Ministry of Heavy Industries (MHI) receives 22 bids for 10 GWh Advanced Chemistry Cell manufacturing capacity under PLI ACC Scheme

1. At a Glance

• The Ministry of Heavy Industries (MHI) received 22 bids in a global tender for 10 GWh of Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) manufacturing capacity. All of it is reserved for Grid-Scale Stationary Storage (GSSS) [1].
• This tranche falls under the National Programme on ACC Battery Storage. It is a Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme approved in May 2021 with an outlay of ₹18,100 crore. Its overall target is 50 GWh [1][2].
• The tender shifts the scheme's focus from batteries in vehicles to storage on the power grid. That links industrial policy to renewable energy integration, energy security and technological self-reliance [1].
• UPSC relevance: GS-III (industrial policy, energy infrastructure, science and technology, environment). For Prelims, expect questions on numbers, the ministry and procurement terms.

2. Why in the News

• MHI received 22 bids for the 10 GWh GSSS ACC capacity [1].
• Technical bids were opened on 11 November 2026 in the presence of the bidders. The tender is now past the bidding stage, but final selection is still pending [1].
• Evaluation follows a two-stage, online Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) process on the Central Public Procurement (CPP) Portal [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Rationale: set up giga-scale ACC manufacturing in India with the maximum possible domestic value addition, and build a domestic value chain for ACC technologies [1][3].
• Chronology:
• 12 May 2021: Union Cabinet approves the PLI scheme "National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell Battery Storage", outlay ₹18,100 crore [2].
• 22 October 2021: MHI issues the Round-1 Request for Proposal (RFP) [3].
• January 2022: 10 companies submit Round-1 bids for about 130 GWh in total. That is far more than the capacity on offer [3].
• Round-2 bidding: one beneficiary firm selected (reported in a PIB release of February 2026) [4].

• 2026: global tender for 10 GWh earmarked for GSSS. Sequence: RFP, pre-bid conference, bid submission, then technical bid opening on 11 November 2026, with 22 bids received [1].

• Related earlier initiatives: this scheme is part of India's wider PLI approach to manufacturing. The 2026 tender is the first tranche reserved for stationary or grid storage rather than general ACC capacity [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Scheme name	National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) Battery Storage (a PLI scheme) [1][2]
Implementing ministry	Ministry of Heavy Industries [1]
Cabinet approval	12 May 2021 [2]
Outlay	₹18,100 crore [1][2]
Overall target	50 GWh of domestic ACC manufacturing capacity [1][4]
Current tranche	10 GWh, earmarked for GSSS [1]
Bids received (current tranche)	22 [1]
Selection method	Two-stage QCBS, online [1]
Procurement platform	Central Public Procurement (CPP) Portal [1]
Tender type	Global tender, open to domestic and international players [1]
Technical bid opening	11 November 2026 [1]
Round-1 response	10 bidders, about 130 GWh in total (RFP dated 22 October 2021) [3]
Vision framing	Viksit Bharat @2047 [1]

Key terms:

• ACC: new-generation battery technology that stores electrical energy. The PIB release gives no further technical definition [1].
• GSSS: large, fixed batteries connected to the power grid, as distinct from batteries in vehicles [1].
• QCBS: bids are scored on technical quality as well as cost, so the lowest price alone does not win. Technical bids are opened first [1].
• RFP: the government's invitation for offers. Bids are the firms' responses [1].

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Economic

• The scheme aims to attract large domestic and international players and build a globally competitive ACC ecosystem [1].
• PLI ties incentives to actual production and value addition, not to up-front subsidy. This lowers the government's fiscal risk if firms do not deliver.
• 22 bids for 10 GWh in 2026 and about 130 GWh bid against the Round-1 offer suggest strong investor interest [1][3]. Bid volume is not the same as plants commissioned, though.

Energy / Environmental

• The GSSS allocation is meant to meet the rapidly growing need for storage as renewable capacity expands [1].
• Storage helps manage the intermittent output of solar and wind. It supports grid stability and the decarbonisation of power.
• Gaps to watch: environmental management across the battery life cycle (mining, recycling, end-of-life disposal).

Geopolitical / Strategic

• The release frames domestic cell manufacturing as reducing external dependence, for energy security and technological self-reliance [1].
• The supply of cells and critical minerals is concentrated in a few countries. Making cells at home reduces exposure to supply-chain disruption.

Scientific / Technological

• The scheme is built to support "advanced" chemistries and giga-scale production, with an emphasis on a domestic value chain [1][3].
• Stationary storage needs different chemistry trade-offs from electric vehicles (cycle life and cost per kWh matter more than energy density). That explains why GSSS has a separate tranche.

Governance / Administrative

• Transparency features: online two-stage QCBS, the CPP Portal, and technical bids opened in the presence of bidders [1].
• Implementation risk: earlier rounds led to only partial selection (Round-2 picked one beneficiary) [4]. Getting from award to commissioning has been the bottleneck.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• February 2026: PIB status release restates the scheme (May 2021, ₹18,100 crore, 50 GWh) and reports that Round-2 bidding selected one beneficiary firm [4].
• 2026: MHI issues a global RFP for 10 GWh of ACC capacity for GSSS, followed by a pre-bid conference and bid submission [1].
• 11 November 2026: technical bids opened, 22 bids received [1].
• Next step: financial evaluation and final selection under QCBS. Not yet complete [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The PLI ACC scheme is implemented by the Ministry of Heavy Industries, not MNRE or the Ministry of Power [1].
• The Union Cabinet approved the scheme on 12 May 2021 [2].
• Total outlay: ₹18,100 crore [1][2].
• Overall capacity target: 50 GWh of ACC [1].
• The latest tranche is 10 GWh, earmarked for Grid-Scale Stationary Storage [1].
• 22 bids received for the 10 GWh GSSS tranche [1].
• Technical bids opened on 11 November 2026 [1].
• Selection method: two-stage Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) [1].
• Bidding is conducted on the Central Public Procurement (CPP) Portal [1].
• Beneficiaries are selected through a global tender, so foreign firms can bid [1].
• Round-1 RFP issued on 22 October 2021. 10 companies bid for about 130 GWh [3].
• Round-2 bidding selected one beneficiary firm [4].
• The release links the scheme to Viksit Bharat @2047 [1].

8. Why 22 Bids Do Not Mean 10 GWh of Factories

• Firms have bid eagerly before, then built very little
• In Round-1, 10 companies bid for about 130 GWh, far more than was on offer [3].
• By February 2026, 40 GWh had been awarded to four firms. Only about 1 GWh had actually been installed [4].

• So a large number of bids shows interest. It does not show that factories will be built.

• Bidding is cheap. Building a gigafactory is not.

• A bid is a paper promise. A cell factory needs proven technology, land, skilled workers and a steady supply of raw materials.

• Most of these problems show up only after the award, when the firm has to build. That is the stage where earlier rounds got stuck [4].

• Round-2 is a warning sign

• Round-2 bidding ended with only one beneficiary selected [4].
• If good bidders are scarce even in a small round, 22 bids may shrink a lot once technical scores are checked under QCBS (Quality and Cost Based Selection, where quality counts along with price) [1].

9. Why the 2021 Rules Were Hard to Meet

• The minimum size kept smaller, experienced players out
• Every selected firm had to commit to a plant of at least 5 GWh [2].

• Only very large companies can take that risk. Many of them had never made battery cells before.

• The local-content target needs a supply chain India does not yet have

• Firms had to reach 60% domestic value addition (the share of the product's value actually made in India) within five years [2].
• Putting cells together in India is not enough to reach 60%. The materials inside the cell also have to be made here.

• India still has to build that upstream chain of minerals and materials. That is why the National Critical Mineral Mission matters for this scheme.

• PLI protects the budget, but it does not speed up building

• The incentive is paid only on cells actually made and sold, spread over five years [2].
• So a firm that never starts production costs the government nothing. But it also adds no storage to the grid.
• The money is safe. The time lost is not. Every year of delay means more imported cells are used in India's storage build-out.

10. Who Will Actually Buy These Cells?

• The factory tender (supply) and the storage tenders (demand) are run by different ministries
• MHI pays firms to make cells [1].
• The Ministry of Power separately funds grid batteries through Viability Gap Funding (VGF: a one-time government grant that covers part of a project's cost so that it becomes affordable). Tranche-II provides ₹5,400 crore for 30 GWh of battery storage [5].

• These storage projects are given to whoever quotes the lowest price. Nothing automatically links them to the cells made under the PLI scheme.

• Why this matters for a stationary-storage tranche in particular

• A 10 GWh grid-storage cell plant needs buyers who run grid-storage projects.
• If those buyers keep choosing cheaper imported cells, the new plant will struggle to sell. Without sales, it cannot earn the PLI incentive, which is paid only on cells sold [2].

11. The Case for Just Importing Cells — and Its Limits

• The strongest argument against the scheme
• Climate goals need storage now. Imported cells are already available at scale.
• Spending public money to make cells at home could slow the roll-out of storage and make it more expensive.

• After five years, the ₹18,100 crore scheme has produced only about 1 GWh of installed capacity [2][4].

• What this argument gets right

• For the next few years, India's grid batteries will mostly use imported cells. Blocking imports now would delay renewable integration.

• The scheme's record so far does not prove that the PLI design works [4].

• Why it still falls short

• The grid will depend more and more on batteries. If all the cells come from a few foreign suppliers, any supply disruption hits power supply directly. This is the energy-security concern the release raises [1].

• A gap that lasts for years is not a reason to drop the goal. It is a reason to fix how the scheme is designed.

• Balanced position for Mains: import cells now for speed, build at home for security, and set a clear date by which the two are expected to meet.

12. What MHI Should Fix Before Final Award

• MHI should give more technical marks for proven manufacturing experience
• QCBS lets MHI score quality, not only price [1].

• It should use that freedom to reward bidders who have already run cell lines or have firm technology partners. After the gap between awards and installed capacity in earlier rounds [4], a cheaper bid that is never built is worth nothing.

• MHI should set stage-by-stage checkpoints, not one final deadline

• Land, equipment orders, a trial line and commercial production should each have a date that is checked publicly.

• In Round-1, the gap between award and installation came to light only years later [4].

• The Ministry of Power and MHI should link VGF demand to PLI supply

• The 30 GWh VGF pipeline [5] is a ready buyer for grid-storage cells.

• A gradual preference for domestically made cells in future VGF tenders would give the new plants an assured market. It should be kept modest at first, so that storage costs do not jump.

• MHI should report outcomes publicly every year

• Capacity awarded, capacity installed and incentive paid should be published together for each beneficiary.
• Then Parliament and the public can see the gap between promise and delivery early, not late.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 40 GWh awarded to four firms, but only about 1 GWh installed (February 2026), which shows the gap between awards and real production [4]
• Data: Round-1 drew about 130 GWh of bids from 10 firms, showing strong interest on paper [3]
• Data: 2021 design rules were a minimum 5 GWh plant per firm and 60% domestic value addition within 5 years [2]
• Scheme: VGF for Battery Energy Storage Systems, Tranche-II: ₹5,400 crore for 30 GWh. This is the demand side that the GSSS cell tranche depends on [5]
• Scheme: National Critical Mineral Mission: needed if the domestic value-addition targets are to become realistic

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-III: Indian economy (industrial policy, effects of liberalisation on industry, investment models); infrastructure (energy); science and technology (indigenisation of technology); environment (conservation, climate mitigation).
• GS-II (secondary): government policies and interventions, and issues arising from their design and implementation.
• Possible question stems: 1. Energy storage is the missing link in India's renewable energy transition. Examine the role of the PLI scheme for Advanced Chemistry Cells in addressing this gap. (15 marks) 2. Production Linked Incentive schemes have drawn strong bidding interest but have been slow to commission capacity. Critically evaluate with reference to the ACC battery programme. (15 marks) 3. Discuss how domestic battery cell manufacturing serves India's energy security and strategic autonomy objectives. (10 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• The PLI scheme framework across sectors: for comparing design, outlay and outcomes.
• Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and Viability Gap Funding: the demand side of grid storage.
• National Critical Mineral Mission: securing lithium, cobalt and nickel inputs for ACCs.
• Battery Waste Management Rules and Extended Producer Responsibility: end-of-life of cells.
• FAME / PM E-DRIVE (EV policy): the mobility side of ACC demand.
• India's 500 GW non-fossil capacity target and the updated NDC: why storage demand is rising.
• Pumped storage hydro: the competing grid-storage technology.
• Public procurement reforms (CPP Portal, GeM, QCBS vs L1): procurement concepts that can be tested.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Production-linked incentive (Economy): The ACC programme is a PLI scheme; incentives are paid on actual production, not upfront.
• Energy storage (Economy): Grid-scale storage is the purpose of this tranche, helping manage solar and wind variability.
• Viability gap funding (Economy): VGF funds grid batteries and forms the demand side that the cell factories depend on.
• Local content requirement (Economy): The scheme demands 60% domestic value addition, which was hard for firms to meet.
• Value added (Economy): Domestic value addition is the scheme's core target and the basis of its local-content rule.
• Energy security (Economy): Making cells at home reduces dependence on imports and protects the grid from supply shocks.
• Self-reliance (Economy): Technological self-reliance in battery cells is a stated goal of the scheme.
• Industrial policy (Economy): PLI-based battery manufacturing is an example of industrial policy linked to energy goals.
• Critical minerals (Economy): Lithium, cobalt and nickel inputs decide whether domestic cell making can reach its targets.
• National Critical Mineral Mission (Geography): This mission builds the upstream mineral chain needed to meet the scheme's domestic value targets.
• Supply chain disruption (Economy): Dependence on a few foreign cell suppliers exposes India's grid to supply shocks.
• Energy transition (Economy): Storage is the missing link in India's shift from fossil fuels to renewables.
• Pumped storage hydropower (Geography): This is the main competing grid-storage technology to batteries.
• Extended producer responsibility (Economy): It covers end-of-life battery collection and recycling, a life-cycle gap the note flags.
• Procurement (Economy): The note stresses the QCBS tender process on the CPP Portal, though this entry is about foodgrain procurement.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Wrong ministry: the scheme belongs to Heavy Industries, not MNRE, Power or MeitY [1].
• Confusing 10 GWh with 50 GWh: 10 GWh is the GSSS tranche, and 50 GWh is the overall programme target [1].
• "22 bids" does not mean "22 beneficiaries": opening technical bids is an intermediate step. Selection is not complete [1].
• QCBS vs L1 (lowest bidder): under QCBS, quality is weighted alongside cost, so the cheapest bid need not win [1].
• Year of approval: May 2021 [2]. The 2026 date belongs to the GSSS tender, not the scheme's launch.