Evaluate the 2023 CEC/EC Act against the independence of the Election Commission as stressed in *Anoop Baranwal*.

Article 324(2) makes appointment of the CEC and ECs "subject to any law made by Parliament" [2]. In Anoop Baranwal (2 March 2023) the Court filled a seven-decade legislative vacuum with an interim PM–CJI–LoP committee, seeking an Election Commission insulated from exclusive executive control [2]. The 2023 Act answers the demand for a law, but only partly the demand for independence.

Where the Act fulfils Baranwal

• Legislative vacuum filled: Baranwal expressly made its committee operative only "until Parliament legislates"; Act No. 49 of 2023 is the first statutory framework for appointment, replacing the 1991 Act's silence [1][2].
• Process, not discretion: a Search Committee under the Cabinet Secretary shortlists five names, with statutory eligibility, term and service conditions — a check on unstructured executive choice [4].
• Opposition presence retained through the LoP; keeping the CJI out of an executive appointment also preserves the Court's capacity to later review ECI decisions [3].

Where it falls short of independence

• Built-in executive majority: PM plus a Cabinet Minister can outvote the LoP, so government "majority of members" persists [3].
• Committee can turn single-party: with Lok Sabha dissolved the LoP post is vacant and the committee "will consist exclusively of ruling party members" — precisely at election time [3].
• Salary de-linked from a Supreme Court judge to the Cabinet Secretary, fixed by government rather than Parliament [3].
• Secretary-rank-only eligibility excludes jurists and academics despite the ECI's quasi-judicial functions [3].
• Unequal tenure security: an EC is removable on the CEC's recommendation, unlike the CEC's judge-level protection [3].
• Comparatively, South Africa mandates a judge on the Commission, the US requires Senate confirmation, and the UK vests oversight in a Speaker's Committee [3].

The Act is constitutionally competent yet institutionally thin: it satisfies Article 324(2)'s form while diluting Baranwal's purpose. Restoring a neutral third member, judge-level salary protection, wider eligibility and removal parity would align the law with the Constituent Assembly's vision of an Election Commission whose impartiality is not merely asserted but visibly assured.