Pradhan Mantri Annadata Aay Sanrakshan Abhiyan
FlashcardsQuick reviseKey facts. One by one.Start →Also called: PM-AASHA · Topic: Agricultural Marketing, MSP, Buffer Stocks and PDS · NCERT: Beyond NCERT
Meaning
PM-AASHA (Pradhan Mantri Annadata Aay Sanrakshan Abhiyan) is an umbrella scheme launched in September 2018. Its aim is fair prices for farmers and stable prices for consumers. Since its continuation was approved in 2024 for the 15th Finance Commission cycle (up to 2025-26), it brings four tools under one roof: the Price Support Scheme (PSS), the Price Deficiency Payment Scheme (PDPS), the Market Intervention Scheme (MIS) and the Price Stabilisation Fund (PSF).
It matters because MSP for wheat and rice is backed by FCI's open-ended buying, but pulses, oilseeds and copra have no such buyer. PM-AASHA is the government's main tool to make MSP real for these crops. It is also the link between MSP policy and India's goal of producing more of its own pulses and edible oil.
Explanation
Why the scheme was needed
- MSP (minimum support price) is the price at which the government promises to buy notified crops. It is announced before sowing, on CACP's advice.
- The gap: MSP is only a promise. It helps a farmer only when someone actually buys at that price.
- For wheat and paddy, FCI and state agencies buy everything offered at MSP that meets quality norms. This is called open-ended procurement.
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Pulses, oilseeds, copra and perishables had no buyer like this, so their market prices could fall well below MSP at harvest.
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PM-AASHA brings together different ways of supporting farm prices. Each tool suits a different kind of crop and a different situation.
The four components
| Component | How it works | Who runs it / key rule |
|---|---|---|
| Price Support Scheme (PSS) | The government physically buys pulses, oilseeds and copra at MSP when market prices fall below MSP at peak harvest | NAFED and NCCF; runs only at the request of the State/UT; central buying capped at 25% of national production of that crop in the season |
| Price Deficiency Payment Scheme (PDPS) | No physical buying. The farmer sells in the market and the government pays the gap between MSP and the market price | Precursor: Madhya Pradesh's Bhavantar Bhugtan Yojana (2017) |
| Market Intervention Scheme (MIS) | One-off buying of perishables that have no MSP (fruits, vegetables) when their prices crash | Centre and states share the losses |
| Price Stabilisation Fund (PSF) | The consumer-side tool: helps keep prices steady for buyers. It is grouped with the farmer-side tools under the umbrella | Brought under PM-AASHA in the 2024 continuation |
How PSS buying works on the ground
- Who can sell: only farmers who registered in advance and have valid land records.
- What is bought: only Fair Average Quality (FAQ) produce, meaning produce that meets the standard quality norms.
- Registration: with Aadhaar, land records and bank details, on e-Samriddhi (NAFED's platform) or e-Samyukti (NCCF's platform).
- Payment: sent straight to the farmer's bank account by direct benefit transfer.
- Biometric check: an Aadhaar-enabled PoS device or a facial scan has been mandatory under PSS since 2025-26. This stops payments to fake sellers.
Worked example: PSS vs PDPS
- Take mustard. Its MSP for RMS 2027-28 is ₹6,613/quintal.
- Suppose (hypothetically) that the mandi price falls to ₹6,000 at harvest.
- Under PSS: NAFED buys the mustard at ₹6,613 and must then store it and sell it later. It can buy at most 25% of national output. The farmers left outside that 25% get ₹6,000.
- Under PDPS: the farmer sells to a trader at ₹6,000. The government pays ₹6,613 − ₹6,000 = ₹613/quintal into the farmer's account. No grain goes into government storage.
- The lesson: PDPS can reach more farmers at lower storage cost. Its weakness is that traders may push market prices down further once they know the government will pay the gap.
In India
- Ministries and agencies:
- Cereals and coarse cereals are bought by FCI and state agencies.
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Pulses, oilseeds and copra are bought under PSS of PM-AASHA through NAFED and NCCF.
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Policy base: Union Budget 2018-19 committed to MSP of at least 1.5 times the all-India weighted average cost of production. PM-AASHA followed in September 2018 so that the higher MSP would actually reach farmers.
- Continuation: in 2024 it was extended up to 2025-26, in the 15th Finance Commission cycle, with PSS, PDPS, MIS and PSF under one umbrella.
- Procurement ceilings under PSS were raised for tur, urad and masur (verify current).
- Pulses mission link: the Mission for Aatmanirbharta in Pulses (until 2030-31) buys tur, urad and masur from pre-registered farmers through Central Nodal Agencies.
- Scale of the problem it tackles:
- Only about 6% of farmers sold wheat or paddy directly to a procurement agency (Shanta Kumar HLC, 2015).
- India imported 56.25% of its edible oil in 2023-24.
Don't confuse with
- PM-AASHA vs PSS: PM-AASHA is the umbrella scheme. PSS is just one of its components.
- PSS vs PDPS: PSS means physical buying at MSP. PDPS means paying the price gap with no buying or storage.
- PDPS vs PM-KISAN: PDPS is tied to a crop actually sold below MSP. PM-KISAN (2019, ₹6,000 a year) is direct income support, cash paid per farmer whatever they grow.
- MIS vs PSS: MIS covers perishables with no MSP (fruits, vegetables), with Centre-state loss sharing. PSS covers MSP crops: pulses, oilseeds and copra.
Prelims Hooks
- PM-AASHA was launched in September 2018. Its aim is fair prices for farmers and stable prices for consumers.
- Components after the 2024 continuation: PSS, PDPS, MIS and PSF.
- PSS buying is done by NAFED and NCCF, not FCI. It covers pulses, oilseeds and copra.
- Central buying under PSS is capped at 25% of national production. PSS runs only at the State/UT's request.
- e-Samriddhi is NAFED's platform and e-Samyukti is NCCF's. Biometric authentication under PSS has been mandatory since 2025-26.
- Trap: "PDPS involves government purchase of produce": FALSE. It pays only the gap between MSP and the market price. Its precursor was MP's Bhavantar Bhugtan Yojana (2017).
Mains Points
- A price signal without a sure buyer:
- Oilseed and pulse MSPs are raised to pull farmers away from wheat and paddy.
- But PSS buys at most 25% of output and only when a State asks for it.
- So at least three-quarters of the crop has no buyer at MSP, and farmers stay with wheat, which FCI buys without limit.
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A good answer ties PM-AASHA to NMEO-Oilseeds and the pulses mission. Neither price nor production support works alone.
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PDPS as a fix: widening PDPS gives MSP benefits to more farmers without the storage, carrying-cost and subsidy burden of physical buying. It also fits the Shanta Kumar HLC's view that support must reach the small farmers who are left out, especially in eastern states. The risks are traders pushing down market prices, and the State capacity needed to check how much each farmer actually sold.
- Federalism, technology and the WTO:
- Because PSS runs only when a State asks, how many farmers benefit depends on how actively each State procures. This is a GS-II Centre-State issue.
- Digital registration, DBT and biometric checks improve transparency.
- New public buying outside pre-2013 programmes may not be shielded by the Bali peace clause. This limits how far physical procurement can grow.