Should the Judiciary have a role in executive appointments? Discuss with reference to the debate on the selection panel for the CEC.

Article 324(2) leaves the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner "subject to any law made by Parliament" [3]. The judiciary's role in such appointments is therefore best seen as a corrective device against executive monopoly, not a permanent seat at the table.

Case for a judicial role

• Filling a constitutional vacuum: in Anoop Baranwal (2023) the Supreme Court, finding no law for over seven decades, created an interim panel of PM, Leader of Opposition and CJI — to hold only until Parliament legislated [3].
• Neutral third voice: the 2023 Act's panel of PM, a Union Cabinet Minister and the LoP gives the ruling side two of three votes, so the Opposition can always be outvoted [1].
• Perception of impartiality: Justice Dipankar Datta held that replacing the CJI with a Minister fails the "perception test" and signals an effective executive veto [4].
• Precedent exists — the CJI or a nominee sits on the CBI Director and Lokpal panels.

Case against

• Separation of powers: designing appointment methods is a legislative function; Parliament acting under Article 324(2) is not defying the Court [3].
• Conflict of interest: a CJI who helps select the CEC later hears petitions against ECI decisions — the mirror of the NJAC reasoning that struck down executive presence in judicial appointments.
• Judicial presence is not the only fix: Canada appoints its election commissioner by resolution of the House of Commons; the UK routes it through a Speaker's Committee; South Africa bars members with a high party-political profile [2].

Beyond the panel

• Independence also erodes after entry: the 2023 Act pegs salary to the Cabinet Secretary rather than a Supreme Court judge, and an EC may be removed on the CEC's recommendation [2].

The real principle is not judicial participation but insulation of the selecting body from single-party control. Parliament should therefore restore statutory parity in salary and removal, and widen the panel — through a parliamentary vote or an independent member — so that the umpire is never chosen by one team alone.