India–China relations today are best described as 'managed coexistence'. Critically examine the sustainability of this framework in light of post-Galwan developments.

India and China are in "managed coexistence": they contain their rivalry through dialogue but have not resolved it. Since the 2020 Eastern Ladakh standoff [1], this framework has restored calm. Whether that calm lasts depends on daily restraint, because the boundary is still unsettled.

Strengths: why the framework is holding

• Disengagement achieved: an agreement on patrolling arrangements ended the standoff at all 2020 friction points. It was followed by the first full leaders' talks in five years at Kazan (October 2024) [1].
• Dialogue institutionalised: the 23rd and 24th Special Representatives (SR) rounds were held, and the WMCC (the India–China working mechanism on border affairs) has met 35 times [1]. At Tianjin, the PM cited "peace and stability" after disengagement and the SRs' understanding on border management [2].
• People-to-people CBMs (confidence-building measures): the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra resumed via Lipulekh and Nathu La after nearly five years, and direct flights restarted in October 2025 [1].
• Strategic framing: the leaders called the two countries "development partners, not rivals" [2].

Weaknesses: why it remains fragile

• No settled boundary: 24 SR rounds since 2003 have produced arrangements for managing the border but no agreed line [1]. On an undemarcated LAC, a routine patrol can escalate, as Galwan showed.
• Reversible gains: pilgrimages, flights and data-sharing all exist by agreement, and either side can withdraw them.
• Water leverage: India demarched China on 30 December 2024 over the Yarlung Tsangpo mega-dam. Both sides then had to agree on an early ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) meeting just to discuss resuming hydrological data [3]. India has no water treaty with China.
• Economic asymmetry: imports from China grew 12.63% in April–November 2025 [4]. Dependence is deepening even while the border remains distrusted.

Way forward

• Use the SR channel to clarify the LAC, not just to manage it.
• Seek binding, year-round river data through the ELM, which was set up in 2006 [3].
• Reduce import dependence through domestic manufacturing and diversified suppliers.
• Judge the thaw by results: an uninterrupted Yatra, timely river data and fewer face-offs.

The framework has turned post-Galwan confrontation into structured dialogue. However, it rests on restraint, not resolution, so it is sustainable only in the short term. If India pairs deterrence along the LAC with patient diplomacy and lowers its water and trade dependence, managed coexistence can mature into the durable peace envisaged in Panchsheel.