SC must ensure consistency in its decisions: senior advocate

1. At a Glance

• Core issue: Growing discrepancies in judgments delivered by different benches of the Supreme Court of India on similar legal questions — a structural problem in judicial discipline. [1]
• Senior advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan called for judicial restraint and consistency, warning against judges applying legally irrelevant principles (e.g., "public interest" as a catch-all) and making jingoistic remarks from the Bench. [1]
• Directly relevant to UPSC: GS-II (Judiciary, Rule of Law, Judicial Accountability) and legal-constitutional dimension of governance. High probability of Mains question stems.
• The debate touches Article 141 (binding precedent), stare decisis, and constitutional limits of judicial power — all examinable static topics. [2]

2. Why in the News

• Date: Statement made and reported on 1 March 2026 (Sunday edition, The Hindu, Page 7, International Print Edition). [1]
• Triggering event: A participant query at a legal/academic forum about growing inconsistencies in Supreme Court judgments prompted senior advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan's critique. [1]
• He highlighted two specific concerns: 1. Judges applying "public interest" as a principle with no legal relevance to the dispute at hand. [1] 2. "Jingoistic" remarks from the Bench about protecting India's international reputation — amounting to the judge "acting like the Prime Minister." [1]

3. Background & Evolution

• 1950: Article 141 of the Constitution established — "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India." [2]
• Doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by things decided") adopted from common law; ensures predictability and equal treatment under law.
• Bench strength hierarchy evolved through judicial practice:
• Single-judge → Division Bench (2 judges) → Full Bench (3) → Constitution Bench (5+).

• A larger bench's ruling overrides a smaller bench on the same question of law. [2]

• Per incuriam doctrine: A ruling made in ignorance of a relevant statute or binding precedent is not considered good law. [2]

• Ratio decidendi vs. obiter dicta: Only the ratio (core legal reasoning) is strictly binding; obiter (incidental remarks) is persuasive only. [2]
• Historically, Presidential References under Article 143 and curative/review petitions have been used to correct inconsistent SC rulings.
• The problem of contradictory SC bench rulings is not new — the 1994 S.P. Gupta case and 2015 NJAC judgment both generated debates about judicial overreach and institutional discipline.

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• Article 141 mandates that SC decisions bind all courts; but it does not explicitly govern intra-SC consistency between co-equal benches. [2]
• When two Division Benches (of equal strength) deliver contradictory rulings, neither technically overrides the other — a Constitution Bench reference becomes necessary.
• Gopal Sankaranarayanan's critique implies judges are expanding the ambit of judicial reasoning beyond the lis (dispute) before them — violating the principle that courts must not adjudicate on hypotheticals or policy matters. [1]
• Judicial overreach — courts acting like the executive ("judge acting like the Prime Minister") — is a longstanding constitutional concern, with the basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) itself being a product of judicial creativity that some see as overreach. [1]

Ethical / Governance

• Judicial accountability without impeachment: India has no simple mechanism to discipline sitting SC judges — impeachment under Article 124(4) requires a special majority in Parliament, making it practically rare.
• Inconsistent rulings erode rule of law and legal certainty — litigants face forum-shopping and contradictory binding obligations.
• "Jingoistic" observations from the Bench risk politicising the judiciary, blurring separation of powers. [1]
• In-house procedure (1999) for complaints against judges lacks statutory backing, weakening accountability.

Administrative

• Supreme Court currently handles lakhs of pending cases; inconsistency compounds delays as lower courts await clarification from larger benches.
• Reference to Constitution Bench is time-consuming; backlog in constitution bench matters runs into years.
• The National Court Management Systems (NCMS) framework (2012) attempted systemic reforms but did not address substantive inconsistency in rulings.

Historical

• A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988): SC itself acknowledged it had passed an order without jurisdiction — rare instance of self-correction.
• Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002): SC introduced curative petition as a remedy post-review dismissal, partly to address justice-defeating inconsistencies.
• British common law's Practice Statement (1966) allowed the House of Lords (now UK Supreme Court) to depart from its own precedents — India's SC does not formally require such a statement but exercises similar inherent power.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 1 March 2026: Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan publicly called for SC bench consistency at a legal forum; reported by The Hindu. [1]
• Ongoing (2025–26): Multiple SC benches have delivered divergent rulings on issues like forest rights, arbitration timelines, and bail jurisprudence, prompting academic and Bar commentary.
• 2025: Chief Justice-led initiative to constitute more Constitution Benches to clear backlog of referred questions — institutional acknowledgment of the inconsistency problem.
• Electoral bonds case (2024) and demonetisation judgment (2023): Both generated debates on whether SC adequately distinguished its judicial role from policy evaluation.

7. Prelims Hooks

1. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution declares that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India. [2]
2. Only the ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court judgment is strictly binding; obiter dicta is merely persuasive. [2]
3. A judgment passed in ignorance of a relevant statute or binding precedent is called per incuriam and does not bind future courts. [2]
4. When two co-equal benches of the SC deliver conflicting rulings, the matter must be referred to a larger/Constitution Bench for resolution. [2]
5. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprises a minimum of 5 judges and is convened for substantial questions of constitutional interpretation (Article 145(3)).
6. The SC's power to review its own judgments is provided under Article 137 of the Constitution.
7. The SC's advisory jurisdiction (non-binding opinions for the President) is exercised under Article 143.
8. Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan stated that applying "public interest" without legal relevance to the dispute is a misuse of judicial power. [1]
9. He criticised "jingoistic" remarks from the Bench on India's international reputation as amounting to the judge acting like the Prime Minister. [1]
10. The curative petition mechanism (post-review) was established by the SC in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) to prevent gross miscarriage of justice.
11. Removal of a Supreme Court judge requires an address by Parliament (special majority) under Article 124(4) — known as impeachment.
12. The in-house procedure (1999) for complaints against SC judges has no statutory backing.
13. The SC's Special Leave Petition jurisdiction flows from Article 136 — broadest appellate power of any apex court globally.

8. Mains Relevance

Plausible Mains Question Stems:

1. "Judicial consistency is the cornerstone of the rule of law. Examine the constitutional mechanisms available to address contradictory judgments by co-equal benches of the Supreme Court of India." (GS-II, 15 marks)
2. "The line between judicial review and judicial overreach is thin but constitutionally significant. Discuss with reference to recent controversies over observations made by Supreme Court benches." (GS-II, 10 marks)
3. "Article 141 ensures the binding nature of Supreme Court law on subordinate courts, but does not guarantee consistency within the Supreme Court itself. Critically analyse." (GS-II, 15 marks)

9. Related Topics to Study Next

10. Common Errors / Trap Areas

1. Confusing Article 141 with Article 137: Art. 141 = SC's law binding on all courts; Art. 137 = SC's power to review its own judgments. Do not mix them up.
2. Assuming obiter dicta is binding: Only ratio decidendi binds; obiter is persuasive — a common MCQ trap.
3. "Larger bench" ≠ Full Bench: A "larger bench" simply means more judges than the conflicting bench; a Constitution Bench is specifically 5+ judges for substantial constitutional questions (Art. 145(3)) — these are not synonymous.
4. Judicial restraint ≠ judicial passivism: Restraint means not going beyond the lis; it does not mean courts cannot be activist within their jurisdiction — aspirants conflate these two concepts.
5. Impeachment procedure: Article 124(4) requires a special majority in both Houses plus an address to the President; it is not a simple majority process — frequently confused with ordinary removal.