Is India a middle power or a rising great power? Critically analyse how this self-definition affects its strategic choices in a fragmenting world order.

As great-power rivalry weakens the rules-based order, Canadian PM Mark Carney urged middle powers at Davos (January 2026) to act together [1]. India's External Affairs Minister has rejected that label and calls India "not a middle power but a power in the middle" [2]. India is best read as a rising great power that, for now, works with a middle power's tools.

India's status: both sides

• Rising great power: It has a very large population, the IMF projects it to become the world's fourth-largest economy [5], it has nuclear weapons and it is one of the fastest-growing major economies.
• Middle-power traits: Its per-capita income is low, it imports much of its defence equipment and energy, and it has no permanent UNSC seat. Its influence still comes more from diplomatic agility than from coercive reach.

How "power in the middle" shapes strategic choices

• Multi-alignment, not alliances: India sits in the Quad, SCO and BRICS at the same time. It favours de-risking, diversification and agenda-based cooperation over rigid alliances [3].
• Normative leadership: The Voice of Global South Summits fed into India's G20 presidency, which secured African Union permanent membership [4].
• Issue-based coalitions: India wants emerging powers to pool diplomatic, economic and technological resources to reshape global decision-making [3]. It also seeks resilience in a "world of choke points", where resources and finance are used as weapons [2].

Limits and risks

• Capability–ambition gap: Great-power rhetoric runs ahead of India's defence-industrial and state capacity, and dependence on imports limits its autonomy.
• Credibility of hedging: Balancing between rival blocs can look like fence-sitting and may invite pressure from both sides.
• Coalition paradox: Rejecting the middle-power label may keep India apart from collective-action coalitions [1] that would strengthen its bargaining power.
• Economic caution: India's exit from RCEP (2019) shows that strategic autonomy can slide into economic insulation.

Overall, the "power in the middle" self-image gives India room to manoeuvre, but the gap between its capability and its ambition limits what it can do with that room. The way forward is to build capacity in defence manufacturing, technology and energy security. India should also join issue-based middle-power coalitions without formal alliance commitments and keep pressing for reformed multilateralism. Acting with a middle power's agility while it grows into great-power status fits Article 51's directive to promote international peace and respect for international law.