India's nuclear policy, 1948-1999

Detail

1. Origins: atoms for peace (late 1940s to 1964)

• Nehru's vision: Nehru believed science and technology would build a modern India. A nuclear programme was part of his plan to industrialise the country.
• Homi J. Bhabha led the programme from the late 1940s.
• Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was set up in 1948. It plans India's atomic energy policy.

• Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up in 1954. It carries out that policy.

• Aim: atomic energy for peaceful purposes, such as electricity and research. The aim was not bombs.

• Nehru's stand on weapons:
• He opposed nuclear weapons.
• He asked the superpowers (the US and the USSR) for comprehensive disarmament, meaning all countries give up all their nuclear weapons.

• The superpowers did not listen, and their arsenals kept growing.

• Turning point: China's test (October 1964). China, which had beaten India in the 1962 war, tested an atom bomb. After this the Bharatiya Jana Sangh demanded that India build its own bomb.

2. The NPT and why India rejected it

• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968): a treaty that lets only the five states that had tested before 1967 keep nuclear weapons. All other states that sign it must promise never to build them.
• The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970 [7].

• Article IX(3) of the treaty defines a nuclear-weapon State as one that "has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967" [8].

• The five were the US, USSR, UK, France and China. They were also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Taiwan held China's UN seat at the time.

• India's objection: the treaty is discriminatory.
• It creates two classes of states, those allowed to have the bomb and those not allowed.

• It does not make the five give up their own weapons within any fixed time.

• Result: India has never signed the NPT.

3. Pokhran-I (18 May 1974)

• Pokhran-I: India's first nuclear test, carried out on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. Its code name was 'Smiling Buddha'.
• India called it a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE), meaning a blast for peaceful uses such as engineering, not for a weapon.
• Situation at home when the test took place:
• Oil shock: oil prices rose sharply after the 1973 Arab-Israel war.
• High inflation made prices rise fast.
• Agitations spread, including the 1974 railway strike.

• This unrest led towards the Emergency of 1975 (→ emergency-1975).

• How the world responded: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, 1974-75)

• NSG: a group of countries that supply nuclear materials and technology. They agree on rules to control nuclear exports so that the materials are not used to make weapons.
• The test led to the NSG and to stricter controls on supplies to India.
• In September 2008 the NSG gave India a waiver, a special exemption from its rules. This made the India-US civil nuclear deal possible.
• India is still not a member. Its membership bid remains blocked (verify current).

4. Against discriminatory treaties (1995-1996)

• NPT indefinite extension (1995): Article X(2) of the NPT said a conference would be held 25 years after the treaty came into force to decide whether it should continue indefinitely [8]. In 1995 the treaty was extended indefinitely, meaning with no end date. India opposed this because the extension made the five states' monopoly permanent.
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996): a treaty that bans all nuclear test explosions, in any place and for any purpose.
• It will come into force only 180 days after all 44 states listed in its Annex 2 have ratified it [4].
• Annex 2 states are the 44 states that had nuclear power or research reactors when the treaty opened for signature in 1996 [4].
• The CTBT is not yet in force [4]. Because India is an Annex 2 state, India's refusal alone keeps it from coming into force.
• India refused to sign. The treaty bound non-nuclear states while protecting the monopoly of the five, who had already tested.

5. Pokhran-II (May 1998)

• Pokhran-II: five tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, code name 'Operation Shakti'. They showed that India could make nuclear weapons for military use.
• Pakistan's reply: Pakistan carried out its own tests on 28 and 30 May 1998.
• The region now had two nuclear-armed rivals.

• The risk of a nuclear exchange in South Asia went up.

• UN Security Council Resolution 1172 (6 June 1998) [5][6]:

• It was adopted unanimously.
• It condemned the tests by both countries.
• It demanded that India and Pakistan carry out no more tests.
• It called on both countries to stop their weapon programmes, not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons, to stop developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and to stop producing fissile material (material such as enriched uranium or plutonium that can be used in a bomb).

• It urged both countries to resume dialogue on the root causes of tension, including Kashmir.

• Sanctions: the US and others put sanctions (penalties such as cuts in aid and trade) on both countries. These sanctions were later waived.

• India announced a voluntary moratorium on testing. This means India chose on its own to stop testing, without signing any treaty.

6. India's nuclear doctrine

A nuclear doctrine is a country's official policy on when and how it will use nuclear weapons.

NCERT's three pillars:

• Credible minimum deterrence: India keeps only enough weapons to make sure any attacker would be punished. It does not join an arms race.
• No first use (NFU): India will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It will use them only to hit back.
• Disarmament: India is committed to global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament, leading to a world free of nuclear weapons.

How the doctrine developed:

• August 1999: the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) published a draft doctrine.
• 4 January 2003: the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) reviewed progress in putting the doctrine into practice and made its main points public [2][3].

Main points of the CCS statement (2003) [2][3]:

Point	What it means
Credible minimum deterrent	India builds and keeps a credible minimum deterrent
No first use	Nuclear weapons will be used only to hit back after a nuclear attack on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere
Massive retaliation	Any answer to a first strike will be "massive" and designed to cause "unacceptable damage"
Non-nuclear states	India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states
Biological or chemical exception	If India or Indian forces anywhere face a major biological or chemical attack, India keeps the option of hitting back with nuclear weapons
Civilian control	Only civilian political leaders can order a nuclear strike, through the Nuclear Command Authority

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) [2][3]:

• Political Council: chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the only body that can authorise the use of nuclear weapons.
• Executive Council: chaired by the National Security Advisor. It gives the Political Council inputs for its decisions and carries out the Political Council's orders.

Debate today: people periodically argue about whether India should revisit no first use (verify current).

NCERT prompt: "Isn't it all about atom bombs? Why don't we say so?" It asks whether India's talk of "peaceful" aims and disarmament hid an aim to build weapons.

Prelims Hooks

• Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948 and the Department of Atomic Energy in 1954. Homi J. Bhabha led the programme.
• Under the NPT, a nuclear-weapon state is one that exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967. The NPT opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970 [7][8].
• Pokhran-I took place on 18 May 1974, was code-named 'Smiling Buddha' and was called a "peaceful nuclear explosion". Trap: it was not a weapons test in India's official description.
• NSG was formed in 1974-75 after Pokhran-I. India got a waiver in 2008 but is not a member.
• The CTBT comes into force only after all 44 Annex 2 states ratify it, and it is not yet in force. India is an Annex 2 state and has not signed [4].
• Pokhran-II consisted of 5 tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 ('Operation Shakti'). Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May 1998.
• UNSC Resolution 1172 was adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998 and condemned the India and Pakistan tests [5][6].
• The Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority is chaired by the PM. The Executive Council is chaired by the NSA [2].
• The no first use exception: nuclear retaliation is allowed against a major biological or chemical attack. Trap: it is not allowed against non-nuclear states otherwise [2].
• India opposed the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995 and refused to sign the CTBT in 1996.

Mains Points

• India's stand against an unequal nuclear order:
• The NPT and CTBT split the world into states that may keep the bomb and states that may not.
• India refused to sign them but still argued for global disarmament.

• This shows strategic autonomy (freedom to make its own choices), which was the nuclear side of non-alignment.

• Is no first use with "massive retaliation" credible?

• For: it keeps India stable and responsible, and it supported the 2008 NSG waiver.

• Against: critics question the biological or chemical exception, ask whether "massive" retaliation is believable against a small tactical strike, and argue that India's first-strike threats are tied up by NFU.

• Did the 1998 tests make India more secure?

• Yes: they gave India deterrence against China and a stronger voice.

• No: Pakistan matched the tests within weeks, sanctions followed (UNSC Resolution 1172) [5], and Kargil (1999) showed that conflict below the nuclear level was still possible.

• Civilian control as a democratic safeguard:

• Through the Nuclear Command Authority, only the elected PM can authorise use [2].
• This contrasts with systems where the military dominates.