Discuss the governance deficit in a Union Territory without a legislature, and suggest institutional mechanisms to address it, with reference to Ladakh.

Under Article 240, the President can make regulations with the force of law for Union Territories that have no legislature. Ladakh has been run this way since 2019, through a Lieutenant Governor answerable to the MHA [1]. This model is efficient, but it has left a democratic, constitutional and trust deficit in a sensitive frontier region.

Dimensions of the governance deficit

• Democratic deficit: Ladakh has no elected law-making body. Laws on jobs and languages arrive as executive regulations, such as the Ladakh Official Languages Regulation, 2025 [4].
• Fragile safeguards: The ST quota rose from 45% to 84%, women got one-third of Council seats, and Bhoti and Purgi became official languages [3]. All of these rest on regulations that the Centre can amend by itself.
• Weak local bodies: The LAHDCs of Leh and Kargil are the only elected bodies [5]. Going from 2 to 8 districts, with Sankoo as the newest, adds officials but no elected representatives [1].
• Tribal and land concerns: In 2019 the NCST put the tribal share above 97% and recommended the Sixth Schedule. It cited land rights, protection of culture and devolution of power [2].
• Trust and security deficit: Protests in Leh turned violent in September 2025 [6]. LAB and KDA rejected the MHA's 32-page Article 371(K) draft in October 2026 [1].

Institutional mechanisms to address it

• Constitutional entrenchment: Any 371(K) or Sixth Schedule arrangement should list the body's legislative, executive and financial powers in the Constitution itself. The Article 240 gains should be written into it as well.
• Empower the LAHDCs: Spell out their area and powers over the new districts. Hand them funds, functions and staff so that new districts do not dilute their authority.
• NCST checklist: Test every draft against the NCST's four aims: devolution, culture, land and farming rights, and more funds [2]. Land protection should come first.
• Consultative check on regulations: Require elected councillors to vet draft regulations before they are notified.
• Structured dialogue: Continue the High-Powered Committee process [3] on a fixed timetable, so that talks do not stall again.

To sum up, Ladakh's deficit is about how securely it holds its gains more than what it has received. Moving those gains into the Constitution, strengthening the elected councils and holding regular talks can turn concessions into guarantees. This would honour the cooperative federalism and tribal self-governance in the Constitution's design.