"AFSPA's continued renewal reflects failure of political resolution rather than security necessity." Discuss.

Section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 allows a "disturbed area" to be notified whenever armed forces are needed to aid the civil power, without fixing any measurable test or sunset date [2]. On 25 September 2026 the Centre again extended the Act for six months in Manipur, nine Nagaland districts, and three Arunachal districts plus Namsai-area police stations [1]. Six-monthly renewal since 1958 suggests a political vacuum as much as a security threat.

Evidence of political, not security, failure

• No independent check: renewal is an executive notification needing neither parliamentary approval nor a published security review, unlike President's Rule [1][2].
• Permanence by default: Tirap, Changlang and Longding remain notified decades on [1], while removal came only where politics succeeded — Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018) [3].
• Ignored remedy: the Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005) urged repeal, shifting the powers into a new Chapter VI-A of the UAPA, 1967, so the Northeast is not singled out; the recommendation stayed "under consideration" [4].
• Accountability untouched: Section 6's sanction requirement lets the same Centre that deploys forces decide on their prosecution [2].

Where security necessity is genuine

• Soldiers lack ordinary police powers; without statutory cover, arrest and search in insurgency operations are themselves unlawful [2].
• Manipur's record cuts both ways: police-station areas were freed in 2022 [3], but ethnic violence followed and President's Rule became necessary in February 2025 [6] — withdrawal without political settlement invited relapse.
• Arunachal's notified belt hugs the Assam border, where insurgent spillover persists [1].
• Immunity is not absolute: the Supreme Court (2012) required a "reasonable nexus" between the act and duty, so private crimes are outside protection [5].

AFSPA must therefore be judged on two scales — territory covered and rights inside it. India has shrunk the map through phased withdrawal [3]; it has not reformed Section 6. The way forward is to complete political processes such as the Naga talks, strengthen State police capacity, and adopt Jeevan Reddy's route of an all-India statutory framework with time-bound, reasoned notifications — converting a permanent emergency into a genuinely exceptional one consistent with Article 21.