Can India and China coexist peacefully?

1. At a Glance

• M.K. Narayanan, former NSA and former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, calls the current state of India–China ties "managed coexistence". Every "patrolling deviation" gets treated as a "face-off", so even that arrangement is proving hard to sustain [1].
• His core argument is that the two ancient civilisations have no obvious reason to be in conflict beyond their border disagreements. He says India would be mistaken to see China as a threat to its very existence [1].
• Since 2024, the relationship has moved from disengagement to normalisation. Steps include resuming Special Representatives (SR) talks, resuming the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra (KMY), and restarting direct flights [2][3][4].
• UPSC relevance: this is core GS-II (IR: India and its neighbourhood) content, and it also links to border security in GS-III.

2. Why in the News

• Narayanan's op-ed "Can India and China coexist peacefully?" ran in The Hindu on 31 October 2026 (Chennai edition, p. 16) [1].
• PM Modi and President Xi Jinping held a bilateral meeting in Tianjin in August 2025. Modi said that after disengagement at the border, an atmosphere of peace and stability has been established [2].
• The 24th round of SR talks was held in New Delhi on 19 August 2025 [3].
• The KMY resumed in 2025 after a gap of nearly five years and continued in 2026 [3][4].

3. Background & Evolution

• "Hindi–Chini Bhai Bhai" was the slogan of the early-era friendship. India saw the 1962 war that followed as a betrayal ("Mao's perfidy") and concluded that China could not be trusted [1].
• 1962 Sino-Indian conflict: Narayanan says one argument links it to Mao's "hubris" after the failed Great Leap Forward, though historians give other causes too [1].
• After 1962, territorial losses in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh became a "permanent sore" [1].
• 2003: The Special Representatives mechanism on the India–China Boundary Question was set up [3].
• The India–China Joint Declaration is a bilateral framework document listed on the MEA's site [5].
• 2020: At the Galwan Valley clash, 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives [1]. The KMY also stopped from 2020, because of COVID-19 and China's non-renewal of arrangements [4].
• December 2024: The 23rd SR round was held in Beijing [3].
• January 2025: The two sides agreed to resume the KMY in summer 2025 [4].
• August 2025: The 24th SR round took place in New Delhi on 19 August, followed by the Modi–Xi meeting in Tianjin [2][3].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Nature of current ties	"Managed coexistence" (Narayanan) [1]
Boundary negotiation channel	Special Representatives mechanism, set up in 2003 [3]
SR rounds held	24 (most recent: 19 August 2025, New Delhi) [3]
SR interlocutors (24th round)	NSA Ajit Doval (India) and Foreign Minister Wang Yi (China) [3]
23rd SR round	Beijing, December 2024 [3]
KMY routes	Lipulekh Pass (Uttarakhand) and Nathu La (Sikkim) [3]
KMY gap	2020–2024, nearly 5 years [3][4]
River cooperation	Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) on trans-border river data [3]
Galwan clash toll (India)	20 soldiers [1]
Disputed sectors (per op-ed)	Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh [1]
Nodal ministry	Ministry of External Affairs (East Asia division handles China) [3]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Because every patrolling deviation becomes a face-off, peace along the border stays fragile even after disengagement [1].
• The SRs have reached an understanding on border management, which shifts the focus from crisis response to managing the border as an institution [2].
• The Tianjin meeting came on the sidelines of the SCO, so multilateral forums are acting as channels for bilateral thaw [2].

Historical / Psychological

• The trust deficit from 1962 persists. Narayanan argues that the 1962 war alone "does not wholly explain" why bitterness remains today [1].
• Commentators see the 2020 Galwan clash as the main recent driver of continued hostility [1].

Socio-Cultural

• The KMY is a pilgrimage of religious importance to Hindus, Jains and Buddhists, and its resumption is a people-to-people confidence-building measure (CBM) [3][4].
• Restarting direct flights helps rebuild links through business, tourism and students [2][3].

Environmental / Water Security

• The two sides agreed to hold an early ELM meeting on trans-border river data. Hydrological data sharing on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej matters for flood forecasting in India's Northeast and North [3].

Governance / Diplomatic

• India's CBMs are layered: SR talks, flights, pilgrimages and data sharing. This reflects a "de-escalation before normalisation" sequencing [2][3].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• December 2024: 23rd SR round held in Beijing [3].
• January 2025: Agreement to resume the KMY in summer 2025 [4].
• Summer 2025: KMY resumed through Lipulekh and Nathu La after nearly 5 years [3].
• 19 August 2025: 24th SR round in New Delhi (Doval–Wang Yi). Agreement in principle on direct air services and an early ELM meeting [3].
• August 2025: Modi–Xi bilateral in Tianjin. Modi said the SRs had an understanding on border management and that direct flights were being started [2].
• June 2026: First KMY 2026 batch via Nathu La flagged off [3].
• 31 October 2026: Narayanan's op-ed frames the relationship as "managed coexistence" [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The SR mechanism on the India–China Boundary Question was set up in 2003 [3].
• 24 rounds of SR talks have been held. The 24th was in New Delhi on 19 August 2025 [3].
• India's SR is the NSA, and China's SR is the Foreign Minister (Wang Yi) [3].
• The 23rd SR round was held in Beijing in December 2024 [3].
• The KMY runs via Lipulekh (Uttarakhand) and Nathu La (Sikkim) [3].
• The KMY was suspended from 2020 and resumed in 2025 [3][4].
• The KMY is organised by the Ministry of External Affairs (it appears in MEA parliamentary replies) [4].
• The Modi–Xi bilateral of August 2025 was held in Tianjin [2].
• The Expert Level Mechanism deals with trans-border river data [3].
• The Galwan Valley clash (2020) killed 20 Indian soldiers [1].
• "Hindi–Chini Bhai Bhai" was the slogan of the pre-1962 friendship era [1].

8. Why the Border Thaw Is Still Fragile

• The peace is built on talks, not on a settled border
• The SR mechanism was set up in 2003. It has held 24 rounds, but the boundary is still not settled [3].
• The LAC (Line of Actual Control, the working line each side actually holds) is not marked on the ground. So each side patrols up to where it thinks the line is.

• This is why Narayanan says every "patrolling deviation" turns into a "face-off" [1]. Without a mapped line, even a routine patrol can look like a push forward.

• Disengagement is only the first step

• The PM spoke of peace and stability "after disengagement" [2]. Disengagement means pulling troops back from points where they stood face to face.
• The SRs reached an "understanding on border management" [2]. That is a way to manage the dispute. It is not a solution.

• So the calm depends on both sides choosing restraint every day. One clash like Galwan, which killed 20 Indian soldiers, can undo years of CBMs (confidence-building measures, steps that build trust) [1].

• The new steps are easy to reverse

• The KMY, direct flights and data sharing were all restarted by agreement [3][4]. They can be stopped in the same way.
• The KMY is the proof: it stopped in 2020, partly because China did not renew the arrangements [4].

9. The Counter-Case: China Is More Than a Border Problem

• The opposing view: the threat is not only on the border
• Narayanan argues that India should not see China as an existential threat (a threat to its very survival) [1].

• The strongest reply is that China has influence over India in areas that border talks do not touch: water and trade.

• China controls the water that flows into India

• China has approved a mega dam on the lower Yarlung Tsangpo, which becomes the Brahmaputra in India. India issued a demarche (a formal diplomatic protest) on 30 December 2024 [6].
• India asked China for transparency and for consultation with downstream countries [6]. China is the upper riparian (the country upstream), so India can ask but cannot insist.

• India's water ministry has said any diversion of the Brahmaputra would encroach on the rights of lower riparian states such as India and Bangladesh [8].

• India keeps buying more from China

• In April–November 2025, imports from China grew by 12.63% over the year before [7].

• So even while border tension stays high, India relies more on Chinese goods. That gives China pressure it can use.

• What the counter-case gets right, and where it goes too far

• It is right that "managed coexistence" on the border does nothing about water and trade dependence.
• But pressure is not the same as a threat to India's survival. Water and trade dependence can be reduced through policy. That supports Narayanan's view that China is a hard competitor India can manage, not an enemy it must fight.

10. Why India Gets River Data Only When China Agrees

• The data system rests on goodwill, not a binding treaty
• The ELM (Expert Level Mechanism) on trans-border rivers was set up in 2006 [6].
• The 2006 Joint Declaration said China's flood-season data on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej had been valuable for flood forecasting [5].

• Yet in 2025 the two sides had to agree on an early ELM meeting just to discuss resuming that data [6]. In other words, the data flow had stopped.

• Why this matters for the Northeast

• Flood warnings in Assam and Arunachal depend on knowing in advance how much water is coming from Tibet [3].
• When data stops, India loses that warning time, and China does not have to explain why.
• India has no water-sharing treaty with China. Talks run only through the ELM and diplomatic channels [6].

11. What India Should Do Before Trusting the Thaw

• MEA: turn river data into a firm, all-season commitment
• At present the data depends on yearly arrangements, and it has already been interrupted once [6].

• MEA should use the ELM to push for data that comes on a fixed schedule all year round, and for consultation before any dam work, as it asked in the December 2024 demarche [6].

• SR talks: work on clearly marking the LAC, not only managing it

• 24 rounds since 2003 have produced arrangements for managing the border, but no agreed line [3].

• Until the LAC is marked on the ground, every patrol can turn into a face-off, which is the risk Narayanan describes [1].

• Department of Commerce: track and reduce dependence on Chinese imports

• Imports from China grew 12.63% in April–November 2025 [7]. A friendlier relationship should not deepen that dependence.

• Each new opening to China, such as flights, trade or investment, should be judged by whether it gives China more pressure over India.

• Test the thaw by results, not by meetings

• Useful tests: Is the KMY held every year without disruption? Does river data arrive on time? Are there fewer face-offs?
• Summits like Tianjin [2] create goodwill, but only steady results on these tests show that coexistence is lasting.

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 20 Indian soldiers killed at Galwan (2020), the trigger for the current phase [1]
• Data: 24 SR rounds since 2003 and still no settled boundary [3]
• Data: Imports from China grew 12.63% in April–November 2025 [7]
• Report/Committee: Expert Level Mechanism on trans-border rivers, set up in 2006 [6]
• Law/Case: 2006 India–China Joint Declaration, which recognises the value of Brahmaputra/Sutlej flood data [5]; India's demarche on the Yarlung Tsangpo mega dam, 30 December 2024 [6]
• Scheme: Vibrant Villages Programme: India building up its own border villages so its presence on the ground does not depend on China's goodwill

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: India and its neighbourhood relations; bilateral groupings and agreements; effect of other countries' policies on India's interests.
• GS-III: Security challenges and their management in border areas.
• GS-IV (case/ethics angle): Trust and statecraft in foreign policy (secondary).

Possible question stems:

1. India–China relations today are best described as 'managed coexistence'. Critically examine the sustainability of this framework in light of post-Galwan developments. (15 marks)
2. Discuss the role of confidence-building measures such as the Special Representatives mechanism and the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in normalising India–China ties. (10 marks)
3. Is China an existential threat or a manageable competitor for India? Substantiate with historical and contemporary evidence. (15 marks)

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• LAC sectors (Western, Middle, Eastern): the geographic basis of the "patrolling deviations".
• Galwan 2020 and the disengagement agreements: the immediate trigger of the current phase.
• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): the venue of the Tianjin thaw.
• Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) dam issue: links to the ELM and to water security.
• India–China trade deficit and FDI curbs: the economic leverage in the relationship.
• China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the String of Pearls: the strategic encirclement debate.
• QUAD and India's strategic autonomy: how India balances against China.
• Vibrant Villages Programme: India's development response in border areas.

15. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Line of Actual Control (Polity): Patrolling deviations becoming face-offs happen because the LAC is undemarcated; it is the heart of 'managed coexistence'.
• India-China boundary (Geography): Explains the western, middle and eastern sectors and the McMahon Line behind the border dispute and SR talks.
• Galwan Valley (Geography): The 2020 clash that killed 20 Indian soldiers triggered the current phase of disengagement and normalisation.
• Aksai Chin (Polity): With Arunachal, it was the core of the 1962 territorial loss that left a 'permanent sore'.
• Brahmaputra river (Geography): Trans-border river data sharing under the Expert Level Mechanism concerns the Brahmaputra and its flood risks.
• String of pearls (Geography): Helps with the strategic encirclement debate and the question of whether China is a threat to India.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• SR mechanism year: it is 2003. Don't confuse it with the 1993 / 1996 LAC peace and CBM agreements.
• SR counterparts: India's SR is the NSA (Ajit Doval), not the External Affairs Minister. China's SR is Foreign Minister Wang Yi [3].
• KMY routes: they are Lipulekh and Nathu La. Shipki La is a separate pass and is not a KMY route [3].
• Tianjin vs Beijing: the August 2025 summit was in Tianjin. The 23rd SR round was in Beijing [2][3].
• The 1962 territorial loss covered both Ladakh (Aksai Chin) and Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA). Don't treat it as one sector only [1].