Trace the evolution of India's nuclear safety regulatory framework from the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 to the establishment of AERB. Is a promoter-cum-regulator model (DAE-AERB) adequate for ensuring independent oversight?

India's nuclear governance began as a promotional enterprise, with safety as an internal responsibility of the atomic establishment rather than an external check. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 vested both development and control in the Centre [1], and only in 1983 was a distinct regulator carved out — an evolution that remains institutionally incomplete.

Evolution of the framework

• 1962 — statutory base: Sections 16, 17 and 23 empowered the Centre over radioactive substances, radiation safety and disposal, exercised through the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) [1].
• 1962–83 — self-regulation: safety assurance was largely scientist-driven; BARC's leadership publicly vouched for reactor safety (as at the 1976 Manila conference) with no independent body to verify such claims.
• 1983 — AERB constituted on 15 November by Presidential order under Section 27 of the Act, to discharge regulatory functions through licensing, safety standards and inspection [2].
• Mandate widening: AERB also enforces the Factories Act, 1948 in DAE units and draws authority from the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 [2].
• Post-Fukushima reform attempt: the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, 2011 proposed dissolving AERB for a statutory authority; it lapsed [3].

Adequacy of the promoter-cum-regulator model

• Merits: concentrated scarce expertise, layered safety-review committees, and an unbroken record of licensing India's operating reactor fleet [2].
• Deficits: AERB is an executive creation, not a statutory body, and can be reconstituted by the same authority it regulates; it reports to the Chairman, AEC, who heads DAE [2]; staff are largely deputed from regulated units — gaps the CAG (Report No. 9 of 2012-13) flagged as compromising independence [4].

The model has delivered operational competence but not structural autonomy. With the Nuclear Energy Mission opening nuclear power to private participation and a DAE task force examining amendments to the Atomic Energy Act [5], the moment is opportune to legislate a financially and administratively independent regulator — separating promotion from oversight, as India's own reform blueprint of 2011 envisaged.