Recent internal dissent within the Election Commission of India shows that collegial functioning is needed in multi-member constitutional bodies. Discuss, and suggest reforms.

Article 324 places the superintendence of elections in a multi-member Election Commission. Recently, two Election Commissioners recorded objections on at least 14 occasions over ten months. They said some orders were issued without their knowledge, and that they got no agenda before meetings or minutes after them [1]. The episode shows that a plural body is only as credible as the way it works together.

Why collegial functioning matters

• Legitimacy of decisions: One objection was to changes in Form 6 (the form for enrolling new voters) made without amending the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 [1]. Decisions that affect the franchise need all members to own them.
• Internal check: A multi-member body exists to stop power gathering in one person. Orders issued without the other members' knowledge defeat that purpose [1].
• Unequal job security: An EC can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation, while the CEC has the same protection as a Supreme Court judge [2]. So an EC who dissents risks their job.
• Executive-leaning appointments: The selection panel is the PM, a Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition. This departs from the Anoop Baranwal (2023) model, which had the CJI on the panel [2]. Pay is also now linked to the Cabinet Secretary's, which the government sets [2].
• No own staff: The ECI still has no independent secretariat [3].

Counter-view

• Dissent put on record shows that internal checks are working. The ECI has already agreed to circulate agendas and minutes [4].
• Elections run to fixed timelines, so the CEC needs some room to act quickly. Collegiality should not mean paralysis.

Reforms

• Equal removal protection: Amend Art. 324(5) so ECs can be removed only the way the CEC is (Law Commission, 255th Report) [5].
• Independent secretariat: Recommended by the Goswami Committee (1990) [3]; the Law Commission proposed a new Art. 324(2A) for it [5].
• Neutral selection panel: Return to the CJI-inclusive Anoop Baranwal model, and limit the panel to the Search Committee's shortlist [2].
• Rules of business: Make agendas and minutes mandatory, publish dissent notes, and require a recorded majority vote for decisions that affect voters [4].
• Pay set by Parliament, not by the government [2].

The dissent is best read as a warning, not a breakdown. Equal protection for all members, a secretariat of its own and transparent rules of business would make the ECI truly collegial. That would uphold free and fair elections, which the Supreme Court treats as part of the Constitution's basic structure.