Raksha Mantri and his South Korean counterpart hold bilateral talks on the margins of 13th ADMM-Plus

1. At a Glance

• Event: Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh held bilateral talks with South Korea's Defence Minister Kang Shin-chul on the sidelines of the 13th ADMM-Plus in Cebu, Philippines, on 28 October 2026 [1].
• What they discussed: a review of defence cooperation, a shared vision of an "open, free and inclusive" Indo-Pacific, co-development of military technologies, joint industry collaboration and maritime security [1].
• Why it matters for UPSC: it brings together India's Act East defence diplomacy, ASEAN-led security architecture (ADMM-Plus) and the India–ROK strategic partnership. The relationship is moving from buyer–seller to technology partner [1].

2. Why in the News

• 13th ADMM-Plus, chaired by the Philippines, held 28–29 October 2026 [1].
• India–ROK bilateral on its margins (28 Oct 2026). Both sides expressed satisfaction that the strategic partnership is getting stronger [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• 1992: India becomes an ASEAN dialogue partner [2].
• 12 October 2010: Inaugural ADMM-Plus held in Hanoi, Vietnam [2].
• Since 2017: ADMM-Plus meets annually [2].
• September 2019: Rajnath Singh visits Seoul and meets ROK Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo. Two agreements signed, one on defence educational exchanges and one on logistical support to each other's navies [3].
• 10 December 2020: ADMM-Plus held online from Hanoi to mark its 10th anniversary [4].
• March 2021: Singh and ROK Minister Suh Wook hold talks in New Delhi. They note that cooperation had widened across the services and in defence technology and industry [5].
• November 2024 (11th ADMM-Plus, Vientiane, Lao PDR): Singh meets ROK Minister Kim Yong-hyun. The two sides exchange an Implementing Arrangement on Air-to-Air Refuelling [6].
• 2025: 12th ADMM-Plus held in Kuala Lumpur [2].
• October 2026: 13th ADMM-Plus held in Cebu, with the India–ROK talks on its sidelines [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Full form	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus [1]
Composition	10 ASEAN members + 8 dialogue partners [1][2]
The 8 Plus countries	India, USA, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand [2]
Inaugural meeting	Hanoi, 12 Oct 2010 [2]
Frequency	Annual since 2017 [2]
13th edition	Philippines (chair), Cebu, 28–29 Oct 2026 [1]
Indian ministry	Ministry of Defence, delegation led by the Raksha Mantri [1]
Experts' Working Groups (EWGs)	7 areas: Counter-Terrorism, Maritime Security, HADR, Peacekeeping Operations, Military Medicine, Humanitarian Mine Action, Cyber Security [7]
EWG co-chair rule	Each EWG has 1 ASEAN member + 1 dialogue partner as co-chairs, for a 3-year cycle [7]
India's EWG roles	Counter-Terrorism, with Malaysia (2024–27), India's first time co-chairing it, taking over from Russia and Myanmar. Earlier, HADR with Indonesia (2021–24) [7]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Shows India's support for ASEAN centrality. India uses a multilateral platform to advance its bilateral ties efficiently [1].
• Shows that like-minded middle powers share an "open, free, inclusive" Indo-Pacific vision [1].
• Maritime security cooperation supports the safety of sea lanes, which is central to Indo-Pacific stability [1]. India has stressed freedom of navigation and overflight at earlier ADMM-Plus meetings [8].

Defence-Industrial / Technological

• The shift to co-development and joint industry collaboration fits indigenisation goals by moving from buying equipment to developing it jointly [1].
• Cooperation in defence technology and industry was already widening by 2021 [5].

Military / Operational

• Interoperability is being built step by step: navy logistics support (2019) [3] and the air-to-air refuelling arrangement (2024) [6].
• Training and professional military education: the 2019 agreement on defence educational exchanges [3].

Security (non-traditional)

• India's co-chairing of the Counter-Terrorism EWG (2024–27) gives it a role in setting the regional counter-terrorism agenda [7].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 2025: Singh attends the 12th ADMM-Plus in Kuala Lumpur [2].
• 2025: India hosts meetings of the ADMM-Plus EWG on Counter-Terrorism in New Delhi, including the 14th and later the 16th meeting with a Final Planning Conference for a Table-Top Exercise [7][9].
• 28 Oct 2026: India–ROK bilateral at the 13th ADMM-Plus, Cebu [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• ADMM-Plus = ASEAN's 10 members + 8 dialogue partners [1][2].
• The 8 Plus countries include India, US, China, Russia, Japan, ROK, Australia, NZ [2].
• First ADMM-Plus: Hanoi, 12 October 2010 [2].
• ADMM-Plus has met annually since 2017 [2].
• India became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1992 [2].
• 13th ADMM-Plus: Cebu, Philippines, 28–29 Oct 2026 [1].
• 12th ADMM-Plus: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2025) [2].
• 11th ADMM-Plus: Vientiane, Lao PDR (Nov 2024) [6].
• ADMM-Plus has 7 Experts' Working Groups, each co-chaired by an ASEAN state and a Plus country for 3 years [7].
• India and Malaysia co-chair the EWG on Counter-Terrorism (2024–27), India's first time in this role [7].
• India and Indonesia co-chaired the EWG on HADR (2021–24) [7].
• India–ROK Implementing Arrangement on Air-to-Air Refuelling exchanged in Nov 2024 [6].
• 2019 India–ROK agreements: defence educational exchanges and logistical support to each other's navies [3].
• ROK defence minister in 2026: Kang Shin-chul [1].

8. Is K9 Vajra Real Co-development, or Just Building a Korean Gun in India?

• India's biggest Korean defence deal makes a Korean design in India. It does not create a joint design.
• In December 2024, the Ministry of Defence signed a Rs 7,628.70 crore contract with L&T for K9 VAJRA-T self-propelled guns (big guns mounted on tracked vehicles) [10].
• The contract was placed under the Buy (Indian) category. That category is for buying from Indian firms, and the government presents the deal as a flagship of Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) [10].

• But the gun was designed by a Korean company, Hanwha Aerospace. Hanwha and L&T signed their own contract for 100 more K9 Vajra guns on 4 April 2025 [11].

• Why this matters for the word "co-development"

• When India builds a gun under licence (permission to copy a foreign design), the factory and the jobs are in India.
• But the design, and the right to upgrade or export the gun, can stay with the foreign company.
• Co-development means designing something new together, so both sides own the result. At Cebu it was only an aim the two ministers talked about. No named project was announced [1].

• The sources do not say what share of each gun is made in India, or whether the design was transferred to India [10][11]. So how "Indian" the K9 is remains an open question.

• What a fair answer should admit

• Licence production is a normal first step. It trains Indian workers and suppliers before joint design becomes possible.
• The test comes later: does a second-generation weapon get designed jointly, or does India simply place the next licence order?

9. Promises That Keep Being Made Again

• The 2015 upgrade already promised much of what was said at Cebu
• The May 2015 Joint Statement raised ties to a Special Strategic Partnership (a higher, closer level of partnership) [12].
• It promised annual summits, a 2+2 vice-ministerial dialogue (defence and foreign ministry officials meeting together), cooperation between shipyards for defence needs, and military education exchanges [12].
• It also invited Korea to be a privileged partner in Make in India [12].

• In 2026, the ministers again spoke of industry collaboration and co-development [1]. That means the 2015 agenda is still being talked about, not finished.

• On trade, the deadline was clear. The follow-through was slow.

• The 2015 statement set June 2016 as the target to amend the India–Korea CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, the free-trade deal between the two countries) [12].

• Ten years later, the MEA's 2025 anniversary brief still lists trade and investment as areas the two sides are reviewing [13].

• Ministers change, so personal trust does not carry over

• Rajnath Singh has dealt with four different ROK defence ministers between 2019 and 2026 [1][3][5][6].
• A short meeting on the sidelines of a summit, held once a year, cannot carry a technology partnership by itself. Officials need fixed, regular meetings to keep the work going between summits.

10. What ADMM-Plus Can Do — and What It Cannot

• China and Russia sit at the same table
• ADMM-Plus includes China and Russia as well as the US, Japan, India and South Korea [2].
• So any text the whole group agrees on must be acceptable to China too. It will be cautious about the South China Sea.

• Sharper language, such as "open, free and inclusive", appears in bilateral statements (between just two countries), like the India–ROK readout [1]. It does not come from the forum as a whole.

• The forum's real strength is practical, not political

• Its useful work happens in the Experts' Working Groups: shared rules, table-top exercises (practice drills on paper) and planning conferences [7][9].

• India co-chairing the Counter-Terrorism group and hosting its meetings is the concrete gain [7][9]. Strong words from the main meeting are not.

• So the sidelines are the point

• For India, ADMM-Plus works mainly as a place to meet many ministers in one trip, as at Vientiane in 2024 [6].
• This is efficient. But it also means the meeting depends on the calendar, and agreements tend to be small steps (one arrangement per meeting) rather than big projects.

11. What India and Korea Should Turn Into Concrete Projects

• The MoD and Korea's defence ministry should pick one named co-development project under the 2020 Roadmap
• A Roadmap for Defence Industries Cooperation was signed in September 2020 [11].
• Indian and Korean defence companies have since signed joint-venture MoUs (non-binding agreements to work together) at Aero India in February 2025, and again in December 2025 [11].

• The next step is to turn one MoU into a funded design project with shared ownership of the design. Otherwise "co-development" stays a phrase in press releases.

• Revive the shipyard cooperation promised in 2015

• The 2015 Joint Statement already listed shipyard cooperation for defence needs [12].

• Naval logistics support (2019) and maritime security are already on the agenda [3][1]. Shipbuilding links India's sea-security goals with an area of Korean industrial strength.

• Hold the 2+2 dialogue regularly

• The 2+2 vice-ministerial dialogue was agreed in 2015 [12].

• A fixed yearly meeting of officials would keep work moving even when ministers change in Seoul.

• Use the Buy (Indian) route as a lever for deeper sharing of technology

• The K9 VAJRA-T contract shows that Korean designs can win Indian orders through an Indian partner firm [10].
• India can ask for more of the design work to be done in India in future orders of this kind.

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: Rs 7,628.70 crore — MoD contract with L&T for K9 VAJRA-T self-propelled guns under the Buy (Indian) category, December 2024 [10]
• Data: A Hanwha Aerospace–L&T contract for 100 more K9 Vajra guns, signed 4 April 2025 [11]
• Report/Committee: India–ROK Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership, 18 May 2015 — promised a 2+2 vice-ministerial dialogue, shipyard cooperation and a CEPA amendment target of June 2016 [12]
• Report/Committee: Roadmap for Defence Industries Cooperation, September 2020 [11]
• Scheme: Aatmanirbhar Bharat / Buy (Indian) category — the route through which a Korean-designed gun was bought from an Indian firm [10]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India; the effect of other countries' policies on India's interests.
• GS-III: Security challenges and their management; indigenisation of technology (defence co-development).
• Possible question stems: 1. "ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ADMM-Plus give India a low-cost platform for both multilateral and bilateral defence diplomacy." Discuss with reference to India's Act East Policy. 2. Examine how the India–Republic of Korea defence partnership is moving from procurement to co-development. What constraints and opportunities does this present for Atmanirbharta in defence? 3. Maritime security is the central pillar of India's Indo-Pacific partnerships. Critically analyse.

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit (EAS): the other ASEAN-centred security forums. Compare their membership and mandates.
• Act East Policy and ASEAN–India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: the policy framework behind India's ADMM-Plus engagement.
• Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: the two sides' Indo-Pacific visions.
• India–ROK relations: the strategic partnership, CEPA and defence trade (e.g., the K9 Vajra howitzer).
• Logistics support agreements: India's network of reciprocal logistics agreements.
• Defence Acquisition Procedure / defence-indigenisation lists: the context for co-development.
• UNCLOS and freedom of navigation: the legal basis for maritime-security commitments.

15. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Comprehensive economic partnership agreement (Economy): India–Korea CEPA is the trade pact whose amendment target slipped, showing slow follow-through in the relationship.
• South China Sea (Geography): China's caution on this sea shapes what ADMM-Plus can agree on, unlike sharper bilateral language.
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Geography): It is the legal basis for freedom of navigation and the maritime security commitments discussed.
• Technology (Economy): Moving from buying equipment to co-developing military technology is the central theme of the partnership.
• Joint production (Economy): Licence production like the K9 Vajra with L&T is joint production, distinct from true co-development.
• Procurement (Economy): Buy (Indian) route and the shift from buyer–seller to technology partner turn on defence procurement.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• ADMM vs ADMM-Plus: ADMM includes only ASEAN members. The "Plus" adds the 8 dialogue partners. ASEAN has more dialogue partners in total than these 8 (e.g., the EU and Canada are dialogue partners but not ADMM-Plus members) [1][2].
• Year of the first meeting: the inaugural ADMM-Plus was in 2010 (Hanoi), not 2006. That year is often confused with the start of ADMM itself [2].
• Frequency: ADMM-Plus is annual only since 2017. It was not annual from the start [2].
• EWG co-chairs: India's partner was Malaysia for Counter-Terrorism (2024–27) and Indonesia for HADR (2021–24). Do not swap them [7].
• ROK minister names change often: Jeong Kyeong-doo (2019), Suh Wook (2021), Kim Yong-hyun (2024), Kang Shin-chul (2026) [1][3][5][6].