SC advocate seeks to file contempt plea against CEC

1. At a Glance

• Criminal contempt action is being sought against CEC Gyanesh Kumar by SC advocate Brajesh Singh. It follows a media report alleging a "complete breakdown of multi-member consensus" within the Election Commission (EC). The allegations are unproven. [1]
• The core issue is whether the CEC is only primus inter pares (first among equals) or has absolute authority over the multi-member EC. [1]
• It links three UPSC themes: Article 324 (EC structure), the 2023 CEC/EC Act (collective functioning), and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (AG consent gate). [2][3][4]

2. Why in the News

• On Thursday (24 Sept 2026), Brajesh Singh sought the Attorney-General's statutory consent to initiate criminal contempt against CEC Gyanesh Kumar. [1]
• He cited a media report alleging "deep structural subversions". It says Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi registered written objections at least 14 times over ~10 months. [1]
• He argued the alleged actions violated court precedents requiring the EC to function through institutional consensus. [1]
• The claims come from a media report and the petitioner's submission; they are not findings. [1]

3. Background & Evolution

• Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the EC. It comprises the CEC and such number of ECs as the President may fix. [2]
• The CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 was introduced in Rajya Sabha on 10 Aug 2023. It repeals the 1991 Act. [2]
• The 2023 Act is Act No. 49 of 2023 on India Code. [3]
• The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act 70 of 1971) sets the procedure for contempt, including Section 15. [4]
• Background not from the retrieved sources: the EC became multi-member in 1993, and Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023) set an interim selection panel.

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The 2023 Act's majority-decision rule contradicts any claim of absolute CEC authority. [2]
• Sec. 15 makes the AG a gatekeeper. Private persons cannot directly move the SC for criminal contempt without consent. [4]
• Whether alleged internal EC dissent is "contempt" of SC precedent is doubtful. Contempt needs scandalising, prejudicing or obstructing justice. This is analytical, not sourced.

Ethical / Governance

• Recorded dissent by ECs (14 times in ~10 months, as alleged) points to weak collegiality and transparency. [1]
• The AG's discretion is a political-legal pressure point, as AG is a government appointee. This is analytical, not sourced.

Administrative

• Majority rule means the CEC can be outvoted by two ECs. Written objections would matter for institutional records. [1][2]

Institutional Independence

• The Selection Committee composition (executive-heavy) is a recurring critique of the 2023 Act. [2]

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 10 Aug 2023: Bill introduced in Rajya Sabha (base context). [2]
• 24 Sept 2026: Advocate seeks AG consent for contempt against the CEC. [1]
• The AG's response is not reported in the available source. [1]

7. Prelims Hooks

• Article 324 deals with the Election Commission's superintendence, direction and control of elections. [2]
• The 2023 Act replaced the 1991 Act. [2]
• The Selection Committee is the PM + Cabinet Minister + LoP (Lok Sabha). [2]
• EC disagreements are decided by majority. [2]
• Contempt of Courts Act: Act 70 of 1971. [4]
• Sec. 15: criminal contempt in the SC needs the AG/SG or their written consent. [4]
• Criminal contempt cases must be heard by a bench of at least 2 judges. [4]
• For High Courts, the Advocate-General is the equivalent. [4]
• The CEC is primus inter pares, not superior to other ECs. [1]
• SC Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt, 1975, exist. [4]

8. Why This Probably Does Not Count as Contempt

• Criminal contempt has only three doors, and this case fits none of them
• The law recognises criminal contempt when an act (i) scandalises the court, (ii) prejudices a case that is going on, or (iii) interferes with the administration of justice in some other way [5].
• The allegation here is that the CEC ignored an earlier Supreme Court view on how the Election Commission (EC) should work together [1].

• Not following the spirit of a past judgment is not the same as insulting a court, spoiling a live case, or blocking a judge's work. It normally goes to a writ petition (a direct case in court asking for the law to be enforced), not a contempt case.

• Contempt of a judgment usually means disobeying a specific order given to you

• The EC was not a party told by any order to record dissent in a fixed way [1].

• So there is no clear command that was broken — and without a command, a contempt court has nothing to measure the behaviour against.

• The numbers show criminal contempt is meant to be rare

• Across all High Courts and the Supreme Court, about 96,993 civil contempt cases were pending, but only 583 criminal contempt cases [5].
• Civil contempt (disobeying an order) is the ordinary route. Criminal contempt is the exception, kept for attacks on the court itself.

9. The Case for the Petitioner, and Where It Breaks

• The strongest version of his argument is real, not silly
• The Supreme Court has treated the EC as a body that must work by institutional consensus — that is, by talking things out and deciding together, not by one person deciding [1].
• The 2023 Act writes the same idea into law: business is done unanimously as far as possible, and only if members differ is it settled by majority [2].

• If a CEC simply overrode two colleagues 14 times in about 10 months, as the report alleges, that is not a small procedure mistake. It would empty out both the judgment and the statute [1].

• But two things break the contempt route

• The allegations come from a media report and a petitioner's own submission. They are not findings by any court or inquiry [1].

• Even if every word were true, the remedy is a court order forcing the EC to follow the majority rule under the 2023 Act [2] — not a criminal punishment on one officer.

• What is worth conceding — a contempt plea is being used because there is no other quick way for an outsider to force a constitutional body to explain its internal conduct. That gap is the actual story.

10. The Attorney-General Is the Gate, and the Gate Has a Problem

• No private citizen can walk into the Supreme Court with criminal contempt
• Under Section 15, the case must be brought by the Attorney-General (AG) or Solicitor-General, or by a person carrying their written consent, which has to be attached to the petition [4].

• So the petition here does not exist yet. Only a request for permission exists [1].

• Why the gate was built — the Law Commission of India, in its 274th Report (2018), kept criminal contempt unchanged partly because the Act has built-in safeguards that stop the power from being used carelessly [5]. The AG's consent is one such filter: it keeps angry, attention-seeking petitions out.

• Why the same gate is awkward here
• The AG is appointed by the President on the government's advice and is the government's own law officer (Article 76).
• The CEC is appointed by a Selection Committee in which two of three members — the Prime Minister and a Cabinet Minister — come from the government side [2].
• So a government law officer decides whether a case may proceed against an officer chosen mainly by the government. Whatever he decides, the decision will look political to one side.
• There is no appeal written into Section 15 against a refusal of consent [4], and the AG is not required to give reasons.

11. Dissent Exists Inside the EC, But Nobody Outside Can See It

• The 2023 Act tells us how a decision is taken, not how it is shown to the public
• The Act says disagreements are settled by majority opinion [2].
• It says nothing about publishing the minority view along with the order [2].

• Result: an Election Commissioner can write an objection, lose the vote, and the public sees only a clean unanimous-looking order.

• That is exactly why this story reached us through a leak

• The claim of 14 written objections in about 10 months is known only because a newspaper reported it, not because the EC disclosed anything [1].

• A system where the only way to learn of internal disagreement is a media leak cannot be called transparent.

• Why it matters more for the EC than for other bodies

• The EC's orders — on the Model Code of Conduct, on candidates, on poll dates — are often taken during an election, when there is no time for a court to review them.
• If the reasoning of the losing side is never visible, neither voters nor judges can test whether the majority decided fairly.

12. Fixes That Do Not Need a Constitutional Amendment

• The Election Commission should publish minority opinions with its orders
• The 2023 Act already accepts that members can differ and that majority decides [2]. Publishing the dissent adds no new power; it only makes the existing rule visible.

• This is how the Supreme Court itself works — a dissenting judge's reasons are printed alongside the majority — and the EC is expected to act in a court-like way when deciding complaints.

• The Attorney-General should give written reasons when refusing or granting consent

• Section 15 requires the consent to be in writing and attached to the petition [4], but it does not require reasons [4].

• A short recorded reason would let the public see whether refusal was on legal grounds or on convenience, without changing the law's design.

• Parliament should close the gap the Law Commission left open

• The Law Commission's 274th Report (2018) chose to keep "scandalising the court" because India still sees many criminal contempt filings, unlike the United Kingdom, which removed the offence after its last such case in 1931 [5].
• The Commission also noted that the higher courts' contempt power comes from the Constitution itself, so trimming the Act would not remove the power [5].

• The practical lesson for an aspirant: the fix for misuse of contempt is not abolishing it, but narrowing who may set it in motion and forcing reasons at every step.

• Restore an outside voice in the Selection Committee — the executive holds two of three seats today [2]. Adding a member not chosen by the government (the arrangement the Supreme Court had set up in Anoop Baranwal, 2023, before the Act) is the single change that would reduce how often a CEC's conduct is read as a political act.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: About 583 criminal contempt cases pending in the High Courts and Supreme Court, against roughly 96,993 civil contempt cases — criminal contempt is the rare exception [5]
• Data: Two Election Commissioners allegedly filed written objections at least 14 times in about 10 months [1]
• Report/Committee: Law Commission of India, 274th Report (2018), Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — recommended no change to Section 2 [5]
• Law/Case: Article 324 (EC's superintendence, direction and control); Article 76 (Attorney-General); Section 15, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (AG/SG consent gate) [4]; CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 (Act 49 of 2023) [3]; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023)
• Comparison: The United Kingdom abolished the offence of "scandalising the court"; its last such case was in 1931, while India still sees regular criminal contempt filings [5]
• Definition to quote: Criminal contempt = scandalising the court, or prejudicing a judicial proceeding, or interfering with the administration of justice in any other manner [5]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: Constitutional bodies; appointment, powers and functions of statutory and quasi-judicial bodies; judiciary; accountability.
• Plausible questions:
• "The Election Commission is a multi-member body but the CEC is only first among equals." Discuss with reference to the 2023 Act.
• Examine the role of the Attorney-General as gatekeeper in criminal contempt proceedings.
• How can institutional consensus in constitutional bodies be safeguarded?

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Anoop Baranwal (2023) and Selection Committee: shapes the appointment debate.
• Removal of CEC/ECs: the CEC has protection similar to a Supreme Court judge.
• Contempt jurisprudence: the Prashant Bhushan case.
• Office of the Attorney-General (Art. 76): the consent role.
• Election Commission's powers under Art. 324: the T.N. Seshan case.
• Article 129: SC as a court of record.
• Model Code of Conduct: the source of EC disputes.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• The CEC's vote does not prevail; the majority does. [2]
• Do not treat the allegations as facts. They come from a media report and a petitioner. [1]
• Consent is needed from the AG/SG for the SC, but the Advocate-General for High Courts. [4]
• Mixing up the 1991 Act (repealed) with the 2023 Act (current). [2]
• Mixing up the Selection Committee (appointment) with the removal procedure.