How can institutional consensus in constitutional bodies be safeguarded?

Multi-member constitutional bodies are designed to decide collectively, not through one office-holder. Article 324 vests electoral superintendence in the Election Commission as a body, and the CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 requires its business to be transacted unanimously as far as possible, with differences decided by majority opinion [1]. Safeguarding consensus means converting this collegiality from an aspiration into an enforceable practice.

Why consensus erodes

• Unenforceable statutory language: the law states the norm but prescribes no remedy when the head overrides colleagues; the head is only primus inter pares, yet the majority rule leaves no public trace [1].
• Executive-tilted appointments: the Selection Committee for the CEC and ECs comprises the Prime Minister, a Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition — a government majority that PRS notes may undermine the ECI's independence [2].
• Narrow external accountability: criminal contempt in the Supreme Court cannot even be initiated without the Attorney-General's written consent under Section 15, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [3], and it is an exceptional route — about 583 criminal against 96,993 civil contempt cases pending in the higher judiciary [4].

Safeguards

• Publish minority opinions with the body's orders: the Act already accepts dissent and majority decision [1], so disclosure adds no new power, only transparency — vital for time-bound election orders that courts cannot review mid-poll.
• Codified rules of business: mandatory recording of written objections and reasoned majority orders.
• Balanced appointment panels: include a member not chosen by the executive, reducing the perception that a chairperson acts politically [2].
• Reasoned gatekeeping: law officers should record reasons when granting or refusing consent, since the statute requires writing but not reasons [3].
• Security of tenure and protected removal, insulating dissenting members from pressure.

Consensus survives not through goodwill but through recorded reasons, balanced appointments and visible dissent. Strengthening these — largely achievable by rules and statute rather than constitutional amendment — would align such bodies with the Law Commission's preference for internal safeguards over blunt coercive powers [4], and with the constitutional promise of free and fair, institutionally accountable governance.