IL&FS Crisis

Indian Economy glossary

FlashcardsQuick reviseKey facts. One by one.Start →

Also called: IL&FS default 2018 · Topic: Banking Regulation, NPAs and Financial Stability · NCERT: Beyond NCERT

Meaning

The IL&FS crisis was the September 2018 default by Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services (IL&FS), a large NBFC (non-banking financial company, a lender that is not a bank). IL&FS had funded long-term infrastructure loans with short-term borrowing, and when that borrowing could not be rolled over, it failed to repay. The crisis matters for two reasons:

  • It showed that trouble at one big NBFC can freeze funding for the whole NBFC sector, because banks and mutual funds hold NBFC debt.
  • It became the standard Indian example of why large NBFCs now face bank-like oversight.

Explanation

How the crisis happened: asset-liability mismatch

  • Asset-liability mismatch means the money a firm lends (its assets) comes back over a different period than the money it borrows (its liabilities) must be repaid. The study note's example is funding 15-year loans with 3-month borrowing.
  • The IL&FS chain:
  • IL&FS lent to infrastructure projects. Such loans pay back slowly, over many years.
  • It raised much of this money through short-term borrowing, which had to be repaid or "rolled over" (replaced with fresh borrowing) again and again.
  • When lenders stopped rolling over its debt, IL&FS had no cash coming in fast enough. It defaulted in September 2018.

  • This is the same weakness Class 12, Money and Banking points to in banks: "being able to repay depositors on demand is crucial". Unlike a bank, though, an NBFC cannot turn to deposit insurance or easy RBI liquidity support.

Why it spread: contagion through shadow banking

  • Shadow banking means credit given by entities outside regular banking, such as NBFCs and money-market funds. They face lighter regulation and have no deposit insurance. The FSB now calls this "non-bank financial intermediation".
  • Contagion (one failure spreading to others):
  • Mutual funds and banks held debt papers issued by NBFCs.
  • After IL&FS defaulted, they began to doubt other NBFCs that used the same funding model.
  • Funding for NBFCs froze. Even healthy NBFCs found it hard to borrow.

  • Systemic risk (one failure setting off a chain of failures) spreads through three channels, and IL&FS showed all three:

  • Interconnectedness: banks are the largest lenders to NBFCs.
  • Common exposures: many funds held the same NBFC papers.
  • Fire sales: forced selling pushes prices down for everyone.

The second shock: DHFL (2019)

  • DHFL made long-term housing loans funded with commercial papers (CPs), which are short-term unsecured borrowing instruments. This was the same mismatch.
  • In 2019 it became the first financial-service provider taken to IBC under s.227.
  • Together, IL&FS and DHFL turned one default into a sector-wide funding problem.

In India

  • Regulator: NBFCs are regulated by the RBI under Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act and registered under s.45-IA. NBFCs cannot take demand deposits or issue cheques drawn on themselves, and their depositors get no DICGC cover.
  • Main regulatory response: Scale-Based Regulation (SBR): announced October 2021, effective October 2022. NBFCs are placed in four layers, and the rules get stricter as size and systemic importance grow:
  • Base layer: small, lightly regulated.
  • Middle layer: deposit-taking NBFCs and larger non-deposit NBFCs.
  • Upper layer: must list within 3 years of being identified and keep CET1 of 9% (CET1 is common equity, the highest-quality capital). The top 10 NBFCs by asset size are included automatically, and an NBFC stays in this layer for at least 5 years.
  • Top layer: meant to stay empty. It is used only if an upper-layer NBFC becomes a serious risk.
  • The rules are consolidated in the Master Direction on Scale-Based Regulation (19 Oct 2023).

  • Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), earlier a tool for banks, has also been extended to NBFCs.

  • Bank-NBFC link: in November 2023 the RBI raised risk weights on bank loans to NBFCs, so banks need more capital for such loans. These were partly rolled back in 2025.
  • Other tightening: housing finance companies moved from NHB to RBI regulation in 2019. The RBI Financial Stability Report (published every June and December) tracks bank-NBFC interlinkage as an emerging risk (FSR December 2025).

Don't confuse with

  • NPA crisis (twin balance sheet problem): that was a solvency problem. Banks' loans to companies went bad and capital shrank. IL&FS began as a liquidity and funding problem caused by asset-liability mismatch at an NBFC.
  • DHFL (2019): a housing finance company funded by commercial papers. It was the first financial-service provider taken to IBC under s.227. IL&FS (2018) was an infrastructure financier.
  • Bank failures (Yes Bank 2020, PMC Bank 2019): these were banks, and their depositors had DICGC cover (Rs 5 lakh per depositor per bank from 2020). IL&FS was an NBFC, and NBFC deposits have no DICGC cover.
  • NPA vs asset-liability mismatch: an NPA is a loan overdue for more than 90 days, so the asset itself is bad. A mismatch can sink a firm even when its loans are good, because the cash simply does not come in on time.

Prelims Hooks

  • IL&FS defaulted in September 2018. The core cause was asset-liability mismatch: long-term infrastructure loans funded by short-term borrowing.
  • NBFCs are regulated by the RBI (Chapter IIIB, registration under s.45-IA), cannot take demand deposits, and get no DICGC cover. Trap: "NBFC deposits are insured by DICGC" is FALSE.
  • DHFL (2019) was the first financial-service provider referred to IBC under s.227, not IL&FS.
  • SBR layers: Base → Middle → Upper → Top. The Upper layer must list within 3 years and keep CET1 of 9%. The Top layer is ideally empty.
  • SBR was announced October 2021 and took effect October 2022. The consolidated Master Direction is dated 19 Oct 2023.
  • Shadow banking (term coined by Paul McCulley, 2007) is now called "non-bank financial intermediation" by the FSB.

Mains Points

  • Shadow banking and systemic risk: banks are the largest lenders to NBFCs, and mutual funds hold NBFC paper, so one NBFC's default can freeze credit for the whole sector. IL&FS and DHFL justify scale-based regulation, PCA for NBFCs and higher risk weights on bank loans to NBFCs (2023).
  • Regulation vs growth trade-off: NBFCs reach borrowers that banks often do not serve. Stricter rules make the system safer but can slow credit. SBR tries to balance this by keeping light rules for small NBFCs and tight rules only for large, interconnected ones.
  • Regulatory arbitrage and coordination: lighter NBFC rules let risk build up outside banks. Lessons from the crisis argue for coordination between the RBI and SEBI through the FSDC (2010), regular stress-testing in the Financial Stability Report, and better liquidity management (avoiding asset-liability mismatches) at large NBFCs.

Read more