Lawyer group calls for fresh hearing in the Noida DM case

1. At a Glance

• Lawyers Association for Constitution has asked the Supreme Court to recall a 23 Sept 2026 interim order involving Noida DM Medha Roopam. She is the daughter of CEC Gyanesh Kumar. The group also wants the challenge to the 2023 CEC/EC Act heard afresh [1].
• The group wants both matters heard by a Bench that excludes Justice Satish Chandra Sharma [1].
• The dispute raises judicial propriety, roster discipline and recusal or conflict of interest. It also touches Election Commission independence and the appointment law, which the Supreme Court had first shaped in Anoop Baranwal (2023) [1][2][3].
• The article text was truncated. Details of the case beyond the excerpt are not verified here.

2. Why in the News

• On Friday (25 Sept 2026), advocates issued a public statement seeking recall of the Supreme Court order in the Roopam matter. They also asked for the CEC/EC appointment-law petitions to be heard afresh [1].
• The statement was circulated online by Supreme Court advocate Subhash Chandran K.R. [1].
• On 23 Sept 2026, a Division Bench led by Justice Sharma passed an interim order in Ms Roopam's appeal [1].
• The same day, Justice Sharma and Justice Dipankar Datta split on the challenge to the 2023 law [1].
• Justice Datta rejected a reference to a five-judge Bench and would hear the merits straight away [1].
• Justice Sharma favoured a reference [1].

• Because of the split, the matter is pending before the CJI [1].

• The group cites two concerns drawn from "public reports" [1]:

• "Improper listing" of Roopam's case before a Bench that did not hold the roster for petitions linked to habeas corpus pleas [1].

• Reports that Justice Sharma's son is empanelled as a standing counsel for the ECI. The excerpt cuts off here, so the rest of the sentence is unavailable [1].

• These are allegations and reports cited by the group. They are not findings by any court.

3. Background & Evolution

• Article 324(2) provides for appointment of the CEC and ECs, subject to any law made by Parliament [3].
• 2 March 2023: Anoop Baranwal v Union of India (WP (Civil) 104 of 2015) [3].
• The Court noted the Constituent Assembly intended an independent Election Commission, with appointments regulated by law and not left to the Executive [3].

• Until Parliament legislated, the CEC and ECs were to be appointed on the advice of a committee of the PM, the CJI and the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in Lok Sabha [3].

• 10 Aug 2023: the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 was introduced in Rajya Sabha [2].

• The Act, 2023 (No. 49 of 2023) followed. The Selection Committee is the PM, a Union Cabinet Minister and the LoP, so the CJI is not on it [2][4].
• A Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary suggests five names to the Selection Committee. It has two other members not below Secretary rank. The Selection Committee may also consider names outside the panel [2].
• 23 Sept 2026: the Supreme Court Bench split on referring the challenge to a Constitution Bench [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Constitutional provision	Article 324(2), appointment of CEC and ECs subject to a law made by Parliament [3]
Statute	CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 (No. 49 of 2023) [4]
Selection Committee under the Act	PM, Union Cabinet Minister, LoP in Lok Sabha (or leader of the largest opposition party) [2]
Committee under Baranwal (interim)	PM, CJI, LoP [3]
Search Committee	Headed by the Cabinet Secretary, with two other members not below Secretary rank; suggests five names [2]
Bill introduced	10 Aug 2023, Rajya Sabha [2]
Case citation	Anoop Baranwal v UoI, WP(C) 104/2015, 2 Mar 2023 [3]
Present bench dispute	Justices Sharma and Datta split; matter is with the CJI [1]
Recall petitioner	Lawyers Association for Constitution [1]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The clash is between the Baranwal interim arrangement, which included the CJI, and the 2023 Act, which replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister [2][3].
• Justice Datta preferred hearing the merits directly. Justice Sharma favoured a reference. Article 145(3) requires at least five judges for a "substantial question of law" on constitutional interpretation. That provision is from general knowledge, not from the sources here.
• Roster allocation is the CJI's power as "master of the roster". The group's "improper listing" objection challenges how the case reached this Bench [1].

Ethical / Governance

• The group alleges a conflict of interest because of a reported family link to the ECI. The report is unverified [1].
• It also points to a personal-interest angle: the appellant is the CEC's daughter, and the law under challenge governs the CEC's appointment [1].
• The principle at stake is that justice must be seen to be done, and it applies to the institution as well as to individual judges.

Administrative

• The CJI now decides how the split is resolved. That includes whether to refer the matter to a larger Bench or assign it to a third judge [1].
• Whether a recall can be sought through a public statement, or only through a formal application in the case, is not covered by the sources.

Institutional independence

• The Baranwal Court stressed an independent Election Commission [3].
• The 2023 Act gives the Executive a majority on the Selection Committee [2].

6. Recent Developments (last 12-18 months)

• 23 Sept 2026: interim order in Ms Roopam's appeal, and the Bench split on the reference question [1].
• 25 Sept 2026: the lawyers' group issued its recall and fresh-hearing statement [1].
• Other 2025–26 developments on the ECI, such as the SIR (special intensive revision) statement, exist. A PIB release titled "All decisions, including SIR, are the outcome of unanimous decisions of the full Commission: ECI" appeared in search results [5]. Its contents were not retrieved.

7. Prelims Hooks

• The 2023 CEC/EC Act is Act No. 49 of 2023 [4].
• The Bill was introduced in Rajya Sabha on 10 Aug 2023 [2].
• The Act's Selection Committee is the PM, a Cabinet Minister and the LoP in Lok Sabha [2].
• The CJI is not a member under the Act. Baranwal had included the CJI [2][3].
• The Search Committee is headed by the Cabinet Secretary and suggests five names [2].
• Anoop Baranwal v UoI was decided on 2 March 2023 [3].
• The Constitutional basis is Article 324(2) [3].
• Justice Dipankar Datta favoured hearing the challenge on merits rather than referring it to a five-judge Bench [1].
• Justice Satish Chandra Sharma favoured a reference [1].
• A split Bench matter goes to the CJI for further directions [1].
• Noida DM: Medha Roopam, daughter of CEC Gyanesh Kumar [1].
• The Lawyers Association for Constitution issued the recall statement [1].

8. A Press Statement Is Not a Recall Petition

• Recall has a fixed doorway, and this group is not standing in it
• A "recall" means asking the same court to take back its own order. It is done by filing a formal application inside that case file.
• Here the demand came as a public statement circulated online by an advocate [1]. That is not a filing. No judge is bound to look at it.

• The Lawyers Association for Constitution is not a party to Ms Roopam's appeal [1]. A stranger to a case normally cannot ask for its order to be undone.

• So what does the statement actually do?

• It works on public opinion and on the CJI's administrative side, not on the judicial side.
• The split between Justices Sharma and Datta is already lying before the CJI [1]. The CJI must now decide who hears the matter next. A public demand is aimed at that choice.
• For an exam answer, this is the useful distinction: judicial remedy (review, recall, appeal — all filed) versus institutional pressure (statements, bar resolutions — not filed). Mixing the two is a common mistake.

9. Recusal in India Has No Rulebook — the Judge Decides About Himself

• The gap: there is no written law telling an Indian judge when to step aside
• The group's whole demand is that a future Bench must exclude Justice Satish Chandra Sharma [1].
• But no statute and no Supreme Court rule lists the situations that force a judge off a case. The judge asked to step aside is the same person who decides whether to step aside.

• A party cannot appeal a refusal to recuse. There is no separate hearing on it.

• Why that matters more when the link is a family one

• The reported objection is that the judge's son is empanelled as a standing counsel for the ECI, and the case touches the ECI and the CEC's own daughter [1].
• This is a reported allegation, not a court finding [1]. The point for analysis is structural, not personal: even a fully honest judge cannot clear his own name, because he is the only one allowed to rule on the question.

• The test everyone quotes is that justice must be seen to be done. A test about how things look cannot be applied by the person being looked at.

• Roster is the second lock, and it is also one person's key

• "Improper listing" means the case reached a Bench that did not hold the roster for that category of petitions [1].
• The roster is made by the CJI alone as master of the roster. Listing is done by the Registry, and its decisions are not published with reasons.
• So both locks on this door — who hears a case, and whether he should — sit with the judiciary's own internal discretion, with no outside check.

10. The Quieter Problem in the 2023 Act: Three Small Clauses, Not One

• The Selection Committee can become an all-government room
• The committee is PM + a Cabinet Minister + the LoP in Lok Sabha [2].
• But when the Lok Sabha is dissolved, there is no LoP. PRS points out the committee then "will consist exclusively of ruling party members" [3].

• That vacancy falls exactly around election time — when an ECI appointment matters most.

• Pay was moved out of Parliament's hands

• Earlier the CEC and ECs drew the salary of a Supreme Court judge, which Parliament fixes. The 2023 Act ties it to the Cabinet Secretary, whose pay the government fixes [3].

• So the same Executive that the ECI must police now also sets what it earns.

• Only a Secretary-rank officer can be picked

• The Act requires a candidate to be a Secretary (or equivalent) to the government [3].

• PRS objects that ECs do quasi-judicial work (deciding disputes, like a judge does), so the rule shuts out judges, lawyers and academics who would suit that work [3].

• An EC is protected less than the CEC

• The CEC can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Supreme Court judge. An EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [3].
• This matters directly here: the challenged law is the law under which the present CEC was appointed [1].

11. What South Africa, the UK and the US Do Instead

• South Africa: a judge is written into the body itself
• Its Election Commission has five members and one of them must be a judge. Members must not have a high party-political profile [3].

• Note the difference from India's fight: South Africa puts the judge on the commission, not on the committee that picks it. That gives judicial presence without dragging the CJI into an Executive appointment room.

• United States: the legislature says yes or no

• Appointees must not hold any office in the executive, legislative or judicial branch at the time of appointment, and the Senate confirms them [3].

• The check is after the nomination and comes from outside the government.

• United Kingdom: a Speaker's Committee oversees the Electoral Commission [3]

• Oversight sits with Parliament, not with the ruling party's cabinet.

• What this tells an examiner

• India's argument has narrowed to one question: who sits on the three-member picking committee.
• Other democracies spread the safeguard across three places — who can be picked, who confirms, and who supervises afterwards. India's 2023 Act loosened all three at once [3].

12. The Strongest Argument on the Government's Side

• The Constitution itself invited this law
• Article 324(2) says appointments are "subject to any law made by Parliament" [3]. For over 70 years Parliament made none.
• Anoop Baranwal did not strike down anything. It filled an empty space, and said the PM–CJI–LoP committee would hold only until Parliament legislated [3].

• So passing the 2023 Act was doing what Article 324(2) always expected, not defying the Court.

• Putting the CJI on the committee has its own cost

• If the CJI helps choose the CEC, the same Supreme Court later hears petitions against that CEC's decisions.

• A judge cannot easily sit in judgment over an appointment he made. Judicial review would weaken, not strengthen.

• Where the argument still fails, honestly

• The Court's stated aim in Baranwal was an independent Election Commission, not merely "some law" [3]. Parliament may replace the interim fix, but a law that hands the Executive a built-in majority does not deliver the aim the Court set out [2][3].
• Justice Datta's view — hear the merits now rather than send it to five judges [1] — reads naturally from this: the constitutional principle was already settled in Baranwal; what is left is whether the Act meets it.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Law/Case: Article 324(2) — appointment of CEC and ECs "subject to any law made by Parliament"; Anoop Baranwal v Union of India (2 March 2023), which set an interim PM–CJI–LoP committee only until Parliament legislated [3]
• Law/Case: CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — Act No. 49 of 2023 [4]
• Report/Committee: PRS Legislative Research brief on the 2023 Bill — flags an Executive majority on the Selection Committee, an all-ruling-party committee when the LoP post is vacant, salary shifted from Supreme Court judge to Cabinet Secretary level, and Secretary-rank-only eligibility despite quasi-judicial duties [2][3]
• Comparison: South Africa — five-member Election Commission with one judge as a member and no high party-political profiles; United States — Senate confirmation and a bar on serving officials; United Kingdom — a Speaker's Committee oversees the Electoral Commission [3]
• Data: Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary suggests five names, but the Selection Committee may go outside that panel [2]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II:
• Judiciary: structure, functioning and judicial accountability.
• Constitutional bodies: the ECI.
• Appointments to constitutional bodies.

• Separation of powers.

• GS-IV: integrity, conflict of interest and impartiality in public institutions.

• Plausible questions:
• Judicial impropriety allegations, roster control and recusal norms affect public trust in the judiciary. Discuss.
• Evaluate the 2023 CEC/EC Act against the independence of the Election Commission as stressed in Anoop Baranwal.
• When should a Bench refer a constitutional challenge to a Constitution Bench? Discuss with reference to Article 145(3).

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Article 324 and ECI powers: it is the constitutional base for this dispute.
• Master of the roster: it decides who hears which case.
• Recusal jurisprudence: it is the doctrine behind the group's demand.
• Article 145(3) and Constitution Bench references: they govern the reference dispute.
• Appointment committees for the CBI and CVC: these are comparable Executive-plus-Opposition models.
• Removal of the CEC and ECs: it is a key independence safeguard.
• Habeas corpus (Article 32/226): the roster point turns on this category.
• Split verdicts and larger Bench procedure: they explain what happens next.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Do not confuse the committee under Baranwal (PM, CJI, LoP) with the Act's committee (PM, Cabinet Minister, LoP) [2][3].
• The Search Committee is different from the Selection Committee [2].
• The Act was not struck down. It is under challenge, and the Bench split on how to proceed [1].
• The judicial allegations are reports cited by a lawyers' group, not court findings [1].
• Baranwal was decided in 2023. The 2023 Bill followed it, not the other way round [2][3].