Judicial accountability without compromising judicial independence is a delicate balance. Elaborate with recent examples.

Judicial independence is protected by security of tenure and a near-impossible removal process under Articles 124(4) and 218 [1], while accountability demands that judges answer for misconduct. The Constitution deliberately tilts towards independence; the challenge is to build accountability that does not become a lever of control.

Why independence is guarded so heavily

• Removal requires a parliamentary special majority after inquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [3]; no judge has ever been removed, ensuring judges decide against the government without fear.
• In the NJAC judgment (2015), the Supreme Court struck down the 99th Amendment, holding that executive dominance in appointments violates the basic structure [4].

The accountability deficit

• Between "no action" and impeachment lies only the in-house procedure (1999) — non-statutory, confidential, and unable to impose any penalty beyond advice to resign [2].
• Complaints against sitting judges have no independent investigating authority; the judiciary probes itself [2].
• "Master of the roster" power over Bench formation and case allocation rests on convention, with no published allocation norms.

Recent examples of the strain

• The 2026 Rajasthan High Court episode: a sitting Supreme Court judge wrote to the CJI alleging that the Acting Chief Justice misused roster powers to route cases to his own Bench; the Acting Chief Justice denied the charges as baseless [5]. The Collegium responded by recommending a new Chief Justice — an administrative transfer under Article 222 [1] used as a substitute for inquiry.
• The 2018 press conference by four senior judges over irregular case allocation showed the same gap surfacing publicly.

The Rajasthan row shows that when institutional remedies are opaque, disputes migrate to the public sphere, damaging both values at once. The way forward lies in a statutory complaints mechanism with judiciary-dominated membership, transparent and randomised case-allocation rules, and codified reasons for transfers. Accountability designed by the judiciary itself strengthens, rather than threatens, the independence the Constitution guarantees.