trust.

Concerns and limits

• Bench-hunting: Litigants may use recusal pleas to pick a friendlier Bench. The 2019 Bench raised exactly this concern [4].
• Over-breadth: If every relative's retainer forced recusal, courts could struggle to form Benches for the many cases involving the government.
• Judicial independence: A code imposed by Parliament could weaken the separation of powers (Article 50). Self-regulation is safer.
• Delay: Recall pleas hold up final rulings on important constitutional questions [2].

The real gap is not the judge's discretion to recuse but the lack of compulsory disclosure and independent review. A procedure notified by the Supreme Court's Full Court could fix this. It would need first-hearing disclosure, defined grounds in line with the Bangalore Principles, and reasoned orders. This would keep the judiciary self-regulating while protecting both litigants and judges. It would also strengthen the fair-procedure guarantee of Article 21 and public faith in the courts.