How has India's engagement with ASEAN evolved from 'Look East' to 'Act East'? What are the economic and strategic constraints in deepening it?
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →India's engagement with ASEAN began in the early 1990s as the Look East Policy, which was mainly about trade. In 2014, at the ASEAN-India Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, it was upgraded to the Act East Policy [1]. ASEAN remains the "foundation" of that policy [1]. However, economic and strategic constraints keep the results below the political ambition.
Evolution: Look East to Act East
- Wider scope: Look East focused on trade and investment. Act East added strategic, security and connectivity goals [1].
- Higher status: ties were raised to a Strategic Partnership in 2012, and India opened a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2015 [1].
- Trade framework: the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) became the economic base. Two-way trade was over USD 120 bn in 2024-25 [2].
- Strategic convergence: at the 23rd Summit (Manila, 2026), India called its support for ASEAN centrality "steadfast." It also said the shared future must rest on "cooperation, not competition" [3].
Economic constraints
- Widening trade deficit: in 2024-25 India imported about USD 84 bn from ASEAN but exported only about USD 39 bn [2].
- Slow AITIGA review: negotiations to fix the uneven tariff concessions are still going on and have no agreed end-date [4].
- Competitiveness gap: tariff cuts alone have not lifted Indian exports. High logistics costs and weak links to regional supply chains continue. India's exit from RCEP (2019) further limits its place in regional value chains.
Strategic constraints
- China factor: China's trade and investment presence in ASEAN is far larger than India's, which reduces India's leverage.
- Quad perception: some ASEAN states are wary of great-power blocs. India must balance its Quad role with its stated support for ASEAN centrality [3].
- Connectivity lag: the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan project are delayed, and Myanmar's internal instability makes this worse.
- Divided ASEAN: members take different positions on the South China Sea, which weakens joint action on maritime security.
India's ASEAN policy has grown from a trade outreach into a multi-sector partnership, but its economic results trail the political ties. A time-bound AITIGA review, export competitiveness linked to PM Gati Shakti, completed Northeast connectivity, and security cooperation through ASEAN-led forums such as EAS and ADMM-Plus can turn "cooperation, not competition" into real gains for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific.
Sources
- 1Ministry of External Affairs, "India-ASEAN Relations" (August 2018): Look East to Act East, the 2014 Nay Pyi Taw announcement, the 2012 Strategic Partnership, the 2015 Jakarta Mission
- 2Ministry of External Affairs, "Brief on India-ASEAN Relations" (July 2025): 2024-25 trade of about USD 123 bn, imports of about USD 84 bn against exports of about USD 39 bn
- 3The Hindu, "Our future must be shaped by 'cooperation, not competition': PM Modi to ASEAN leaders" (Nov 2026): 23rd Summit in Manila, ASEAN centrality, the "cooperation, not competition" line
- 4PIB, "India Participates in 14th East Asia Summit Economic Ministers' Meeting and 23rd ASEAN-India Economic Ministers Consultation": AITIGA review negotiations still under way