Rural banking appraised: default, distress and farm loan waivers
Rural Credit, Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · section 10 of 10
In this note
Detail
1. Achievements of rural banking (Class 11, Rural Development)
- Social banking means using banks to serve social goals, not only profit. It began with bank nationalisation in 1969. Banks were then pushed to open branches in villages and lend to farmers and small producers.
- Rapid bank expansion helped the rural economy:
- More branches in villages → more formal loans for seeds, fertiliser, pumps and small businesses.
- These loans raised farm and non-farm output, income and employment.
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The effect was strongest after the Green Revolution (new high-yield seeds that needed costly inputs, so farmers needed credit).
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Food security: NCERT says "famines became events of the past". India now keeps large buffer stocks (grain the government stores to use in shortages and to supply the PDS).
2. Failures of rural banking
- Weak credit culture. NCERT says that "with the possible exception of the commercial banks", formal institutions failed to build "a culture of deposit mobilisation, lending to worthwhile borrowers and effective loan recovery".
- Deposit mobilisation = collecting savings from people as bank deposits.
- Loan recovery = getting borrowers to pay loans back.
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Weak institutions here: cooperative banks, RRBs (Regional Rural Banks) and land development banks.
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Loan default = failure to repay a loan (the interest, the principal, or both) on time.
- NCERT calls agricultural default "chronically high" (high year after year).
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It hurts rural banks other than commercial banks the most. Money that is not repaid cannot be lent again.
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A simple way to measure default (worked example):
- Recovery rate = (Amount repaid ÷ Amount due) × 100. Default rate = 100 − recovery rate.
- Say a cooperative society has ₹10 crore due this year and gets back ₹6 crore. Recovery = 60%, default = 40%.
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So next season it has only ₹6 crore (plus fresh deposits) to lend, not ₹10 crore. The credit cycle shrinks.
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Rural banking "has taken a backseat after reforms" (the post-1991 changes):
- Loss-making rural branches were rationalised (closed or merged).
- Banks started to focus on profitability (earning profit), not social goals.
- So many farmers moved back to moneylenders (informal lenders who charge very high interest).
3. Wilful default or distress default? (NCERT's key question)
- Wilful default: the borrower can repay but chooses not to. This can happen when they expect a waiver or see weak recovery.
- Distress default: the borrower cannot repay because of events they cannot control:
- crop failure (drought, flood, pests)
- low prices at harvest
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no insurance to cover the loss
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Why this matters for policy: wilful default calls for stricter recovery. Distress default calls for insurance, better prices and loan restructuring.
4. Credit and agrarian distress
- Agrarian distress = long-term hardship in farming: low incomes, debt, crop losses.
- A Class 11 exercise notes that some farmers who borrowed, then faced crop failure, low income and lack of work, could not repay and died by suicide. This links debt directly to distress (see rural-diversification-allied).
- Latest NCRB data (ADSI 2022): 11,290 persons in the farming sector died by suicide in 2022. This was 5,207 farmers/cultivators plus 6,083 agricultural labourers. They made up 6.6% of all 1,70,924 suicides in India. Of the 5,207 farmers, 4,999 were male and 208 were female [6].
- ADSI = Accidental Deaths & Suicides in India, the yearly report of the NCRB (National Crime Records Bureau, under the MHA).
5. Farm loan waivers: meaning and history
- Farm loan waiver = the government writes off (cancels) all or part of farmers' unpaid loans, usually after drought or distress. The government then pays the banks the waived amount from its budget.
- Central waivers:
- ARDRS, 1990 — Agricultural and Rural Debt Relief Scheme.
- ADWDRS, 2008 — Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme (NCERT: about ₹52,000 crore).
- Loans covered: direct farm loans from scheduled commercial banks, RRBs, cooperative credit institutions and local area banks. The loans had to be given between 1 April 1997 and 31 March 2007, be overdue on 31 Dec 2007, and still be unpaid on 29 Feb 2008 [3].
- Final benefit: 3.73 crore farmers received relief of ₹52,259.86 crore [3]. This matches NCERT's "about ₹52,000 crore".
- Two parts [3]:
- Small and marginal farmers → 100% waiver.
- "Other farmers" → debt relief of 25% of the eligible amount, only if the farmer paid the other 75% (a one-time settlement).
- Worked example: an "other farmer" owes ₹2,00,000. If they repay ₹1,50,000 (75%), the government pays the bank ₹50,000 (25%). A marginal farmer with the same debt gets all ₹2,00,000 waived.
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CAG audit (2013) of ADWDRS (CAG = Comptroller and Auditor General, India's top government auditor):
- It found wrong inclusions (ineligible farmers got benefits) and wrong exclusions (eligible farmers were left out).
- It also found little checking of whether the scheme met its main aim: getting fresh loans to farmers [4].
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State waivers:
- A wave in 2017-19: UP, Maharashtra, Punjab, Karnataka, MP, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh.
- 10 states declared farm loan waivers worth ₹2,63,260 crore. About ₹1.85 lakh crore of this was announced in just 2017-18 and 2018-19 [5].
- States pay these waivers over several years to keep their fiscal deficit low (fiscal deficit = how much more the government spends than it earns, which it must borrow). As of 2019-20, ₹1,08,843 crore was still to be paid [5].
- More rounds came later (verify current).
6. The waiver debate
| For waivers | Against waivers |
|---|---|
| Immediate relief to distressed farmers | High fiscal cost; state capital spending is crowded out |
| Supports rural consumption | Moral hazard: farmers wait for the next waiver |
| Clears the balance sheet for fresh borrowing | Damages credit culture and repayment discipline |
| Helps only formal borrowers; moneylender debt is untouched, so the poorest miss out |
- Moral hazard = people take less care, or behave worse, when they expect someone else to cover the cost. Here, a farmer who can repay waits for a waiver.
- Crowding out of capital spending:
- Waiver money comes from the state budget.
- FRBM limits cap how much a state can borrow (FRBM = Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management law) → the state cuts capital expenditure (money spent on lasting assets like irrigation, roads and cold storage).
- Result: less long-term investment in farming.
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States that already have high fiscal deficits find it hardest to fit a waiver in [5].
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Unfair to honest borrowers: the Union Agriculture Ministry noted that waivers reward defaulters and discourage farmers who can pay, or have paid on time [5].
7. RBI's Internal Working Group on Agricultural Credit (2019)
- The report was released on 13 September 2019. It studied the reach of institutional credit, ease of access, and the effect of loan waivers on state finances and credit discipline [2].
- Key finding: since 2014-15, 10 states announced waivers worth ₹2.4 lakh crore (1.4% of 2016-17 GDP), mostly near elections [2].
- Why it opposed waivers [2]:
- Waivers do not fix the root causes of farm distress.
- They destroy credit culture, which can harm farmers in the medium to long term.
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They squeeze fiscal space (the room in the budget) for productive investment in farming.
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Recommendations [2]:
- Avoid loan waivers.
- The Centre and states should do a full review of farm policies and input subsidies (subsidies on fertiliser, power and so on) so that farming can pay for itself.
8. Alternatives to waivers
- Better crop insurance (e.g. PMFBY) → a crop loss is paid for by insurance, so the loan is still repaid.
- Income support such as PM-KISAN (a direct cash transfer to farmers; detail in agri-marketing-msp-pds).
- Better price realisation (farmers get a fair price at the market).
- Loan restructuring when a calamity is declared (the bank gives more time or reschedules repayments instead of cancelling the loan).
- The accounting difference between a write-off and a waiver is covered in banking-regulation-npas.
Prelims Hooks
- ADWDRS 2008: 100% waiver for small and marginal farmers. "Other farmers" got a 25% rebate if they paid the remaining 75%.
- ADWDRS final figures: 3.73 crore farmers, ₹52,259.86 crore. It covered loans given between 1997 and 2007.
- The first central farm debt relief scheme was ARDRS, 1990, not 2008. This is a common trap.
- The CAG (2013) audited ADWDRS and found wrong inclusions and wrong exclusions.
- The RBI Internal Working Group on Agricultural Credit (2019) said waivers should be avoided. It counted ₹2.4 lakh crore of state waivers since 2014-15, equal to 1.4% of 2016-17 GDP.
- Farm-sector suicide data comes from NCRB's ADSI report (NCRB is under the MHA, not the Agriculture Ministry). In 2022: 11,290 deaths, 6.6% of all suicides.
- Moral hazard = expecting a bailout makes people behave worse. Loan waivers are the classic example.
- Waivers help only formal borrowers. Debt owed to moneylenders is not covered.
- NCERT: the one formal institution partly excused from the failure to build a credit culture is the commercial banks.
Mains Points
- Wilful vs distress default: most farm default comes from risk nobody manages (weather, prices, no insurance). So the lasting fix is insurance, price realisation and restructuring, not blanket waivers. The same logic answers "Are loan waivers a solution to agrarian distress?" (GS-III).
- Fiscal trade-off: state waivers of about ₹2.63 lakh crore, paid over several years, crowd out capital spending on irrigation, storage and research. This hurts future farm income more than the waiver helps it now. Link this to the FRBM Act and to competitive populism near elections (GS-II/III).
- Credit culture and financial inclusion: repeated waivers raise moral hazard and make banks more cautious about lending to farmers. Farmers are then pushed back to moneylenders. This works against what PMJDY and priority sector lending try to achieve.
- A better policy mix: targeted income support (PM-KISAN), crop insurance, calamity restructuring, and the IWG 2019 call to review input subsidies. Use this for "way forward" answers.
Sources
- 1Class 10, Ch 3 "Money and Credit"; Class 11, Ch 5 "Rural Development"; Class 7, Ch 8 "Banks and the Magic of Finance" (primary)
- 2Report on Review of Agricultural Credit (RBI Internal Working Group, 2019) — summaryprsindia.org · tier 1
- 3Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme (ADWDRS), 2008pib.gov.in · tier 1
- 4Lessons from Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme of 2008 (R. Ramakumar, RBI) — ).pdfrbidocs.rbi.org.in · tier 1
- 5State of State Finances: 2019-20 (PRS)prsindia.org · tier 1
- 6Accidental Deaths & Suicides in India 2022, Chapter 2: Suicides (NCRB)ncrb.gov.in · tier 1