Two consecutive failures of PSLV raise questions not merely about technology but about ISRO's institutional quality culture. Discuss.

Q. Two consecutive failures of PSLV raise questions not merely about technology but about ISRO's institutional quality culture. Discuss. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The PSLV, ISRO's "workhorse" with only three failures in its first sixty-odd flights, lost EOS-09 (May 2025) and EOS-N1 (January 2026) to third-stage anomalies [1][2]. It is the recurrence, not the failure itself, that shifts scrutiny from hardware to institutional processes.

The technological reading - Both anomalies localised in PS3: a chamber-pressure fall in C61 [3], and an elevated roll-rate disturbance with flight-path deviation near the end of PS3 burn in C62, confirmed by Chairman V. Narayanan [2]. - PS3 is a solid motor [4] — once ignited it cannot be throttled or shut down, so pre-launch non-destructive evaluation and quality control are the only intervention points. - Repetition in the same stage points to a batch-level casting or casing defect, or a design vulnerability, rather than random chance.

Why the questions run deeper - A Failure Analysis Committee was constituted after C61 [3], yet a PS3-linked anomaly recurred within eight months — implying either misdiagnosis of the root cause or incomplete implementation of corrective action. - The C61 findings were not publicly released even in redacted form, weakening the accountability norm expected of a publicly funded agency. - Launch cadence pressure under the liberalised Indian Space Policy 2023 [5], with PSLV productionisation and rising commercial commitments through NSIL [6], can compress quality-assurance timelines.

The other side of the ledger - PSLV's cumulative reliability, four-stage design maturity and institutionalised FAC mechanism remain genuine strengths [4]. - NSIL's expanding customer base and revenue show India's launch credibility is dented, not lost [6].

Consecutive failures therefore expose a systems-assurance gap more than an engineering incapacity. A time-bound, externally reviewed FAC with published redacted findings, strengthened independent quality audit of solid-motor production, and cadence calibrated to assurance capacity would rebuild confidence. Sustaining PSLV's reliability is essential to India's Space Policy 2023 ambition of becoming a trusted global launch provider.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. ISRO — PSLV-C62 / EOS-N1 Mission — mission identity and payload 2. PSLV-C62 Anomaly: ISRO Investigates Roll Disturbance During Third Stage, says Chairman Dr V. Narayanan — News on AIR — roll-rate disturbance, flight-path deviation, PS3 localisation 3. ISRO Forms Probe Panel After PSLV-C61 Glitch Leaves EOS-09 Off Target — News on AIR — C61 third-stage pressure fall; Failure Analysis Committee constituted 4. ISRO — PSLV Configuration — four-stage alternating solid/liquid design; PS3 solid motor 5. Indian Space Policy 2023 (Department of Space/ISRO) — liberalised participation and expanded launch commitments 6. PIB — "Space Sector Reforms have unlocked India's Commercial Potential in Space" — NSIL's commercial role and PSLV productionisation