Türkiye's multi-vector foreign policy presents both opportunities and challenges for India. Analyse.

Türkiye's multi-vector foreign policy means working with rival blocs at the same time. It has been a NATO member since 1952 [2], yet Russia's Rosatom is building its first nuclear plant at Akkuyu [3]. It is now also deepening nuclear and defence ties with South Korea [4]. For India, this hedging creates openings but also complications.

Opportunities for India

• Trade potential: Bilateral trade peaked at over USD 13.8 billion in FY 2022-23 [1]. Because Türkiye is open to partners outside the West, India has room to export more iron and steel, auto parts and telecom equipment [1].
• Shared multilateral platforms: Erdoğan attended the G20 New Delhi Summit (2023), and the two leaders have also met at the SCO and COP28 [1]. Multi-alignment brings Ankara into forums where India also has influence.
• Defence-industrial openings: The two sides are exploring trade, technology transfer and joint ventures in defence [1].
• Goodwill capital: Under Operation Dost, India sent more than 250 NDRF and Army personnel after the 2023 earthquakes, among the earliest foreign help to arrive [1].
• Similar outlook: Ankara keeps its distance from bloc discipline, much like India's strategic autonomy, which leaves room for issue-based cooperation.

Challenges for India

• Pakistan factor: Ankara's political closeness to Pakistan, including on Kashmir, limits how far it can be trusted on India's core concerns. The Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism last met in 2019 [1].
• Falling economic ties: Trade fell to USD 6.88 billion in FY 2025-26, and Türkiye slipped to become India's 40th-largest partner [1]. Turkish FDI since 2000 is only about USD 256 million [1].
• Risk of technology leaking to third countries: Korea is India's K9 Vajra co-production partner [5] and is also building defence ties with Türkiye [4]. Once Türkiye absorbs Korean know-how, it could reach countries hostile to India.
• Unpredictability: A NATO ally that buys Russian reactors [2][3] makes deals case by case, so long-term commitments are risky.

Türkiye's hedging is a double-edged sword: it opens economic and multilateral space but carries strategic risks. India should engage it issue by issue. That means reviving the Joint Committee on Economic and Technical Cooperation (JCETC), dormant since 2014 [1], and building on the goodwill from Operation Dost. India should also use the planned India–ROK 2+2 dialogue [5] to seek limits on passing Korean technology to third countries. Practical, interest-based ties rather than alignment fit India's own commitment to strategic autonomy.