More than fifteen years after 26/11, India's coastal security architecture has evolved from a fragmented to an integrated multi-agency model. Critically examine, with reference to Exercise Sea Vigil.

The 26/11 attackers landed in Mumbai by sea, which showed how badly the coastal agencies were coordinated. Sea Vigil was conceived in 2018 and is coordinated by the Navy. Its fifth edition (11–19 Nov 2026) tests readiness along the entire coastline and EEZ [1]. Integration has clearly grown, but it is not yet complete.

Evidence of integration

• Wider participation: The first edition (2019) covered all 13 coastal States/UTs with about 150 ships [2]. By 2024 the exercise involved 6 ministries and 21 agencies, and the Army and Air Force took part for the first time [2].
• Whole-of-government design: Five facilitating ministries take part, including Petroleum and Ports, which protect offshore energy and port assets. Fishing communities act as the "eyes and ears" [1].
• Readiness audit: The CDSRE phase comes before the Sea Phase, and Sea Vigil-24 audited over 950 critical locations [2].
• Apex coordination: A Multi Agency Maritime Security Group was set up under the National Maritime Security Coordinator in the NSCS in 2021 [3].
• Infrastructure: The Coastal Security Scheme Phases I and II funded coastal police stations and boats [4].

Persisting gaps

• Exercise versus daily readiness: CAG found that sea patrols in Gujarat fell 78–91% short of target, and boat repairs took 4–13 months [5]. In Karnataka, 4 of 9 coastal police stations had no boat [6].
• Split mandates: The Navy runs the test, but the Coast Guard and State marine police do most of the daily patrolling. Police is a State subject, so States supply the manpower [4].
• Small-boat blind spot: Boats under 20 m had no formal tracking system [7]. The transponder roll-out (36,000+ delivered by Jan 2025) still has no legal mandate [8].
• No enforcement: Public releases describe how large the audit was, not who must fix the gaps it finds [2].

Sea Vigil shows that India has moved from fragmented agencies to coordinated ones, but it is not yet a fully integrated system. The MAMSG should track each CDSRE gap with a named agency and a deadline. Transponders should be made compulsory under the proposed fisheries law, and central funding should cover boat maintenance and jetties. Surprise drills should be added. These steps would make the post-26/11 reforms a truly integrated, cooperative-federal shield for the coast.