Plea in SC seeks SIT probe against CEC, audit of poll body

1. At a Glance

• A petition in the Supreme Court seeks a Judicial Inquiry Commission or SIT, headed by a retired SC judge, to probe allegations against CEC Gyanesh Kumar. It also seeks an audit of Election Commission databases [1].
• The plea's core legal claim is that the CEC has no immunity for acts lacking a "reasonable nexus" with official functions, and is answerable as an "ordinary accused" [1].
• Allegations are unproven. They come from an investigative newspaper report, and the plea is only a petition; the Court has not ruled. The excerpt available here does not name the newspaper [1].
• Relevance: the independence of a constitutional body, the CEC's removal protection under Art. 324(5), electoral roll integrity, and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR).

2. Why in the News

• On Friday, 25 Sept 2026, a petition was filed in the SC. The Hindu reported it on 26 Sept 2026, p. 3 [1].
• Petitioner: advocate Shailendra Mani Tripathi, represented by advocate Chand Qureshi [1].
• Relief sought: a high-powered Judicial Inquiry Commission or SIT headed by a retired SC judge [1].
• Scope sought: an end-to-end audit of EC databases, and a probe into the circumstances in which 13 crore names were deleted across 30 States/UTs under SIR [1].
• Legal hook: the plea says the allegations amount to a cognisable offence under Section 32, RP Act 1950 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and include tampering with the electoral roll [1].
• The plea says the allegations show no reasonable nexus with the CEC's official functions [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Art. 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission. The CEC is removable only like an SC judge [2].
• 2023 Act: the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 created a Selection Committee of the PM, a Union Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition (or leader of the largest opposition party) in the Lok Sabha. A Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary proposes the panel [2].
• Rolls: under the RP Act 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules 1960, the EC may direct that rolls be revised intensively, summarily, or partly each. An intensive revision prepares the roll afresh [3].

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The plea argues that the "ordinary accused" status follows from the absence of a nexus with official duty [1]. Against this, Art. 324(5) gives the CEC removal protection [2].
• Section 32 applies to an ERO, AERO or "other person required to perform official duty" [3]. Whether it reaches the CEC is a contested question, and the Court has not ruled on it.
• The s.32 cognizance bar requires an EC or CEO complaint [3]. This is a procedural hurdle for any prosecution based on it.

Ethical / Governance

• The petition raises institutional accountability and an audit of electoral data [1].
• Under the 2023 Act, the executive-heavy Selection Committee is a long-running concern about independence [2].

Administrative

• The plea concerns the scale and process of SIR deletions: 13 crore names across 30 States/UTs [1].
• The EC's statutory power to direct intensive revision is the legal basis for SIR-type exercises [3].

Judicial process

• The plea seeks a court-monitored inquiry rather than a police FIR [1]. Judicial acceptance is uncertain, and courts often decline to act on unverified media reports.

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 25 Sept 2026: the petition was filed in the SC seeking an SIT/Judicial Inquiry Commission [1].
• SIR reportedly led to 13 crore deletions across 30 States/UTs, per the plea [1]. This is the petitioner's figure and I could not independently verify it.
• Other 2024-26 developments (SC hearings on SIR, impeachment-notice talk) were not retrievable from the whitelist and are omitted.

7. Prelims Hooks

• CEC removal follows the SC judge procedure, under Art. 324(5) [2].
• Other ECs are removable on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• The 2023 Act's Selection Committee: PM, a Union Cabinet Minister, and the Leader of Opposition (or leader of the largest opposition party) in Lok Sabha [2].
• The Search Committee is headed by the Cabinet Secretary [2].
• Selection Committee recommendations remain valid despite a vacancy in the Committee [2].
• RP Act 1950, s.32 covers breach of official duty in electoral roll work [3].
• Courts cannot take cognizance of a s.32 offence without an EC/CEO complaint [3].
• Rolls may be revised intensively, summarily, or partly each, as the EC directs [3].
• In an intensive revision the roll is prepared afresh [3].
• The 2023 Act is Act No. 49 of 2023, per its India Code file name (a2023-49) [4].

8. The Petition Asks the Election Commission to Prosecute Its Own Head

• The law the plea leans on can only be switched on by the EC itself
• Section 32 of the RP Act 1950 punishes an official who breaks their duty while making or correcting electoral rolls [3].
• But no court can even start a case under it unless the Election Commission or the State Chief Electoral Officer files a complaint, or orders one [3].

• So the plea is asking for a prosecution that, by law, the EC must first ask for — against the person who heads the EC [1][3]. Unless the Court reads around this bar, the case stops at the door.

• The section is written for roll-level officers, not the top of the Commission

• Section 32 names the ERO, the AERO and other persons required to do duty in roll work [3].
• An SIR of the size alleged — 13 crore deletions across 30 States/UTs — is a policy direction from the Commission, not a clerk's entry [1].

• Policy directions are exactly what Article 324's power of superintendence covers [2]. A wrong policy is usually corrected by the Court, not punished as a crime.

• An SIT is a criminal investigation tool, and the material here is a news report

• The allegations come from an investigative newspaper report; nothing has been proved and the Court has not ruled [1].
• A court-monitored SIT normally follows some verified material, not a first-day petition.

9. The Strongest Argument Against the Plea — and What It Gets Wrong

• The case against the plea: if any citizen can get an SIT against the CEC by filing a petition, the protection in Article 324(5) stops meaning anything.
• The Constitution deliberately made the CEC removable only like a Supreme Court judge — both Houses, a majority of total membership, and two-thirds of those present and voting [2].
• That high bar exists so that a CEC who annoys the ruling party, or the opposition, cannot be pushed out easily.

• A criminal probe ordered on an unproved report would do the same damage as removal, with none of the safeguards.

• What the plea gets right, though: protection from removal was never meant to be protection from every form of answerability.

• Article 324(5) protects the office from being emptied by politics. It says nothing about immunity from ordinary criminal law [2].
• A judge of the Supreme Court also enjoys removal protection, yet is not placed outside the criminal law.
• So the honest answer is narrow: the CEC is not immune, but the route to test him must be one that cannot be triggered by anyone with a newspaper clipping.

10. The Bigger Hole Is the Other Two Commissioners, Not the CEC

• Two of the three people who run Indian elections have almost no job protection
• The CEC gets the Supreme Court judge level of protection [2].
• The other Election Commissioners can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone — no Parliament vote, no two-thirds majority [2][5].

• The EC decides by majority of three. If two members can be removed on one man's word, the majority is not really independent.

• The Supreme Court saw this gap and left it to Parliament

• In Anoop Baranwal (2 March 2023), the Court said appointments to the EC must not be made by the executive alone [5].
• On extending removal protection to the ECs, the Court said this is for Parliament to consider, because it needs a constitutional amendment [5].

• Parliament then passed the 2023 Act on appointments — and did not touch the removal gap [5].

• Meanwhile the appointment side moved the other way

• The 2023 Act's Selection Committee is the PM, a Union Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha [2].
• Two of those three are from the government of the day, so the government can always outvote the opposition member [5].
• The Supreme Court had asked for the Chief Justice of India in that third seat instead of the Cabinet Minister; Parliament replaced him [5].

11. How Other Countries Choose the People Who Run Their Elections

• South Africa — judges and rights bodies choose, the President only signs
• The shortlist comes from a panel chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court, with members from the Human Rights Commission, the Gender Equality Commission and the public prosecutor's office [5].

• The elected government is not on that panel at all. India's panel is mostly the elected government [5].

• United Kingdom — Parliament, not the Cabinet, controls the hiring

• Recruitment is overseen by a Speaker's Committee of MPs, and the House of Commons must approve the appointment before it is made [5].

• So the opposition can actually block a name. In India's Selection Committee the single opposition member can be outvoted [5].

• Canada — the Chief Electoral Officer is chosen by a resolution of the House of Commons [5].

• United States — the President appoints and the Senate confirms [5].
• What this tells an aspirant: every one of these systems puts either a judge or the full legislature between the ruling party and the election watchdog. India did that only between 2023 and the 2023 Act [5].

12. Fixes That Do Not Need a Court to Order an SIT

• Parliament should extend Article 324(5) protection to the other Election Commissioners
• This is not a new idea. The Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal (2023) specifically pointed to it and said it is Parliament's job [5].
• It needs a constitutional amendment, because the present wording protects only the CEC [2][5].

• Effect: an EC who disagrees with the CEC on something like SIR cannot be removed for it.

• Parliament should put the Chief Justice of India back in the Selection Committee

• The 2023 Act gives the government two of three seats [2][5].
• The Supreme Court's own design had the CJI in that seat, so no single party controls the choice [5].

• The UK does the same thing differently — the Commons must approve the name, so the government cannot appoint alone [5].

• Parliament should narrow the Section 32 cognizance bar

• Today, a complaint about roll-tampering can only reach a court if the EC or the State CEO authorises it [3].
• That works when the accused is an ERO. It fails completely when the complaint is about the Commission's own instructions, as this plea alleges [1][3].

• A simple carve-out — where the allegation is against the Commission itself, permission should come from someone other than the Commission — would close the loop without touching Article 324.

• The EC should publish the reasons for mass deletions in machine-readable form

• The plea had to ask a court for an end-to-end audit of EC databases, which means the data is not otherwise open to checking [1].
• In an intensive revision the roll is prepared afresh, so almost every voter's entry is re-decided at once [3].
• Publishing the ground of each deletion turns an audit into something any citizen or party can do, instead of something only an SIT can do.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 13 crore names reportedly deleted across 30 States/UTs under SIR — the petitioner's figure, not an official one [1]
• Law/Case: Article 324(5) (CEC removal like a Supreme Court judge) [2]; Section 32, RP Act 1950 and its EC/CEO cognizance bar [3]; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2 March 2023) — EC appointments must not rest with the executive alone [5]
• Report/Committee: PRS Legislative Brief on the CEC and Other ECs Bill, 2023 — flags the government majority on the Selection Committee and the missing removal protection for ECs [5]
• Comparison: South Africa — shortlist by a panel chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court, with no ruling-party member; United Kingdom — Speaker's Committee of MPs oversees recruitment and the Commons must approve [5]
• Scheme: Special Intensive Revision (SIR) — uses the EC's power under the RP Act 1950 to order an intensive revision, in which the roll is prepared afresh [3]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: constitutional bodies; the Election Commission; the RP Acts; appointment to constitutional posts and their accountability; electoral reforms.
• GS-IV: integrity and accountability of public institutions.
• Likely stems:
• "Constitutional protection to the CEC should not amount to immunity from accountability." Discuss.
• Examine the legal framework and controversies around the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls.
• Evaluate the 2023 Act's appointment mechanism against the goal of an independent Election Commission.

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Art. 324 and EC structure: the constitutional basis of the Commission.
• Anoop Baranwal (2023) judgment: the interim appointment committee, later legislated by the 2023 Act. I did not retrieve this from a source and it is from memory, so verify it.
• RP Act 1950 vs 1951: rolls versus conduct of elections and disqualification.
• Judge-removal procedure (Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968): the model for CEC removal.
• Registration of Electors Rules 1960: the procedure for roll preparation and revision [3].
• BNS: replaced the IPC and is relevant to any criminal prosecution.
• PIL and locus standi: the jurisdiction the petition invokes.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Allegation vs finding: the claims are unproven. Do not present them as facts.
• Removal: the CEC is removed like an SC judge, but other ECs are removed on the CEC's recommendation [2].
• Statute: s.32 is in the RP Act 1950 (rolls), not the 1951 Act (elections) [3].
• Section 32 scope: it targets officials in roll preparation. Applying it to the CEC is the petitioner's contention.
• Appointment: the 2023 Act's committee includes a Union Cabinet Minister, not the CJI [2].