Viksit Bharat- G RAM G

1. At a Glance

• VB-G RAM G stands for Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin). It is a new law on rural wage jobs that repeals and replaces MGNREGA, 2005 [3][4].
• It gives a legal guarantee of 125 days of wage work every financial year to each rural household whose adult members volunteer for unskilled manual work. MGNREGA guaranteed 100 days [1][3].
• It changes the programme's design in three ways [3]:
• funding moves from demand-driven to normative (fixed) allocation;
• the scheme becomes a Centrally Sponsored Scheme with 60:40 Centre–State cost sharing;

• all works are planned through Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans (VGPPs).

• Why it matters for UPSC: it is one of the biggest changes to social protection since 2005. It raises questions on federal finances, rights-based welfare, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and digital governance, and maps to GS-II and GS-III.

2. Why in the News

• 16 Dec 2025: the Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha. It passed both Houses on 18 Dec 2025 [2].
• Dec 2025: the President gave assent. The PIB backgrounder on the assent is dated 22 Dec 2025 [3][5].
• 1 Jul 2026: the Act came into force in all rural areas, and MGNREGA was repealed from the same date [4].
• 29 Sep 2026: PIB published the first progress report (figures as of 24 Sep 2026). It said the switch from MGNREGA was "seamless and disruption-free" [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Rationale: the government argues that rural India has changed since 2005 [3]:
• poverty fell from 27.1% (2011-12) to 5.3% (2022-23);
• rural livelihoods are more diverse and more digital;

• so MGNREGA's open-ended, demand-driven design "no longer aligns" with current realities.

• MGNREGA's problems, as cited by the government [3]:

• works recorded but not found on the ground;
• spending that did not match physical progress;
• machines used in labour-intensive works;
• digital attendance being bypassed;

• few households completing the full 100 days after the pandemic.

• MGNREGA's gains, as acknowledged [3]:

• women's participation rose from 48% (FY14) to 58.15% (FY26);
• wide rollout of the Aadhaar-Based Payment System (ABPS);
• near-universal electronic wage payments;

• more geo-tagged assets.

• Earlier wage-employment programmes, in order [3]:

• Rural Manpower Programme (1960s)
• Crash Scheme for Rural Employment (1971)
• Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act (1977), which introduced a statutory right to work
• NREP and RLEGP (1980s)
• Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (1993), into which NREP and RLEGP were merged
• Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (1999)
• Employment Assurance Scheme and Food for Work Programme

• MGNREGA (2005)

• Milestones:

• Bill introduced: 16 Dec 2025 [2]
• Passed by both Houses: 18 Dec 2025 [2]
• Presidential assent: Dec 2025 [5]
• Came into force: 1 Jul 2026 [4]
• First progress release: 29 Sep 2026 [1]

4. Core Static Facts

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Economic

• Guaranteed days rise by 25% (100 to 125). The government expects higher household earnings, more village-level spending and less distress migration [3].
• A fixed (normative) allocation makes budgeting predictable. The flip side is that the State pays for any demand above that allocation, which could cap employment in poorer or high-demand States [2][3].
• The pause of up to 60 days during peak farming seasons is meant to keep farm labour available and prevent wage inflation [3].

Social

• Women made up 61.65% of participation in 2026-27, up from 58.15% under MGNREGA in FY26 [1][3].
• Workers got employment on demand: 2.81 crore people from about 2.23 crore households [1].
• The unemployment allowance continues as a mandatory safeguard [3].

Legal / Constitutional

• The right to work stays statutory (a "guarantee"). It links to DPSP Article 41 (right to work).
• Paying for demand above the normative allocation, and for the unemployment allowance, falls on the States. This moves the cost of honouring the legal right away from the Centre [2][3].
• The Centre can investigate complaints, suspend fund releases where serious irregularities are found, and order corrective action [3].

Governance / Federalism

• A 40% State share (versus MGNREGA's mainly central funding) puts a heavier fiscal load on States. The government says this is balanced by predictable allocations and extra help during disasters [3].
• Gram Sabha approval of VGPPs and six-monthly social audits strengthen PRIs, in the spirit of the 73rd Amendment. At the same time, VGPPs must fit national systems such as PM Gati Shakti [1][3].

Scientific / Technological

• Workers are verified through Face Authentication and biometric e-KYC and attendance [1].
• Works are tracked through geo-tagging, electronic Measurement Books (e-MB) and mobile monitoring [1].
• Planning uses GIS, Yuktdhara and PM Gati Shakti, supported by AI analytics and real-time dashboards [1].

Environmental

• Water security and mitigation of extreme weather are two of the four thematic areas. Examples include water harvesting, flood drainage, soil conservation and groundwater recharge [1][3].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 16–18 Dec 2025: Bill introduced and passed by Parliament [2].
• Dec 2025: Presidential assent [5]. PIB backgrounder released on 22 Dec 2025 [3].
• 1 Jul 2026: Act commenced across all rural areas; MGNREGA repealed [4].
• FY 2026-27 funding: interim allocation of ₹93,841 crore to States/UTs. A Mother Sanction of ₹25,880 crore was issued as the first instalment [1].
• Progress as of 24 Sep 2026 [1]:
• 10.88 crore active workers
• 31.69 crore+ person-days
• 2.83 lakh assets created
• 97.17 lakh works under execution
• 73.24 lakh approved works kept ready for future demand
• about 20.16 lakh active worksites
• nearly 2.31 lakh Gram Panchayats executing works
• 3.76 crore DBT transactions
• average wage ₹283.24 per day

7. Prelims Hooks

• VB-G RAM G guarantees 125 days of wage work per rural household per financial year [1].
• The Act repealed MGNREGA, 2005, with effect from 1 July 2026 [4].
• The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 16 Dec 2025 and passed by both Houses on 18 Dec 2025 [2].
• Cost sharing: 60:40 in general, 90:10 for NE and Himalayan States, 100% Centre for UTs without legislatures [3].
• States may announce a pause of up to 60 days a year during peak sowing and harvesting [2].
• The admin expenditure ceiling rose from 6% to 9% [3].
• Wages are paid weekly, or at the latest within a fortnight [3].
• An unemployment allowance is payable if work is not given within 15 days; the States pay it [3].
• The VGPP Framework lists 318 types of permissible works under 4 thematic areas [1].
• Assets are aggregated into the Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack [3].
• Gram Panchayats must carry out at least 50% of works by cost [3].
• Social audits are held at least once every six months [3].
• The job card is called the Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Card [1].
• The scheme changed from a Central Sector scheme to a Centrally Sponsored scheme [3].
• Women's participation in 2026-27 was 61.65% [1].

8. Why 125 Days on Paper May Not Mean More Work

• Most families never reached even the old 100-day limit
• Over the last ten years, MGNREGA gave each working household about 48 days of work a year on average [7].
• Fewer than 10% of these households completed the full 100 days [7].

• So the legal ceiling was never the real limit. Raising it to 125 days [1] does not, on its own, raise the average.

• Workers were often paid less than the wage the government itself fixed

• The notified wage rate is the daily wage the Centre announces for each State.
• In 2025-26, workers in 20 of 31 States and UTs got less than this rate. In Rajasthan the notified rate was ₹281, but the average wage actually paid was ₹221 [7].

• The new law keeps the same system, with the Centre notifying wage rates [7]. So the first-year average of ₹283.24 a day [1] should be checked against each State's notified rate. It should not be read as one national success figure.

• The wage formula still uses an old base year

• MGNREGA wages are linked to CPI-AL (Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers). It tracks price changes for families that live on farm labour [7].
• The Standing Committee on Rural Development (2024) said wages are too low because the formula still uses 2009-10 as its base year. It repeated this in 2025 [7].
• Extra days at a low wage add less to family income than '25% more work' suggests.

9. Who Pays When More People Ask for Work

• The Centre used to pay almost all the cost
• Under MGNREGA, the Centre paid 100% of wages and 75% of material costs [7].
• Wages were about 70% of all spending. So over the last five years the Centre paid around 90% of the total [7].

• The split is now 60:40. PRS notes that States' spending on the scheme may rise [7].

• The States' share is large in rupees

• The government estimates the yearly need at ₹1,51,282 crore, with ₹95,692.31 crore from the Centre [3].

• That leaves about ₹55,590 crore for States and UTs. This comes before any spending above the normative allocation.

• Each State's share comes from a tax formula, not from the need for work

• Normative allocation means the Centre fixes in advance how much money each State gets.
• The draft Rules say the Centre will use the parameters (measures) that the 16th Finance Commission recommended for dividing central taxes among States [2].

• That formula was built to share tax money. It does not measure how many people in a State need work in a bad year.

• The cap hurts most during a crisis

• In 2020-21, MGNREGA spending jumped 55%, as migrant workers returned to their villages during COVID-19 [7].
• Under the old law, central money grew with demand. Under the new law, the State pays for any spending above its allocation [3].

• The government promises extra help during disasters [3]. But this help is not automatic, and the law sets no rule for when it applies.

• Weaker States lose twice

• The Economic Survey 2023-24 found that the work a State gives depends on its institutional capacity, meaning its staff and planning ability. States with more capacity run the scheme better [7].
• Poorer States have both less capacity and less money to pay 40% plus any extra spending.

10. Why a State May Find It Cheaper Not to Record Demand

• The unemployment allowance was rarely paid even before
• From 2019-20 to 2024-25, only about 8% of the allowance owed was actually paid [7].
• In 2025-26, only 2% had been paid by February 2026. Of the 14 States that owed it, only Assam, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh paid anything [7].

• Across the whole country, States paid only ₹7.8 lakh in 2023 and ₹90,000 in 2024 [7].

• How the allowance was avoided

• The Economic Survey 2023-24 found that, where capacity was weak, demand for work was not registered in real time [7].

• The 15-day clock starts only when a demand is recorded. If there is no record, no allowance is owed.

• The new law gives States a stronger reason to do this

• The State now pays for work above its allocation. It also pays the allowance if it does not give work [2][3].
• The State pays either way. So for a State short of money, the cheapest choice is to not record the demand at all.
• On paper the guarantee is never broken, because the demand never appears in the records.

11. Can Gram Panchayats Carry the Work the Law Gives Them?

• Social audits already fall short
• In a social audit, the Gram Sabha checks the official records against the work actually done on the ground.
• MGNREGA required these audits. Yet by December 2025, only 63% of the 2.7 lakh Gram Panchayats (GPs) had held even one audit in 2025-26 [7].

• The new law asks for an audit at least every six months [3]. Most GPs were not managing one a year.

• There are too few staff

• The Devolution Index Report 2024 (Ministry of Panchayati Raj) found that in most States, panchayat offices have fewer staff than sanctioned. On average, one Panchayat Secretary looks after 17 GPs [7].

• PRS links this staff shortage to GPs being unable to hold regular social audits [7].

• The planning work has grown

• Each GP must now prepare a VGPP that fits national platforms like PM Gati Shakti, and must carry out at least 50% of works by cost [1][3].
• With the same thin staff, plans may be drawn up from above on software, with the Gram Sabha only signing off. That weakens the grassroots planning the 73rd Amendment intended.

12. What Other Countries' Work Programmes Teach

• Ethiopia plans work for the slack farm season
• Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) gives 30 days of work per household member per year. The work is scheduled when there is little farm work [8].
• The ILO says regular, scheduled work is easier to manage than work 'on demand' [8].

• VB-G RAM G's farm-season pause of up to 60 days follows the same idea from the other side [2][3]. This point supports the government.

• A safety net and an asset-builder behave differently when work stalls

• The ILO explains that when a project is delayed, a programme built mainly for social protection (income support) keeps paying workers. A programme built mainly to create assets stops paying, to save cost [8].
• Asset-first programmes also use less labour and more materials [8].

• The new law leans towards assets: 318 types of works, a National Rural Infrastructure Stack and links to Gati Shakti [1][3]. The Rules should say which goal comes first when the two clash.

• South Africa kept no central list of workers

• South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) hired workers at each project, with no central database. This made it hard to track who had worked, and how often [8].
• MGNREGA and Ethiopia's PSNP both kept central registers [8]. The Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Card, with 15.17 crore issued [1], keeps that strength.

13. The Strongest Case for the New Law, and Where It Falls Short

• The government's best argument
• MGNREGA's 'demand-driven' promise was already weak in practice. It gave 48 days on average, fewer than 10% of households reached 100 days, and only 8% of the allowance owed was paid [7].
• The Economic Survey 2023-24 said demand under MGNREGA is not a true sign of rural distress, because it depends on how well each State can run the scheme [7].

• So open-ended central money mostly went to States that could already run the scheme well. Fixed allocations and advance planning could, in principle, do better.

• What is right about it

• It is true that the demand-driven design did not reach the weakest States well.

• The ILO warns that long-running work programmes seen as producing little of value lose political support and funding [8]. A focus on useful assets can help the programme survive.

• Where it falls short

• The answer to weak capacity is more capacity, such as staff, planning and audits. A funding cap does not fix it.
• The cap removes the one safety cushion that worked in a crisis, when spending grew 55% in 2020-21 [7].
• It also moves costs onto the States the Survey found weakest [7]. The fix and the problem do not match.

14. What the Centre, States and Panchayats Should Fix First

• The Ministry of Rural Development should update the wage base year
• This follows the Standing Committee on Rural Development's advice in 2024, repeated in 2025, to move the wage formula off the 2009-10 base [7].

• Without it, 125 days at a low wage adds little real income.

• The Ministry should make the unemployment allowance automatic

• The Standing Committee (2022) asked the Ministry, as the nodal agency (the lead ministry responsible), to make sure the allowance is paid properly [7].

• Every demand for work should be logged with a date on the digital system. Then the 15-day clock starts on its own and the allowance is triggered without a State's action.

• The Centre should write a clear rule for extra money in a crisis

• The government already promises extra help in disasters [3]. The Rules should say exactly when it applies, for example when a district is officially declared disaster-hit.

• The 55% jump in 2020-21 [7] shows how large such a spike can be.

• The Ministry of Panchayati Raj and the States should fill panchayat posts

• This responds to the Devolution Index Report 2024 finding of one Secretary for 17 GPs [7].
• Part of the higher 9% administrative cap [3] can pay for panchayat staff and independent Social Audit Units. Then six-monthly audits become possible, not just a rule on paper.

15. Anchors for Answers

• Data: MGNREGA gave about 48 days of work per household per year over the last decade; fewer than 10% of households completed 100 days [7]
• Data: Only about 8% of unemployment allowance owed was paid between 2019-20 and 2024-25; only 2% in 2025-26 [7]
• Data: Only 63% of 2.7 lakh Gram Panchayats held even one social audit in 2025-26 (till Dec 2025) [7]
• Data: Under MGNREGA the Centre paid around 90% of total spending; the new split is 60:40 [7][3]
• Report/Committee: Standing Committee on Rural Development and Panchayati Raj (2024, repeated 2025): wages inadequate, revise the 2009-10 base year [7]
• Report/Committee: Economic Survey 2023-24: work demanded reflects State capacity, not true rural distress [7]
• Report/Committee: Devolution Index Report 2024 (Ministry of Panchayati Raj): one Panchayat Secretary for 17 GPs on average [7]
• Law/Case: ILO Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (C122), cited by the ILO as a basis for rights-based work guarantees [8]
• Comparison: Ethiopia's PSNP gives 30 days per household member, scheduled in the slack farm season; South Africa's EPWP had no central worker register [8]
• Scheme: The normative allocation uses the 16th Finance Commission's tax-sharing parameters, which ties this scheme to fiscal federalism debates [2]

16. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: government policies and interventions; welfare schemes for vulnerable sections; devolution to local bodies (PRIs); fiscal federalism; transparency and accountability (social audit).
• GS-III: inclusive growth and employment; rural infrastructure; disaster management and climate resilience; use of IT in governance.
• Possible question stems: 1. The replacement of MGNREGA by the VB-G RAM G Act marks a shift from a demand-driven right to a normatively funded guarantee. Critically examine its implications for the right to work and fiscal federalism. (15 marks) 2. Discuss how Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans seek to combine grassroots participatory planning with national infrastructure platforms such as PM Gati Shakti. What challenges do they face? (10 marks) 3. Technology-driven verification in welfare delivery improves transparency but risks exclusion. Evaluate this with reference to VB-G RAM G. (10 marks)

17. Related Topics to Study Next

• MGNREGA, 2005: the predecessor; compare its demand-driven design, Schedules and social audit rules.
• PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan: the spatial platform VGPPs must integrate with.
• Yuktdhara (Bhuvan-based GIS planning portal): named as a planning tool for VGPPs.
• 73rd Amendment and Gram Sabha powers: the constitutional basis for VGPP approval and social audits.
• Centrally Sponsored Schemes vs Central Sector Schemes: the funding shift at the heart of the Act.
• DAY-NRLM: the livelihood ("Ajeevika") link and convergence with Self-Help Groups.
• Aadhaar-Based Payment System and DBT: the payment backbone and exclusion debates.
• Maharashtra EGA, 1977: the historical first statutory right to work.

18. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• 125 vs 100 days: 100 days was MGNREGA; VB-G RAM G guarantees 125 [3].
• Dates: passed and assented in Dec 2025; came into force 1 Jul 2026, not 1 Apr 2026 [2][4].
• Cost sharing: don't mix up 90:10 (NE and Himalayan States) with 100% (UTs without legislatures) [3].
• Unemployment allowance: paid by the States, not the Centre [3].
• The pause is "up to 60 days" in total per year, not a fixed 60 days, and the States announce it, not the Centre [2].
• Ministry: the nodal ministry is Rural Development. The PRS summary tool I used returned "Agriculture and Farmers Welfare", which I believe is wrong, so verify this on the PRS page.