The line between judicial review and judicial overreach is thin but constitutionally significant. Discuss with reference to recent controversies over observations made by Supreme Court benches.

Q. The line between judicial review and judicial overreach is thin but constitutionally significant. Discuss with reference to recent controversies over observations made by Supreme Court benches. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Judicial review — testing executive and legislative action against the Constitution — is part of its basic structure; overreach begins where a court steps beyond the lis before it into policy or rhetoric. Recent criticism of stray observations from Supreme Court Benches shows how thin, yet constitutionally decisive, that line is.

Judicial review: a constitutional mandate - Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts, and Article 145(3) reserves substantial constitutional questions for a Constitution Bench of five or more judges [1]. - The basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) and the striking down of the NJAC (2015) illustrate review used to protect constitutional supremacy and judicial independence [3]. - Articles 137 and 143 allow self-correction through review and Presidential Reference — review is thus a bounded, not open-ended, power [1].

Where review slides into overreach - Senior advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan cautioned that judges invoke "public interest" as a catch-all even where it has no legal relevance to the dispute [2]. - He criticised "jingoistic" remarks from the Bench about India's international reputation, amounting to a judge "acting like the Prime Minister" [2]. - Such remarks are obiter dicta, not binding ratio, yet they are widely reported — blurring separation of powers and inviting the charge that courts evaluate policy, as debated after the demonetisation and electoral bonds verdicts [3].

Why the distinction matters constitutionally - Legal certainty: divergent rulings by co-equal Benches bind no one conclusively, forcing time-consuming larger-Bench references amid heavy pendency [4]. - Accountability gap: removal under Article 124(4) needs a special majority, and the 1999 in-house procedure lacks statutory backing [1].

Judicial review sustains the rule of law only while it remains disciplined and predictable. Judicial restraint — confining reasoning to the dispute, prompt Constitution Bench references, and sparing use of extra-judicial observations — would preserve both the Court's authority and public confidence, keeping Article 141's promise of a single, consistent law for the whole country.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The Constitution of India, Ministry of Law and Justice (as on 11 November 2025) — Articles 141, 137, 143, 145(3) and 124(4) 2. “SC must ensure consistency in its decisions: senior advocate”, The Hindu, 1 March 2026 — Gopal Sankaranarayanan on "public interest" and jingoistic Bench remarks 3. Judgments, Supreme Court of India — Kesavananda Bharati (1973), NJAC (2015), demonetisation and electoral bonds verdicts 4. National Judicial Data Grid — Supreme Court of India — pendency of cases before the Supreme Court