·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

The removal of the CEC is deliberately made onerous. Examine the constitutional rationale and adequacy of Article 324(5).

In this answer
  1. Rationale: why the bar is set high
  2. Adequacy: protection that stops short

Article 324(5) provides that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed except in the like manner and on the like grounds as a Supreme Court judge [1] — a deliberately high bar, since the umpire of elections cannot be dismissible by the players. Recent removal notices in Parliament have revived the question of whether this protection is well-designed.

Rationale: why the bar is set high

  • Special majority: removal needs a motion carried in both Houses in the same session by a majority of total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting [2] — impossible for a transient majority acting alone.
  • Screened initiation: on the judge model, a notice needs at least 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members, which the presiding officer may admit or decline [2].
  • Fact-finding before politics: charges go to a three-member committee of a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist before any floor vote [2], so a CEC is tested on evidence, not numbers.
  • Judicial parity suits the ECI's quasi-judicial work — deciding disqualifications and registering parties [1].

Adequacy: protection that stops short

  • Asymmetry: Election Commissioners are removable merely on the CEC's recommendation [1]; the Supreme Court held parity needs a constitutional amendment [1].
  • Silence on entry: Article 324(5) guards exit, not appointment. Anoop Baranwal (2023) proposed PM–LoP–CJI, but the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 substituted a Union Minister, giving government two of three seats [1][3].
  • Service conditions: salary moved from Supreme Court judge level, alterable only by Parliament, to Cabinet Secretary level, fixed by the executive [1].
  • No independent secretariat, despite the Goswami Committee (1990) [4].

Thus the rationale is sound but the safeguard is incomplete: security of tenure without security of appointment, pay and staff is a partial shield. Parliament should amend the Constitution to extend removal protection to ECs, restore a neutral member to the selection committee and grant the ECI an independent secretariat — completing the insulation that Article 324(5) began.

Sources

  1. 1PRS Legislative Brief — The CEC and Other Election Commissioners Bill, 2023CEC removable as a Supreme Court judge; ECs removable only on CEC's recommendation and need for constitutional amendment; selection committee replacing the CJI with a Union Minister; salary shifted from Supreme Court judge to Cabinet Secretary level; ECI's quasi-judicial functions
  2. 2PRS Explainer — Removal of Judges from Office100 Lok Sabha / 50 Rajya Sabha signature threshold and presiding officer's admission; majority of total membership plus two-thirds present and voting; three-member inquiry committee
  3. 3PRS Bill Track — CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023introduction and passage in 2023; replacement of the 1991 Act
  4. 4PIB — Electoral Reforms (Goswami Committee recommendations)independent secretariat for the Election Commission recommended in 1990

More from this note