·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Export controls on advanced semiconductors have turned technology into an instrument of geopolitics. Examine with reference to recent U.S. measures against China, and discuss the implications for India.

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In this answer
  1. Technology as a geopolitical instrument: recent U.S. measures
  2. Limits and costs
  3. Implications for India

Advanced semiconductors supply the computing power that artificial intelligence runs on, which makes them a strategic commodity. On 16 November 2026, the U.S. Commerce Department issued an Interim Final Rule that extends controls beyond chip shipments to cloud access [1]. Control over technology is now a direct lever of state power.

Technology as a geopolitical instrument: recent U.S. measures

  • Denial of compute: data centres outside the U.S. that use advanced American chips now need licences to serve firms headquartered in about two dozen "countries of concern," including China, Iran and Russia [1].
  • Extraterritorial reach: foreign operators are regulated because of where their chips came from. This closes the loophole of renting compute abroad [1].
  • Policing transit hubs: shipments to five countries, including Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, now need explicit approval, to stop chips being diverted to China [1]. This narrows these countries' room to stay neutral.
  • Bargaining leverage: the rule came days before the Trump–Xi meeting in Shenzhen [1], so the controls also work as negotiating tools.
  • Chokepoint power: chip value chains are concentrated in a few economies [3]. That concentration is what makes denial effective, a clear case of weaponised interdependence.

Limits and costs

  • China calls the rule an abuse of export controls that "overstretches" national security [1]. This puts strain on the WTO's security-exception norms.
  • The IMF estimates that fragmentation could cost 0.2–7% of global GDP [2]. Curbs buy time but also speed up rival self-reliance.

Implications for India

  • Opportunity: while Southeast Asian hubs face new licensing [1], India can pitch itself as a trusted geography. ISM 1.0 (approved December 2021) [4] carries a ₹76,000-crore outlay [5].
  • Scale gap: one leading-edge fab costs US$10–20 billion [3]. India should therefore target specific segments, and ISM 2.0 moves into equipment, materials and chip IP [4].
  • Exposure: Indian data centres serving firms from listed countries still need U.S. licences [1]. India's AI-compute ambitions also rely on imported advanced chips.
  • Credibility: tracking the end-use of imported AI chips under the SCOMET regime would keep India off future U.S. watch-lists.

Export controls show that compute, as much as territory, now defines power. India should combine trusted-partner diplomacy (iCET/TRUST) with ISM 2.0 indigenisation and strict end-use compliance. This would turn the rivalry into lasting strategic autonomy and support the goal of Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

Sources

  1. 1The Hindu, "How U.S. curbs flow of latest chips to China" (22 Nov 2026)IFR of 16 Nov 2026; data-centre licensing; five transit countries; China's objection; Trump–Xi Shenzhen timing
  2. 2IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001, *Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism* (2023)fragmentation cost of 0.2–7% of global GDP
  3. 3OECD, *Economic Security in a Changing World* (2025), special focus on semiconductor value chainsconcentration of chip value chains; US$10–20 billion leading-edge fab cost
  4. 4PIB Backgrounder: India Semiconductor Mission 2.0 (7 Feb 2026)ISM 1.0 approved December 2021; ISM 2.0 focus on equipment, materials and IP
  5. 5PIB document on India Semiconductor Mission outlay (Aug 2025)₹76,000-crore ISM outlay

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