Production Linked Incentive schemes have drawn strong bidding interest but have been slow to commission capacity. Critically evaluate with reference to the ACC battery programme.

The National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) Battery Storage was approved in May 2021 with an outlay of ₹18,100 crore. It targets 50 GWh of domestic cell capacity [1]. Its record shows the PLI paradox. Bids have far exceeded the capacity on offer. Yet of the 40 GWh awarded to four firms, only about 1 GWh had been installed by February 2026 [2].

Strengths: interest is real and the design is sound

• Strong investor signal: in Round-1, 10 firms bid for about 130 GWh [3]. The 2026 tranche of 10 GWh for grid-scale storage drew 22 bids [4].
• Fiscal prudence: the incentive is paid only on cells actually made and sold [1]. If a firm does not deliver, the government pays nothing.
• Transparent procurement: selection is through a global, two-stage, online Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) on the CPP Portal [4]. Quality counts alongside price.
• Strategic logic: making cells at home reduces dependence on foreign supply chains. This serves energy security and technological self-reliance [4].

Weaknesses: why factories lag behind bids

• A bid is not a factory: a bid is a paper promise. Problems with land, technology, skilled workers and raw materials appear only after the award [2].
• Hard design rules: each firm needed a plant of at least 5 GWh and 60% domestic value addition within five years [1]. Only large firms could take that risk, and many had never made cells. Meeting 60% also needs a mineral and materials supply chain that India does not yet have.
• Few strong bidders: Round-2 ended with only one beneficiary selected [2].
• Supply and demand are not linked: the Ministry of Power's VGF Tranche-II funds 30 GWh of battery storage with ₹5,400 crore [5]. These projects go to the lowest bidder, with no link to cells made under PLI.
• Delay has a cost: the budget is protected, but every year of delay deepens dependence on imported cells.

Verdict: the scheme's aim is sound, but its execution has been weak. Bidding interest shows the PLI idea is viable. Slow commissioning shows the scheme needs better follow-through.

Strong bidding supports the PLI approach, while slow commissioning points to gaps in execution. The way forward:

• give more technical marks under QCBS for proven manufacturing experience;
• set dated, publicly checked milestones from land to commercial production;
• introduce a gradual domestic-cell preference in VGF tenders;
• use the National Critical Mineral Mission to build the upstream supply chain.

Importing cells now for speed while building capacity at home for security would align the programme with SDG 7 and Viksit Bharat @2047 [4].