"Constitutional protection to the CEC should not amount to immunity from accountability." Discuss.

Article 324(5) makes the Chief Election Commissioner removable only in the same manner as a Supreme Court judge [1]. This is a shield for the institution, not a personal privilege — and a shield against removal was never meant to be a shield against answerability.

Why the protection exists

• The CEC can be removed only by a Presidential order following a motion passed by both Houses with a majority of total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting [1]; other Commissioners enjoy no such bar.
• The purpose is insulation from the government of the day, so that adverse decisions do not cost the office its holder.
• In Anoop Baranwal (2023), the Supreme Court reinforced this logic, holding that appointments to the Commission must not rest with the executive alone [3].

Where protection ends and accountability begins

• Article 324(5) speaks only of removal; it confers no immunity from ordinary criminal law [1]. A sitting SC judge, likewise protected, is not outside the penal law.
• Section 32, RP Act 1950 penalises breach of official duty in preparing or revising electoral rolls, but no court may take cognizance without a complaint by the Election Commission or State Chief Electoral Officer [2] — the accountability loop closes on the Commission itself.
• A recent plea in the Supreme Court sought an SIT and an audit of EC databases over alleged large-scale deletions under the Special Intensive Revision [4]. The allegations remain unproven, but the need to approach a court for an audit signals a transparency deficit.

The thinner protections

• Election Commissioners are removable on the CEC's recommendation alone; the Court left parity to Parliament as it requires a constitutional amendment [3].
• The 2023 Act's Selection Committee gives the government two of three seats, replacing the CJI with a Cabinet Minister [1][3] — unlike South Africa's judge-led panel or the UK's Speaker's Committee with Commons approval [3].

Independence and accountability are therefore complementary, not rival, values. The way forward lies in extending Article 324(5) protection to all Commissioners, restoring a neutral judicial voice in appointments, narrowing the Section 32 cognizance bar where the allegation is against the Commission itself, and publishing the grounds of mass deletions in machine-readable form. An Election Commission that is both secure and transparent best serves the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.