·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Can the U.S.–China tech rivalry become an opportunity for India's semiconductor ambitions? Critically evaluate the India Semiconductor Mission in this context.

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In this answer
  1. Rivalry as an Opportunity
  2. ISM: Strengths
  3. ISM: Weaknesses

The U.S. now treats advanced chips as strategic assets. A November 2026 Commerce Department rule requires licences even for foreign data centres that serve Chinese firms [1]. Supply chains are looking for trusted geographies, so the rivalry opens a real but conditional window for India. The India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) has only partly used it.

Rivalry as an Opportunity

  • China-plus-one demand: chip production is highly concentrated. One firm in Chinese Taipei makes over 90% of leading-edge logic chips [4], so buyers want alternatives.
  • Curbs on rival hubs: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia now need U.S. licences for high-end chips [1]. This makes India relatively more attractive for AI data centres.
  • Market potential: NITI Aayog sees scope for a US$120–150 billion domestic chip value chain by 2035 [3].

ISM: Strengths

  • Fiscal commitment: a ₹76,000-crore incentive framework has been in place since December 2021 [2].
  • Early traction: by December 2025, 10 projects worth about ₹1.60 lakh crore had been approved across six states [2].
  • Course-correction: ISM 2.0 (Budget 2026–27) goes beyond assembly to equipment, materials and chip IP [2].

ISM: Weaknesses

  • Scale gap: one outlay must cover fabs, display fabs and packaging. That is modest next to the multi-billion-dollar cost of a single leading-edge fab. NITI Aayog itself advises against trying to catch up with global leaders in cutting-edge manufacturing [3].
  • Import dependence: India spent nearly US$150 billion on semiconductor imports between FY17 and FY25 [3].
  • Talent deficit: NITI Aayog flags skilled manpower as a critical constraint [3].
  • External volatility: Indian data centres using U.S. chips still need licences to serve firms from "countries of concern" [1]. Geo-economic fragmentation could cost up to 7% of global GDP [5], which would shrink the markets India hopes to supply.

The rivalry is an opportunity, not a guarantee. ISM's money and early projects are real, but its scale, talent base and exposure to outside shocks limit what it can do. ISM should focus on niches where India can become irreplaceable, such as advanced packaging, design and materials, as NITI Aayog recommends [3]. It should pair incentives with a talent pipeline and credible tracking of where imported chips end up. Turning geography into verifiable trust is how ISM can deliver Atmanirbhar Bharat in chips.

Sources

  1. 1The Hindu, "How U.S. curbs flow of latest chips to China" (Nov 2026)U.S. Commerce Department rule licensing foreign data centres; licence requirement for Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia; "countries of concern"
  2. 2PIB Backgrounder: India Semiconductor Mission 2.0 (7 Feb 2026)ISM 1.0 (Dec 2021, ₹76,000 crore); 10 projects worth ₹1.60 lakh crore in six states; ISM 2.0 scope
  3. 3NITI Aayog, *Future of India's Semiconductor Industry* (May 2026)US$120–150 bn target by 2035; import bill; talent constraint; focus on niches rather than leading-edge manufacturing
  4. 4OECD, *Economic Security in a Changing World* (2025)over 90% of leading-edge logic chips made by one firm in Chinese Taipei
  5. 5IMF Staff Discussion Note, *Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism* (2023)fragmentation costs of 0.2–7% of global GDP

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