‘Make in India’ of 12 years shows patchy performance

1. At a Glance

• Make in India (MII) was launched on 25 September 2014 to make India a hub for manufacturing, design and innovation, and it identified 25 key sectors [2][1].
• Its three headline targets were 12–14% annual manufacturing growth, 100 million additional manufacturing jobs and a 25% manufacturing share of GDP. The deadline was 2022 and was later pushed to 2025 [5].
• The Hindu BusinessLine's 12-year audit uses 12 metrics. It finds that manufacturing has not materially raised its share in growth, employment or global exports, and that incentive gains are confined to a handful of sectors [1].
• This matters for the industrial policy, PLI and jobs-versus-growth debates in GS-III.

2. Why in the News

• The 12th anniversary of MII falls on 25 Sep 2026. The article is by TCA Sharad Raghavan (New Delhi), Print Edition p. 17, dated 25 Sep 2026 [1].
• Manufacturing versus overall growth (GVA/GDP):
• Under the old series, manufacturing grew faster than the overall economy in only half of the 12 years [1].

• Under the new series, it outpaced the economy in all three years with data (2023-24 to 2025-26), but the gap is shrinking fast [1].

• IIP:

• Under the old series, manufacturing outpaced the overall index in only 3 of 12 years [1].

• Under the new series, manufacturing growth equalled the overall index in 2023-24 and was slower in the next two years [1].

• Share of GVA: the old series shows manufacturing's share in 2025-26 is lower than in 2014 [1]. The excerpt is cut off before the new-series finding.

• Incentives: recent incentive schemes have seen some success, but only in a few sectors [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Launch: 25 Sep 2014. The stated aim was to facilitate investment, foster innovation and build best-in-class infrastructure [2].
• Targets: 12–14% growth, 100 million additional jobs and a 25% share of GDP by 2022, later revised to 2025 [5].
• PLI schemes:
• Introduced in 2020, first for mobile phones and electronics, and later extended to 14 sectors [3][6].
• As of June 2024, they had drawn ₹1.32 lakh crore of investment and ₹10.90 lakh crore of output [5].

• PIB's later release cites ₹2.16 lakh crore investment, ₹20.41 lakh crore production and 14.39 lakh jobs [4].

• Later phase: PIB marked "Make in India Celebrates 10 Years" and "Make in India 2.0" [7][8].

• Share of GDP:
• Manufacturing's share fell from 16.7% (FY14) to 15.9% (FY24) [5].
• A Business Standard-linked snippet says the share was 13% in 2023 versus 17% in 2010. It uses a different measure, so do not mix the two [9].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Launch date	25 Sep 2014 [2]
Sectors	25 focus sectors [2]
Growth target	12–14% per annum for manufacturing [5]
Jobs target	100 million additional jobs, by 2022 and later 2025 [5]
GDP-share target	25%, by 2022 and later 2025 [5]
PLI	2020; 14 sectors [3][6]
Pillars	Investment, innovation, infrastructure [2]
Data series	Old and new GVA/IIP series (new series has 2023-24 to 2025-26) [1]

• Implementing body: I could not verify this from the retrieved sources. It is commonly given as DPIIT under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, so verify it before use.

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Economic

• Manufacturing's share of GVA has stagnated or fallen. Old-series data show it lower in 2025-26 than in 2014 [1].
• Growth outperformance is inconsistent. It held in half the years under the old GVA series and in only 3 of 12 years for IIP [1].
• Export share has not materially risen [1]. Mobile phone exports are the exception, rising from ₹22,870 crore in FY21 to about ₹2 lakh crore in FY25 [6].

Social (employment)

• Manufacturing's share of employment has not materially increased [1].
• The 100-million-jobs goal is far from met. PLI-linked jobs are put at 14.39 lakh [4].

Administrative / Policy design

• Incentives such as PLI are sector-specific, so gains are concentrated in a few sectors [1].
• Targets were reset from 2022 to 2025 without being met [5].

Historical / Comparative

• The 16.7% to 15.9% fall in manufacturing's GDP share runs against the stated 25% goal [5].
• Series changes (old to new base) complicate comparison across years [1].

Technological

• Electronics and mobile phones are the flagship PLI success [6].

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 25 Sep 2026: the BusinessLine 12-year audit was published [1].
• PIB PLI update: ₹2.16 lakh crore investment, ₹20.41 lakh crore production and 14.39 lakh jobs. The retrieved snippet gives no date [4].
• PIB PLI document (Aug 2025): "PLI Scheme: Powering India's Industrial Renaissance" [10].
• Data: a new GDP/GVA series now covers 2023-24 to 2025-26, and in it manufacturing has outpaced the economy, with a narrowing gap [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• Make in India was launched on 25 September 2014 [2].
• It identified 25 key sectors [2].
• Target: manufacturing growth of 12–14% p.a. [5].
• Target: 100 million additional manufacturing jobs [5].
• Target: 25% of GDP, first for 2022 and later revised to 2025 [5].
• PLI schemes started in 2020, first for mobile and electronics, and cover 14 sectors [3][6].
• Manufacturing's share of GDP was 16.7% in FY14 and 15.9% in FY24 [5].
• Under the old IIP series, manufacturing beat overall IIP in only 3 of 12 years [1].
• Under the new IIP series, manufacturing growth in 2023-24 equalled the overall index [1].
• Mobile phone exports rose from ₹22,870 crore (FY21) to about ₹2 lakh crore (FY25) [6].
• PLI output reached ₹10.90 lakh crore by June 2024 [5].

8. Why "Made in India" Often Means "Assembled in India"

• The phone is put together here, but almost all the costly parts come from abroad
• Domestic value addition in India's mobile phone making is only about 18–20%, against 38–40% in the world's largest phone-making country [11][12].
• Display, processor and memory chips make up 60–70% of a phone's cost and are imported. What India actually makes is casing, plastic parts and packaging [22].

• So the ₹2 lakh crore mobile export figure [6] counts the full value of the phone, not the value India added to it.

• A simple test of this: GVA-to-GVO (gross value added divided by gross value of output — how much of the sale price is value created inside the factory, after paying for bought-in inputs)

• For telecom equipment including smartphones, this ratio is 8.86%, among the lowest of all Indian industries [12].
• Domestic value added in India's exports of communication equipment was about 20.93% in 2022 [12].

• This is why exports can rise sharply while manufacturing's share in GVA does not move [1].

• Imports rose alongside the export boom

• India's electronics imports crossed $20 billion for five quarters in a row even after PLI [24].
• In 2024 India ran a trade deficit of $23.5 billion in chips, $4.3 billion in display panels and $2.7 billion in batteries [25].
• Assembly can grow fast. Deep manufacturing of components has not followed yet.

9. The Money Announced and the Money Actually Paid Are Very Different

• Incentive payouts are a small fraction of the output claimed
• Up to December 2025, the government had paid out ₹28,748 crore across all 14 PLI schemes [13].
• Set that against the claimed ₹20.41 lakh crore of PLI production [4]. Most of the headline number is production, not incentive actually earned and released.

• In one early year the payout fell well short of the government's own estimate of ₹11,000 crore for that year [14].

• The payouts sit in one basket

• Electronics alone (large-scale electronics plus IT hardware) has taken about ₹15,554 crore of incentives; the whole automobile sector got ₹2,377.56 crore [23].
• Textiles, IT hardware and speciality steel have fallen short of their investment targets, while mobile phones, bulk drugs, telecom, drones and food processing are on track [14].

• This is the mechanism behind the article's "a handful of sectors" finding [1] — the scheme pays for output that firms were best placed to scale anyway.

• PLI is time-limited, so the support ends before the ecosystem is built

• Each firm gets incentives for a fixed run of years. Samsung's PLI period in mobile phones has already ended [21].
• A five-year subsidy can pull in an assembly line. It cannot by itself build chip, display and battery plants, which need much longer money [25].

10. India Chose the Sectors That Create Output, Not the Ones That Create Jobs

• The 100 million jobs target [5] needed labour-heavy industry, but the push went elsewhere
• Electronics, chemicals, autos and steel are capital-heavy: a rupee invested buys machines more than workers.

• Apparel and footwear hire far more people per rupee, and the Economic Survey 2016-17 had already argued these were India's best chance to "reclaim low skill manufacturing" [18].

• India kept losing that ground instead

• India's share of world apparel exports was 2.8% in 2023, against China 30%, Bangladesh 9% and Vietnam 7% [17].
• Bangladesh and Vietnam are far smaller economies. They won this space with simpler labour rules and duty-free access to the EU.

• Textiles is India's biggest employer after agriculture, with about 4.5 crore direct jobs [17]. Losing share here is losing exactly the jobs the target needed.

• Why this shows up in the employment data

• PLI-linked jobs are put at 14.39 lakh [4] — under 1.5% of the 100 million goal.
• Growth came in sectors that add output without adding many workers, which is why manufacturing's share of employment has not moved [1].

11. India's Own Tariff Wall Is Working Against Make in India

• Taxing imported parts makes Indian factories costlier, not stronger
• The Economic Survey 2025-26 says India's high and fragmented tariff regime (many different duty rates on many items) pushes up input costs, cuts export competitiveness, and makes firms sell at home instead of abroad [16].
• A firm assembling phones in India pays duty on the components it must import. The finished phone it competes against abroad faces no such cost [22].

• High duties on mobile device parts are directly offsetting the benefit the PLI cash gives the same firm [22].

• The Survey has flagged a tariff skew inside electronics itself — the duty structure cuts against the very electronics ambition it is meant to protect [15].

• The bigger call: stop copying import substitution
• The Survey says the next phase must shift from an import substitution model (make at home whatever we used to buy) to scale, competitiveness and deeper global value chain (GVC) integration — GVCs meaning production split across countries, each doing one stage [16][20].
• Make in India was built as a "make it here instead" idea. East Asia grew by joining other countries' chains first and moving up later.

12. The Strongest Defence of Make in India, and What It Leaves Out

• The fair case for the government
• Twelve years ago India assembled almost no phones for export; mobile exports went from ₹22,870 crore in FY21 to about ₹2 lakh crore in FY25 [6].
• PLI has drawn real money: ₹2.16 lakh crore of investment [4]. Under the new GVA series, manufacturing has grown faster than the whole economy in all three years with data [1].

• Ecosystems take time. Even at 18–20% value addition, an assembly base is the first step every East Asian producer went through [11].

• What the defence cannot cover

• The targets were about shares, not sizes — 25% of GDP, 100 million jobs [5]. A share only rises if manufacturing grows faster than everything else, for many years together. That has not happened [1].
• The gap between manufacturing and overall growth in the new series is already shrinking fast [1], and on IIP manufacturing was slower than the overall index in the last two years [1].
• So the honest verdict is narrower than either side claims: a real success in one sector's assembly, no change in the structure of the economy.

13. Where the Fix Has to Come From: States, Components and Duties

• Centre should cut duties on parts and machines, not just hand out subsidies
• Economic Survey 2025-26: rationalise tariffs especially on intermediates and capital goods — the parts and machines factories buy — to cut costs and join GVCs [16][20].

• Today PLI gives a firm cash with one hand while customs duty on its components takes it back with the other [22].

• States must do the land, labour and building reform, because that is where the law sits

• The Economic Survey asked for "Ease of Doing Business 2.0": states should cut compliance burden, simplify rules, and remove restrictions such as limits on women working in factory processes [19].
• MSMEs carry the heaviest compliance cost in both time and money [19]. They are also the firms that hire most workers.

• Labour and land are largely state subjects, so a Delhi scheme cannot deliver this [19].

• Shift support from assembly to components

• India is now pushing component manufacturing (ECMS) after finding that chips, displays and batteries stayed imported [25].

• Judge it by one number only: does domestic value addition rise above 18–20% [11]?

• Bring back the labour-heavy sectors deliberately

• Economic Survey backs a shift to man-made fibre (MMF) textiles, where world demand has moved and India lags [17].
• India's 2.8% apparel share against Vietnam's 7% [17] is a policy choice, not a natural limit — it needs FTA access to the EU and UK plus simpler factory rules [18].

14. Anchors for Answers

• Data: Domestic value addition in Indian mobile phone manufacturing is only 18–20%, against 38–40% in the largest producing country [11][12]
• Data: GVA-to-GVO ratio for telecom equipment including smartphones is 8.86%, among the lowest of all Indian industries [12]
• Data: Only ₹28,748 crore of PLI incentive had actually been disbursed across all 14 schemes up to December 2025 [13]
• Data: India's share of world apparel exports was 2.8% in 2023, versus China 30%, Bangladesh 9%, Vietnam 7% [17]
• Data: India's 2024 trade deficit was $23.5 bn in chips, $4.3 bn in display panels, $2.7 bn in batteries [25]
• Report/Committee: Economic Survey 2025-26 — tariff skew hurts electronics; shift from import substitution to GVC integration [15][16][20]
• Report/Committee: Economic Survey 2024-25 — "Ease of Doing Business 2.0", state-level land, labour and building deregulation [19]
• Report/Committee: Economic Survey 2016-17, Chapter 7, "Clothes and Shoes: Can India Reclaim Low Skill Manufacturing?" [18]
• Comparison: Vietnam and Bangladesh took the labour-heavy apparel space China vacated, using simpler labour rules and duty-free EU access, while India's share stayed at 2.8% [17][18]
• Scheme: Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) — the shift from subsidising assembly to subsidising components [25]
• Scheme: PLI, 14 sectors — incentives are time-limited per firm; Samsung's mobile PLI period has already ended [21]

15. Mains Relevance

• GS-III: Indian Economy, covering industrial policy, investment models, growth and employment, and infrastructure.
• GS-II: government policies and interventions.
• Likely questions:
• Twelve years after Make in India, manufacturing's share in GDP, jobs and exports has barely moved. Examine the reasons and suggest reforms. (15 marks)
• Critically evaluate the PLI scheme as an instrument of industrial policy. (10 marks)
• Why has India failed to replicate an East Asian manufacturing-led growth path? (15 marks)

16. Related Topics to Study Next

• PLI schemes: the main incentive tool and its sectoral concentration.
• GDP/GVA and IIP base revision: needed to interpret old-series versus new-series claims.
• National Manufacturing Policy: an earlier target of a 25% share.
• Labour codes and the employment-intensity debate: they bear on the job-creation shortfall.
• Export competitiveness, trade agreements and global value chains: the export-share question.
• Ease of doing business, logistics and infrastructure: the enabling environment.
• Electronics manufacturing: the flagship success story.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Old versus new series: the article's conclusions differ by series, so do not quote a conclusion without naming the series.
• Target years: 2022 versus 2025. Many sources cite 2022 first.
• PLI figures: investment and output numbers differ by date (₹1.32 lakh crore in June 2024 versus ₹2.16 lakh crore later). Quote the date with the figure.
• GDP versus GVA: the 16.7% to 15.9% figure is a GDP share. The BusinessLine article uses GVA, so keep the two separate.
• Launch versus PLI: Make in India began in 2014 and PLI in 2020. PLI is one tool within MII, not a separate scheme.