Assess how much India's defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia has kept pace with its economic engagement with ASEAN.

ASEAN was India's second-largest trading partner in FY 2023-24, with goods trade of USD 120.87 bn [2]. Defence ties started from a low base and now run through several institutions. In structure they have largely kept pace with trade; in substance they have not yet.

Benchmark: Depth of Economic Engagement

• The ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) has been in force since 2010. Imports (USD 79.67 bn) are almost double exports [2].
• Most of this trade moves by sea. Trade itself therefore gives India a security stake in safe sea lanes.

Where Defence Diplomacy Has Kept Pace

• Institutional presence: India has been a "Plus" member of ADMM-Plus since its first meeting (Hanoi, 2010). The forum has met every year since 2017 [1].
• Leadership role: India co-chairs the Experts' Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia for 2024–27. It is one of seven expert groups that keep cooperation going between ministerial meetings [1][2].
• Upgraded framework: The Delhi Declaration (2018) put maritime cooperation at the centre of the partnership. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2022) came in the same month as the first ASEAN-India Informal Defence Ministers' Meeting [2].
• Maritime agenda: The 2023 Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation backs UNCLOS, ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific [3].
• Access: At the 13th ADMM-Plus in Cebu (2026), the Raksha Mantri's bilateral meetings let India advance several partnerships in a single visit [1].

Where It Lags

• Declaratory, not operational: India's message stays the same every year: freedom of navigation and a South China Sea Code of Conduct that follows UNCLOS [4]. Yet the Code is still being called for two decades after the 2002 Declaration on Conduct [3].
• Cautious positioning: India says its stance is "not against any country" [4]. This keeps India out of any bloc, but a claimant such as the Philippines gets moral support rather than a firm partner.
• Consensus limits: ADMM-Plus outcomes are non-binding, and China, a party to the dispute, sits at the same table [1].
• Few visible outputs: Official briefs describe the counter-terrorism co-chair role but list no concrete deliverables [1][2].

Assessment Defence diplomacy has largely caught up with trade in institutional depth. It still trails in strategic weight, because its principles have not yet become operational cooperation.

India's ties with ASEAN have grown from a sectoral partnership in 1992 to a CSP with a working defence track [2]. Even so, security cooperation remains a step behind economic integration. India could close the gap before its co-chair term ends in 2027. It could show concrete counter-terrorism results and put the 2023 maritime agenda into practice. That would make the Act East Policy a balanced partnership resting on both trade and security, in line with SDG 16's goal of peaceful, rules-based institutions.