Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

Polity & Governance glossary

Also called: Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord · Topic: India's External Relations, 1947-1999: Non-alignment, Wars and Nuclear Policy · NCERT: Beyond NCERT

Meaning

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (also called the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord) was signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987 by Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene to settle Sri Lanka's Tamil ethnic conflict [1].

It matters for two reasons:

  • It is the clearest example of India acting as the security manager of South Asia.
  • It led to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The IPKF's costly war with the LTTE shaped India's neighbourhood policy for years.

Explanation

Why the Accord was needed

  • Sri Lanka's Tamil-speaking people live mostly in the North and East of the island. They demanded more rights and self-rule.
  • Armed Tamil groups were fighting the Sri Lankan state. The strongest was the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).
  • India had a direct stake. Tamil opinion in Tamil Nadu was closely tied to the Tamils of Sri Lanka.
  • The Accord tried to do two things at once:
  • keep Sri Lanka united;
  • give the Tamil areas a real share of power.

Key clauses of the Accord

  • Clause 1.1: Sri Lanka's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity would be protected [1]. This means there would be no separate Tamil state.
  • Clause 1.4: the Northern and Eastern Provinces were recognised as "areas of historical habitation" of Tamil-speaking peoples [1].
  • Clauses 2.2 / 2.3: the North and East would be run as one administrative unit for a temporary period [1].
  • The Eastern Province would hold a referendum by 31 December 1988 [1].
  • The vote would decide whether the East stays linked with the North.

  • Clause 2.9: a ceasefire within 48 hours of signing. Militant groups were to surrender their arms [1].

  • Clause 2.14: India would "underwrite and guarantee" the agreement [1]. This means India would stand behind it and make sure it was carried out.
  • Clause 2.16(c): India would give military assistance if Sri Lanka asked for it [1].
  • Clause 2.18: Sinhala stays the official language. Tamil and English also become official languages [1].
  • Annexure para 6: the President of Sri Lanka may invite an "Indian peace keeping contingent" to enforce the ceasefire [1].

Devolution through Sri Lanka's 13th Amendment

  • Devolution means the central government hands some of its powers down to provinces.
  • Sri Lanka did this through its 13th Amendment (1987). It created Provincial Councils, which are elected bodies that run each province.
  • Remember: this is an amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution, not India's.

The IPKF and the limits of the Accord

  • IPKF (1987-1990): the Indian military force sent at Colombo's request under the Accord to disarm the Tamil militants.
  • What went wrong:
  • Trigger: the LTTE refused to disarm.
  • Fighting: the IPKF ended up in costly battles with the LTTE, for example Operation Pawan (October 1987) in Jaffna. More than 1,000 Indian soldiers were killed.
  • Exit: Sri Lanka's next President, R. Premadasa, wanted the force out. The IPKF withdrew in March 1990.

  • The main limit: the Accord was signed by two governments. The LTTE was not a party to it, but the ceasefire and disarmament depended on its cooperation.

In the Constitution and practice

  • Where it sits in Indian law:
  • The Accord is an international agreement. It was not made under any article of the Indian Constitution.
  • Making treaties is part of the Union's executive power. "Foreign affairs" and the making and carrying out of treaties are in the Union List (Seventh Schedule).
  • Article 253 lets Parliament make laws to carry out a treaty, even on state subjects.
  • Unlike the Land Boundary Agreement, no Indian territory changed hands, so the Accord needed no constitutional amendment.

  • Who used it: Rajiv Gandhi's government signed it. Sri Lanka's President invited the IPKF under Annexure para 6 [1].

  • Place in India's foreign policy:
  • It is a key example of the Indira Doctrine. This was the informal idea that South Asia is India's security sphere and no outside power should interfere there.
  • Other examples of this doctrine are the 1971 Bangladesh war and Operation Cactus (Maldives, 1988).

  • Outcome and lasting effect:

  • IPKF exit: the force withdrew in March 1990 without disarming the LTTE.
  • Assassination: the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur (Tamil Nadu) on 21 May 1991.
  • Shift in policy: the high cost of this intervention helped push India towards the Gujral Doctrine (1996-97). Under it, India gives to its smaller neighbours without asking for reciprocity (something in return) and does not interfere in their internal affairs.
  • Lasting legacy: the 13th Amendment and its Provincial Councils remain the Accord's main lasting result.

Don't confuse with

  • Shastri-Sirimavo Pact (1964): this pact dealt with stateless people of Indian origin, mostly Tamil plantation workers. India was to take back 5.25 lakh and Sri Lanka was to give citizenship to 3 lakh. It had nothing to do with the ethnic war or devolution.
  • Katchatheevu agreement (1974): this was a maritime boundary agreement (an agreement fixing the sea border). India accepted Sri Lanka's sovereignty over Katchatheevu [2]. The 1987 Accord was about the Tamil conflict, not borders.
  • Operation Cactus (1988): this was also an Indian military action taken on a neighbour's request, but in the Maldives. It was quick and successful, and Indian troops left immediately [3]. The IPKF was a long, costly war that ended with Sri Lanka asking India to leave.
  • Sri Lanka's 13th Amendment vs India's constitutional amendments: the 13th Amendment (1987) changed Sri Lanka's Constitution to create Provincial Councils. Do not mix it up with any Indian amendment. India's 100th Amendment (2015) relates to the Bangladesh land boundary, not Sri Lanka.

Prelims Hooks

  • Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: signed at Colombo, 29 July 1987, by Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene [1].
  • Clause 2.18: Tamil and English became official languages along with Sinhala [1].
  • Clause 2.14: India would "underwrite and guarantee" the Accord. Annexure para 6: Sri Lanka's President may invite an "Indian peace keeping contingent" [1].
  • Devolution: Sri Lanka's 13th Amendment (1987) created Provincial Councils.
  • Trap: the IPKF went at Colombo's request, not on India's own initiative. It withdrew in March 1990, when R. Premadasa was President.
  • Operation Pawan (October 1987): the IPKF's battle against the LTTE in Jaffna.

Mains Points

  • Cost of being the regional security manager (GS-II / GS-I):
  • The cost: the Accord and the IPKF show what happens when India "guarantees" another country's internal settlement. More than 1,000 Indian soldiers died, Tamil opinion at home was angered, and Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991.
  • The lesson: this pushed India from the Indira Doctrine towards the Gujral Doctrine. A balanced answer argues for security firmness plus economic generosity, not direct military involvement in a neighbour's ethnic conflict.

  • Devolution as the political answer to ethnic conflict (GS-II):

  • The idea: the Accord tried to keep Sri Lanka united (clause 1.1) while giving Tamil areas power through Provincial Councils (13th Amendment) and official status for Tamil (clause 2.18) [1].
  • The comparison: this is close to India's own approach of handling diversity through federalism and recognising languages, rather than through separation.

  • Centre-state angle in foreign policy (GS-II):

  • The link: Tamil Nadu's concerns shaped India's Sri Lanka policy, from Katchatheevu and the fishermen dispute to the Accord and the IPKF.
  • Reform idea: a federal consultation mechanism would let border states be heard before India signs treaties that affect them.

Related concepts

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Sources

  1. 1Indo-Lanka Accord, Colombo, 29 July 1987, full text — India-Nepal treaty review: MEA Indian Treaties Databasemea.gov.in · tier 1
  2. 2MEA reply on the India-Sri Lanka boundary agreement in historic waters (1974)mea.gov.in · tier 1
  3. 3MEA, India-Maldives Bilateral Relationsmea.gov.in · tier 1