"Price control on scheduled drugs has not translated into affordable medicines for most Indians." Critically examine the design of DPCO 2013.

The Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013 was issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Under it, NPPA fixes ceiling prices for the essential medicines listed in its First Schedule (the NLEM), which covers over 930 formulations [2]. In September 2026 the Supreme Court flagged steep mark-ups across the drug supply chain [1]. This shows that DPCO works well inside its scope, but that scope is too narrow.

Strengths of the design

• Uniform ceiling: every maker of a scheduled drug, branded or generic, must sell at or below the ceiling price plus taxes [2].
• Built-in viability: ceiling prices are revised every year using the WPI, which lowers the risk of firms stopping supply [3].
• Some check on the wider market: the MRP of a non-scheduled drug cannot rise by more than 10% in 12 months [3].
• Special power in public interest: in 2019, NPPA capped the trade margin on 42 cancer drugs at 30%. The MRP of 526 brands fell by up to 90%, saving patients about ₹984 crore a year [4].

Design gaps

• Narrow coverage: for drugs outside the list, the company sets the MRP itself. The 10% rule limits only how fast a price rises, not whether the starting price is fair [3].
• Trade margins left open: the 90% price falls show that much of the MRP was distribution mark-up, not production cost [4]. The Court's concern was about exactly these margins [1].
• Enforcement after the fact: from 2020 to 2025, 436 overcharging cases recovered only ₹133.19 crore [5], far less than one year's savings from the cancer-drug margin cap [4]. Detection depends on state monitoring units and complaints [3].
• Split responsibility: the Health Ministry decides which drugs go on the NLEM, while the Department of Pharmaceuticals and NPPA fix their prices.
• What families still pay: out-of-pocket spending was still 47.1% of total health spending in 2019-20 [6].

Way forward

• Make trade-margin caps a standing rule inside DPCO, instead of relying on one-off use of the special power.
• Widen the NLEM and strengthen state price-monitoring units.
• Use Jan Aushadhi as a model: store operators earn a fixed 20% margin on MRP, which shows a capped margin can keep a retail network running [7].

Overall, DPCO 2013 controls ceiling prices well but leaves trade margins and most of the market uncontrolled. Capping margins in advance and widening coverage would make its promise real. This would advance Article 21's right to health and SDG 3.8 (universal health coverage).