Critically examine the asymmetry in removal procedures between the CEC and Election Commissioners.

Article 324(5) shields the Chief Election Commissioner with the removal protection of a Supreme Court judge, but leaves the other Election Commissioners removable merely on the CEC's recommendation [1]. This graded security of tenure sits uneasily with the Commission's post-1993 multi-member, majority-decision character [2].

The asymmetry in law

• CEC: removable only by presidential order, on a motion passed by both Houses in the same session, by a majority of the total membership and two-thirds of those present and voting — the judge-removal route, preceded by a signed notice of 50 Rajya Sabha or 100 Lok Sabha members and a three-member inquiry committee [3].
• ECs: no parliamentary process at all; removal rests on the recommendation of a single colleague, the CEC [1].
• The CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 (Act 49 of 2023) replaced the 1991 Act but retained this differential [2].

The case for the distinction

• It preserves a clear line of institutional responsibility in a body whose decisions are taken by majority [1].
• The high threshold insulates the head of the ECI from executive displeasure and transient majorities — the very rationale of borrowing the judicial standard [1].
• The Supreme Court in 2023 declined to mandate parity, holding that the Constitution itself prescribes distinct processes [1].

Why it is inadequate

• Since ECs are equal voting members, a commissioner who dissents is structurally vulnerable — protection is weakest where independence is most tested [1].
• The safeguard is hollow at the entry point: the 2023 Act substituted a Union Minister for the Chief Justice of India on the selection committee, giving the government two of three seats [1].
• Salary was shifted from Supreme Court judge parity to Cabinet Secretary level, moving a service condition from Parliament's control to the executive's [1].

The asymmetry is constitutionally explicable but functionally indefensible in a collegiate commission. As the Court itself indicated, extending judge-like protection to ECs is a task for Parliament through constitutional amendment, complemented by the Goswami Committee (1990) proposal of an independent ECI secretariat [1]. Securing the umpire's independence at appointment, tenure and removal alike is essential to the free and fair elections that form part of the basic structure.