The non-disclosure of the Failure Analysis Committee report on PSLV-C61 highlights a tension between national security and public accountability in space governance. Analyse.

Q. The non-disclosure of the Failure Analysis Committee report on PSLV-C61 highlights a tension between national security and public accountability in space governance. Analyse. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The PSLV-C61 mission of May 2025 failed after a third-stage anomaly cost India the EOS-09 satellite, and the Failure Analysis Committee (FAC) constituted by ISRO [1] submitted its findings to the Prime Minister's Office without public release. Analysing this episode requires separating its three strands — the security rationale, the accountability deficit, and the institutional design that must reconcile them.

The security rationale for withholding - EOS-series satellites are dual-use, serving border surveillance alongside agriculture and disaster mapping; disclosing payload and trajectory detail can reveal reconnaissance capability. - The RTI Act, 2005 itself recognises this: Section 8(1)(a) exempts information prejudicial to the security, strategic and scientific interests of the State [2]. - The Department of Space reports directly to the PMO, so routing a sensitive report upward is procedurally normal, not irregular.

The accountability deficit - ISRO is publicly funded and has historically explained failures openly, as with Chandrayaan-2's lander; silence here breaks that convention. - Section 8(2) permits disclosure where larger public interest outweighs harm, and the Second ARC's first report treated transparency as the "Master Key to Good Governance" [3] — a redacted technical summary was therefore feasible. - Opacity has a scientific cost: the recurrence of a PS3 anomaly in PSLV-C62 in January 2026 [4] suggests corrective action went unscrutinised by the wider engineering community. - Commercially, NSIL and the private entities invited in by the Indian Space Policy 2023 [5] price risk from published reliability data; withholding it raises their cost of participation.

Reconciling the two The tension is real but not irreducible — it is a failure of calibration, not of principle. Segregating classified payload data from generic vehicle diagnostics would let ISRO publish the latter routinely.

The two demands are complementary, since credible disclosure is itself what sustains confidence in a strategic capability. Institutionalising time-bound release of redacted FAC summaries — ideally anchored in a statutory space law replacing the present executive framework — would let India's space programme protect its secrets while honouring the transparency that Article 19(1)(a) and good governance demand.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. ISRO Forms Probe Panel After PSLV-C61 Glitch Leaves EOS-09 Off Target — News on AIR (DD/AIR, Government of India) — PSLV-C61 failure and constitution of the Failure Analysis Committee 2. The Right to Information Act, 2005 — India Code, Ministry of Law and Justice — Section 8(1)(a) security exemption and Section 8(2) public-interest override 3. Second ARC First Report, "Right to Information — Master Key to Good Governance" — Press Information Bureau — transparency as a governance principle for public institutions 4. PSLV-C62 Anomaly: ISRO Investigates Roll Disturbance During Third Stage of EOS-N1 Mission — News on AIR — repeat third-stage (PS3) anomaly in January 2026 5. Indian Space Policy — 2023, ISRO/Department of Space — private-sector participation framework and NSIL's commercial role