Critically examine the adequacy of India's in-house mechanisms for addressing allegations of misconduct against sitting High Court and Supreme Court judges.

Impeachment under Articles 124(4) and 218 has never been completed against any judge [1], leaving misconduct below the removal threshold to the Supreme Court's non-statutory In-House Procedure (1999) — a necessary but structurally weak safeguard.

Where the mechanism works

• Graded response: a three-member committee (one Supreme Court judge, two High Court Chief Justices) can find no substance, minor misconduct meriting the CJI's advice, or misconduct grave enough to trigger removal proceedings [1].
• Fills the accountability gap between an unworkable parliamentary route under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [3] and total impunity — allowing withdrawal of judicial work or a request to resign.
• Protects independence: preliminary scrutiny stays within the judiciary, avoiding executive-led investigation of sitting judges.
• Speed: it can act within weeks, unlike a removal motion requiring 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatures and a two-thirds majority [1].

Where it falls short

• No statutory basis or sanction: the procedure is court-devised; its committee can only recommend, not punish, and a judge who refuses to resign continues in office [1].
• Opacity: inquiry reports are confidential and rarely disclosed even to the complainant, weakening deterrence and public confidence.
• Concentration of discretion in the CJI over whether a complaint is examined at all invites perceptions of selectivity — visible in the recent Rajasthan High Court row, where a Supreme Court judge's letters alleging misuse of "master of the roster" powers by the Acting Chief Justice were met with a Collegium transfer recommendation rather than a publicly disclosed inquiry [4].
• Transfer as substitute: an Article 222 transfer relocates the problem instead of adjudicating it.
• Stalled reform: the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — proposing Scrutiny Panels, a National Judicial Oversight Committee and mandatory asset declaration — lapsed [2].

The mechanism is thus necessary but insufficient: credible in design, uncertain in enforcement. Codifying it with statutory backing, time-bound inquiries, an independent complaints body and reasoned public outcomes, while retaining judicial primacy, would strengthen both accountability and the institutional trust that judicial independence ultimately rests on.