The New Collective Quantified Goal agreed at Baku reflects the persistent trust deficit between the developed and developing world in climate negotiations. Critically examine.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) was adopted at COP29, Baku (2024). Developed countries are to "take the lead" on at least USD 300 billion a year by 2035, replacing the USD 100 billion goal [1]. The NCQG is real progress, but its design shows the North–South trust deficit more than it repairs it.
How the NCQG reflects the trust deficit
- Quantum vs need: The UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance estimates developing countries' needs at USD 455–584 billion a year. India told Parliament that the NCQG does not meet these needs [3]. India had sought USD 1.3 trillion, with USD 600 billion as grants [2].
- Who pays is unclear: The larger USD 1.3 trillion figure is only a call to "all actors" from public and private sources [1]. No country is answerable for it.
- Accounting disputes: India objected to counting multilateral development bank (MDB) flows towards the goal, because developing countries are themselves shareholders in these banks [3].
- Broken past promises: The Glasgow pledge to double adaptation finance by 2025 is off track. Adaptation needs exceed USD 310 billion a year, about 12 times current public flows [4].
- The Economic Survey 2024-25 judged that the NCQG offers little prospect of support for developing countries [5].
Why it is not only a trust deficit
- Nominal tripling of the earlier goal shows that consensus-based multilateralism can still deliver [1].
- The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T keeps the higher ambition under negotiation [1].
- Developing countries are encouraged to contribute voluntarily, without any change in their obligations under the UNFCCC [1].
- Stretched budgets in developed countries mean that private capital is needed for bankable mitigation, such as solar power. However, it can bring only a small share of adaptation needs [4].
The NCQG is a compromise. It shows political will in the headline figure, but its vague wording on who pays and what counts keeps mistrust alive. The way forward:
- a grant-heavy, concessional core;
- a common definition of climate finance;
- a baseline and a yearly path for adaptation finance;
- a check on whether past promises were delivered, in the next Global Stocktake.
This would put the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR-RC) principle and Article 9 of the Paris Agreement into practice and advance SDG 13. Delivery, not new pledges, can turn the deficit into trust.
Sources
- 1UNFCCC, Decision 1/CMA.6 – New collective quantified goal on climate finance (FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/17/Add.1)USD 300 bn and USD 1.3 tn figures, replacement of the USD 100 bn goal, Baku to Belém Roadmap, voluntary contributions by developing countries
- 2PIB, "India's Intervention at the Plenary Session of the UNFCCC-CoP29" (Nov 2024)India's demand for USD 1.3 tn with USD 600 bn as grants
- 3PIB, Government reply in Parliament on the NCQG outcome (Aug 2025)SCF needs estimate of USD 455–584 bn a year; objection to counting MDB flows
- 4UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report 2025: Running on Emptyadaptation need above USD 310 bn a year, about 12 times current flows; Glasgow doubling goal off track; limited private finance for adaptation
- 5PIB, Economic Survey 2024-25 releasethe Survey's view that the NCQG offers little prospect of support