UN peacekeeping missions in Africa are moving from expansion to exit. Using MINUSCA as an example, examine the challenges of transferring security responsibility to host states.

MINUSCA was deployed in 2014 during the Central African Republic's (CAR) civil war. In November 2026 it was renewed unanimously, with a goal of "progressive transfer of authority" to CAR authorities, and its numbers were already falling [1]. Budgets and Council politics, more than readiness on the ground, are setting the pace of this exit.

Drivers of the exit

• Financial: The UN's liquidity crisis forced cuts to uniformed personnel and a smaller footprint limited to priority areas [4].
• Political: In 2025 the US abstained (14–0–1) after proposing a six-month extension [3]. The 2026 unanimity covered a mission that was already shrinking [1].

Challenges in transferring security responsibility

• Security vacuum: Armed groups remain active, and Rwandan and Burundian peacekeepers were killed in January 2021 [7]. If troops leave before national forces can cover territory, armed groups fill the gap.
• Weak state capacity: A handover needs an army, police, courts and local administration that work beyond the capital. There are no clear tests of whether these are ready.
• Calendar over conditions: The Council has mandated a multi-year strategic vision [2], but mandate and money still depend on a vote every year. CAR and troop contributors can plan only about 12 months ahead.
• Overstretched civilian protection: The protection mandate stays the same while fewer troops cover more ground [4].
• Legitimacy deficit: UN report A/71/99 found that MINUSCA's head did not follow up on sexual abuse allegations [5]. Only the troops' own countries can prosecute them. This erodes the local trust a handover needs.
• Risk of relapse: An early exit may lead to a costlier re-intervention later.

Way forward

• Conditions-based benchmarks for each phase, for example police posted in every district.
• Predictable financing, with assessed contributions paid on time.
• Police-centric capacity building: India's Formed Police Units and military observers, deployed since 2014, suit this role [6].
• Zero tolerance on abuse, with troop-contributing countries held accountable.

Leaving CAR is necessary, but MINUSCA shows that an exit needs a capable state to hand over to. A phased, benchmarked and adequately funded transition rather than withdrawal would protect the gains of more than a decade. It would also advance SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and the UN Charter's promise of collective security.