·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Should political parties have to disclose how they will fund their poll promises? Evaluate the ECI's proposal from the angles of fiscal federalism and voter autonomy.

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In this answer
  1. Fiscal federalism: merits
  2. Fiscal federalism: concerns
  3. Voter autonomy: gains
  4. Voter autonomy: risks
  5. Verdict and way forward

In S. Subramaniam Balaji (2013), the Supreme Court held that poll promises are not a corrupt practice. The Election Commission of India (ECI) then added Part VIII (Guidelines on Election Manifestos) to the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) [1]. It later proposed a proforma in which parties would state how financially viable their promises are and how they would fund them [1][2]. The proposal deserves support as a disclosure tool, but the ECI should not act as a gatekeeper of welfare.

Fiscal federalism: merits

  • Tight budgets: In Punjab, committed expenditure takes 72% of revenue receipts. Its fiscal deficit is 4.1% of GSDP, above the 16th Finance Commission's 3% limit (2026-27 BE) [3]. Unfunded promises widen this gap.
  • Hidden liabilities: The RBI found Punjab's freebies above 2% of GSDP. It also flagged Punjab's DISCOM-linked contingent liabilities [4]. A proforma would bring such costs into the open.
  • Shared burden: Stress in a state's finances reaches the Centre through borrowing consent (Art. 293) and bailouts.

Fiscal federalism: concerns

  • Jurisdiction: State finances are governed by state FRBM laws, state legislatures and Finance Commissions. The ECI is not a fiscal regulator.
  • One template, unequal states: A uniform proforma ignores differences in revenue capacity and uncertainty over devolution.
  • Weak enforcement: The MCC has no statutory backing [2], and nobody audits the disclosures.

Voter autonomy: gains

  • Informed choice: It extends the voter's right to know (Union of India v. ADR, 2002; Art. 19(1)(a)) from candidates' backgrounds to what policies will cost.
  • Comparability: Standard disclosures make it easier to tell costed welfare apart from election-season promises.

Voter autonomy: risks

  • Paternalism: Choosing welfare is a political choice that the DPSP (Arts. 38, 39) legitimise. Voters, not regulators, should judge it.
  • Information asymmetry: Ruling parties have access to budget data and opposition parties do not, so disclosures may end up as boilerplate.

Verdict and way forward

  • Make disclosure mandatory but non-judgmental: parties state the cost and the source of funding, and the ECI does not rule on merit.
  • Give it statutory backing through an amendment to the RPA, 1951, for disclosure only.
  • Have an independent fiscal council check the costing against budget data [3], including guarantees [4].

On balance, funding disclosure supports both fiscal federalism and voter autonomy, provided it informs voters and does not restrict them. A light-touch disclosure regime, backed by law and checked independently, would link electoral promises to fiscal responsibility. That serves the constitutional value of informed choice and SDG 16's goal of accountable institutions.

Sources

  1. 1Election Commission of India, *Leap of Faith* Vol. 2, p. 260: the Subramaniam Balaji direction, MCC Part VIII manifesto guidelines and the financial-viability requirement
  2. 2PRS Legislative Research blog, note on key features of the MCC: the MCC's non-statutory nature and the proposed financial-viability disclosure
  3. 3PRS Legislative Research, Punjab Budget Analysis 2026-27: committed expenditure at 72% of revenue receipts, fiscal deficit at 4.1% of GSDP, the 16th Finance Commission's 3% limit
  4. 4RBI Bulletin, "State Finances: A Risk Analysis" (June 2022): Punjab's freebies above 2% of GSDP, contingent liabilities and DISCOM risk

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