"Security of tenure under Article 324(5) protects the Election Commission from executive interference but may insulate it from accountability." Critically examine in the light of recent litigation.

Under Article 324(5), the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds of a Supreme Court judge. In October 2026 the ECI filed a joint affidavit invoking this shield against petitions by Opposition leaders [1]. The case shows that the shield guards against executive pressure but cannot, on its own, secure accountability.

How security of tenure shields the ECI

• Hard-to-remove CEC: removal needs "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" and a special majority in both Houses, as for SC judges under Article 124(4). No government can dismiss an inconvenient CEC in the middle of an election.
• Fixed service conditions: the CEC's conditions cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment, so pay or terms cannot be used as punishment.
• Protection from tactical litigation: the ECI argues that media reports are "hardly evidence" [1]. If they were enough, any party could stall the referee with a news story.
• Collective decision-making: Section 18 of the 2023 Act makes the majority view prevail. All three Commissioners signed the affidavit, which rebuts the charge of one-man rule [1].

Where it may insulate from accountability

• Unequal tenure: ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2]. T.N. Seshan (1995) made them equals in decision-making [2], but an EC who outvotes the CEC still risks their job. This weakens the majority check.
• Removal is not immunity: the petitioners want the Court to examine how decisions are taken, not to remove the CEC [1]. Pointing to the removal shield answers a different question, and judicial review remains available.
• SC-judge status only in part: the CEC's pay is linked to the Cabinet Secretary's, which the government sets [2]. SC judges' salaries are fixed by law under Article 125.
• Selection dominated by the government: the PM and a Cabinet Minister can outvote the LoP 2-to-1. PRS says this "may undermine the independence of the ECI" [2]. With no veto, the Opposition turns to the courts [1]. Anoop Baranwal (2023) held that equal protection for ECs is for Parliament to decide [2].

Article 324(5) is therefore a necessary but incomplete safeguard. It blocks removal by the executive but leaves appointment, pay and the ECs' tenure exposed. The way forward is to implement the Law Commission's 255th Report: equal removal protection for ECs and a PM–LoP–CJI collegium for appointments [3]. Pay should be fixed by statute, and dissent recorded in signed minutes. Together these would combine independence with answerability and protect free and fair elections, part of the Constitution's basic structure.