National security exceptions are increasingly eroding the rules-based multilateral trading order. Discuss with examples.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →Article XXI of GATT lets a WTO member take any action "which it considers necessary" to protect its essential security interests. The clause was meant as a narrow safety valve. It is now used more and more to shield tariffs, technology bans and sanctions from WTO rules, and this weakens a system built on non-discrimination and binding dispute settlement.
How security exceptions are eroding the trading order
- Tariffs presented as security measures: The U.S. justified its 2018 steel and aluminium duties under Article XXI. A WTO panel found that the duties broke bound-tariff and MFN rules and rejected the security defence. The U.S. appealed, arguing that security is a political matter that WTO panels cannot review [2].
- Appeals that go nowhere: Since December 2019 the Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals [3]. A losing party can therefore appeal "into the void" and avoid compliance.
- Technology export controls: In November 2026 the U.S. required licences for foreign data centres using American AI chips to serve firms from about 24 "countries of concern". It also imposed licensing on chip shipments to transit hubs such as Singapore and Malaysia. China called this "abusing export control measures" [4].
- Extraterritorial reach: Under the same rule, third countries' firms are regulated because of where their chips came from. Neutral hubs are pulled into a bilateral rivalry [4].
- Economic cost: The IMF warns that geo-economic fragmentation could cost from 0.2% to 7% of global GDP [5].
The other side
- Security concerns can be real: In Russia – Traffic in Transit, the panel accepted that a real "emergency in international relations" existed [1].
- The exception is not unlimited: The same panel held that Article XXI is not self-judging, so panels can review whether a measure fits its listed grounds [1]. The steel panel applied this test [2].
Way forward
- Revive a two-tier dispute settlement system, using interim arbitration under DSU Article 25 for now [3].
- Agree WTO guidelines on transparency and proportionality for security measures.
- India should make its export controls easy to verify, including its SCOMET list. It should also build domestic capacity so it is less exposed to unilateral rules.
Security exceptions have moved from rare use to routine use, and the WTO's weakened enforcement makes this worse. Some security claims are legitimate. The answer is to give them clear limits that panels can review, as panels have already begun to do, rather than drop the rules. This would protect the trading order's predictability and support SDG 17.14's call for policy coherence in global partnership.
Sources
- 1WTO, DS512: Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Panel Report, 2019): an emergency in international relations was found to exist, and Article XXI was held not to be self-judging
- 2WTO, DS544: United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products (Panel Report, 9 Dec 2022): Article II:1 and MFN breaches, security defence rejected, U.S. appeal arguing non-justiciability
- 3WTO, Dispute Settlement Body meeting, 18 December 2019: Appellate Body unable to hear appeals since December 2019; arbitration under DSU Article 25 as the alternative
- 4The Hindu, "How U.S. curbs flow of latest chips to China" (22 Nov 2026): the November 2026 Interim Final Rule on data-centre licensing and the five transit countries, and China's response
- 5IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001, *Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism*: fragmentation could cost 0.2% to 7% of global GDP