·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsIR

India's engagement with ASEAN is moving from 'Look East' to a broad-based Indo-Pacific partnership. Examine this in light of the recent Manila summits.

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In this answer
  1. From Look East to Indo-Pacific: the shift
  2. Manila summits: evidence of broad-basing
  3. Limits of the transition
  4. Way forward

India's Look East Policy (1991–92) aimed mainly at trade and investment ties with Southeast Asia. In 2014 it became Act East, and in 2022 ties were raised to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. These steps added security and connectivity to trade. The November 2026 Manila summits show that the partnership is broadening, but its economic pillar is still lagging.

From Look East to Indo-Pacific: the shift

  • From economic to strategic: India moved from sectoral dialogue partner (1992) to founding member of the East Asia Summit (2005), and then to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2022).
  • From regional to Indo-Pacific: India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (2019) matches the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Both treat ASEAN centrality as the core principle.

Manila summits: evidence of broad-basing

  • Several forums at once: The PM attended the ASEAN-India Summit, the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Quad Summit back-to-back. India's outreach went beyond the Quad [1].
  • Diplomatic signal: India returned in person after skipping the 2025 Kuala Lumpur summits, a gap linked to domestic commitments and trade friction with the US [1].
  • Closer ties with the host: India–Philippines ties "improved dramatically" after President Marcos visited Delhi in August 2025 [1]. Defence links such as BrahMos exports add a maritime-security layer.
  • Hedging: Great powers are acting more unilaterally, as the Trump–Xi–Putin trilateral that same week showed. Closer work with ASEAN gives India room to act as a middle power [1].

Limits of the transition

  • Trade lag: The AITIGA review was meant to finish in 2025 [2]. Despite calls to speed it up [3] and a 10th Joint Committee meeting in August 2025 [4], negotiators were still being told to finish outstanding chapters in July 2026 [5].
  • Balancing act: Holding the Quad on the sidelines of ASEAN's own summit risks making India's support for ASEAN centrality look like words only [1].
  • Unclear delivery: The summits produced "several concrete announcements" [1]. They will only matter if funding and timelines follow.

Way forward

  • Set a new public deadline for the AITIGA review and track it through the Joint Committee.
  • Have the MEA publish one outcomes list, with a lead ministry for each commitment.
  • Make regular summit attendance a fixed rule.

The Manila summits confirm that India's engagement with ASEAN now covers diplomacy, security and a shared Indo-Pacific vision, not just trade. Finishing the AITIGA review and delivering on the summit commitments would complete this shift. That would match India's SAGAR vision and its stated commitment to ASEAN centrality.

Sources

  1. 1The Hindu – "What are the Manila summits' takeaways?" (explainer, 22 November 2026)the three Manila summits, broad-basing beyond the Quad, the 2025 Kuala Lumpur absence and its causes, India–Philippines ties, the Trump–Xi–Putin trilateral, "concrete announcements"
  2. 2PIB – 3rd Meeting of AITIGA Joint Committee, February 2024target to conclude the AITIGA review in 2025
  3. 3PIB – 6th meeting of AITIGA Joint Committee, New Delhi, November 2024calls to speed up the review
  4. 4PIB release on the 10th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting, August 2025 (Department of Commerce)review still in progress in August 2025
  5. 5PIB – India Hosts 13th AITIGA Joint Committee Meeting, July 2026negotiators told to finish outstanding chapters in 2026
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