Pokhran-II

Also called: Operation Shakti · Topic: India's External Relations, 1947-1999: Non-alignment, Wars and Nuclear Policy · NCERT: Class 12, Ch 4 "India's External Relations"

Meaning

Pokhran-II (code name 'Operation Shakti') was a series of five nuclear tests that India carried out at Pokhran on 11 and 13 May 1998. The tests showed that India could make nuclear weapons for military use. They changed India's nuclear stand. India had called its 1974 test a "peaceful" blast, and now it openly became a nuclear-armed state. Pakistan's reply tests followed within weeks, so South Asia came to have two nuclear-armed rivals.

Explanation

What happened in May 1998

• The tests: India set off five tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 at Pokhran in Rajasthan.
• The purpose: to show that India could build nuclear weapons for military use.

• This differs from Pokhran-I (18 May 1974, code name 'Smiling Buddha'). India called that test a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE), meaning a blast for peaceful uses such as engineering, not for a weapon.

• Pakistan's reply: Pakistan carried out its own tests on 28 and 30 May 1998.

• The region now had two nuclear-armed neighbours.
• The risk of a nuclear exchange (the two sides firing nuclear weapons at each other) in South Asia went up.

Why India tested: the road from 1964 to 1998

• China's bomb (October 1964): China had beaten India in the 1962 war. After China tested an atom bomb, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh demanded that India build its own bomb.
• The NPT (1968): the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty lets only five states keep nuclear weapons: the US, USSR, UK, France and China. Every other state that signs must promise never to build them.

• India called it discriminatory (unfair) and never signed it.

• The NPT's indefinite extension (1995): the NPT was extended with no end date. India opposed this because it made the five states' monopoly (sole control) permanent.

• The CTBT (1996): the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear test explosions.
• India refused to sign. The treaty bound states without the bomb but protected the five, who had already tested.
• The pressure from these treaties formed the background to the 1998 tests.

How the world responded

• UN Security Council Resolution 1172 (6 June 1998) [5][6]:
• It was adopted unanimously, meaning every member voted for it.
• It condemned the tests by both India and Pakistan.
• It demanded that the two countries carry out no more tests.
• It called on both to stop their weapon programmes, not to weaponise (turn the devices into usable weapons) or deploy nuclear weapons, to stop developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and to stop producing fissile material (material such as enriched uranium or plutonium that can be used in a bomb).

• It urged both to restart talks on the root causes of tension, including Kashmir.

• Sanctions: the US and other countries put sanctions on both India and Pakistan. Sanctions are penalties, such as cuts in aid and trade. They were later waived (lifted).

• India's voluntary moratorium: India announced that it would stop testing on its own, without signing any treaty.

In the Constitution and practice

• Not a constitutional provision: Pokhran-II is a post-1947 event in India's foreign and security policy. No article or amendment covers it. It belongs to the nuclear policy that began with Nehru and Homi J. Bhabha.
• Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), set up in 1948: it plans India's atomic energy policy.
• Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), set up in 1954: it carries out that policy.

• The first aim was peaceful use, such as electricity and research.

• Outcome: a nuclear doctrine. A nuclear doctrine is a country's official policy on when and how it will use nuclear weapons.

• August 1999: the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) published a draft doctrine.

• 4 January 2003: the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) reviewed how the doctrine was being put into practice and made its main points public [2][3].

• Main points of the 2003 doctrine [2][3]:

• Credible minimum deterrence: India keeps only enough weapons to make sure any attacker would be punished.
• No first use (NFU): India will use nuclear weapons only to hit back after a nuclear attack on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere.
• Massive retaliation: any reply to a first strike will be "massive" and designed to cause "unacceptable damage".
• India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.

• Exception: if India faces a major biological or chemical attack, it keeps the option of hitting back with nuclear weapons.

• Civilian control through the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) [2][3]:

• Political Council: chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the only body that can authorise the use of nuclear weapons.

• Executive Council: chaired by the National Security Advisor. It gives the Political Council inputs for its decisions and carries out its orders.

• Lasting effects:

• Kargil (1999): fighting below the nuclear level still broke out within a year of the tests.
• The doctrine of restraint helped India obtain the September 2008 NSG waiver. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear-supplying countries that controls exports of nuclear materials and technology. The waiver, a special exemption from the group's rules, made the India-US civil nuclear deal possible. India is still not a member of the NSG (verify current).
• India's refusal to sign the CTBT still matters. India is one of the 44 Annex 2 states (the states whose ratification is needed), so the treaty is not yet in force [4].

Don't confuse with

• Pokhran-I (1974): code name 'Smiling Buddha'. India called it a "peaceful nuclear explosion", and it was a single test. Pokhran-II (1998), code name 'Operation Shakti', consisted of five tests that openly showed weapons capability.
• Pakistan's tests (28 and 30 May 1998): these were Pakistan's reply. They were not part of Pokhran-II. UNSC Resolution 1172 condemned both countries [5].
• Voluntary moratorium vs CTBT: after 1998, India stopped testing by its own choice. It did not sign the CTBT, which would have legally banned all tests [4].
• NSAB draft (1999) vs CCS statement (2003): the NSAB only published a draft doctrine. The CCS reviewed the doctrine and made its main points public on 4 January 2003 [2][3].

Prelims Hooks

• Pokhran-II: 5 tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, code name 'Operation Shakti'. Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May 1998.
• Code-name trap: 'Smiling Buddha' = Pokhran-I (1974). 'Operation Shakti' = Pokhran-II (1998).
• UNSC Resolution 1172 was adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998. It condemned the tests by both India and Pakistan and mentioned Kashmir among the causes of tension [5][6].
• NCA: the Political Council is chaired by the PM and is the only body that can authorise nuclear use. The Executive Council is chaired by the NSA [2].
• NFU exception: India keeps the option of nuclear retaliation against a major biological or chemical attack [2].
• Treaty trap: India has signed neither the NPT (1968) nor the CTBT (1996). Its stop to testing after 1998 is only a voluntary moratorium.

Mains Points

• Did the 1998 tests make India more secure? (GS-I and GS-II)
• Yes: they gave India deterrence against China and a stronger voice in world affairs.

• No: Pakistan matched the tests within weeks. Sanctions and UNSC Resolution 1172 followed [5]. Kargil (1999) showed that conflict below the nuclear level was still possible.

• Strategic autonomy against an unequal nuclear order:

• The NPT and CTBT split the world into states that may keep the bomb and states that may not. Pokhran-II was India's answer.

• India still backs global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament. This fits the NCERT question "Isn't it all about atom bombs?", which asks whether India's "peaceful" language hid a weapons aim all along.

• A responsible-power doctrine and civilian control:

• For: credible minimum deterrence, no first use and civilian control through the NCA (only the elected PM can authorise use) [2] made India look stable and responsible. This helped secure the 2008 NSG waiver.
• Against: critics question the biological or chemical exception. They also ask whether "massive" retaliation is believable against a small tactical strike. Debate on revisiting NFU comes up from time to time (verify current).

Related concepts

• India's nuclear policy
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• Pokhran-I
• Nuclear Suppliers Group
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
• Credible minimum deterrence
• No first use

Read more

• India's nuclear policy, 1948-1999