Examine whether the different removal protections for the CEC and the Election Commissioners under Article 324(5) weaken the multi-member character of the ECI.

Article 324 gives a multi-member Election Commission the "superintendence, direction and control" of elections [1]. Yet Article 324(5) shields only the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) like a Supreme Court judge, while Election Commissioners (ECs) can be removed on the CEC's recommendation [1]. This imbalance weakens the Commission's collegial character but does not destroy it.

The asymmetry under Article 324(5)

• CEC: removable only like an SC judge, by a special majority in both Houses [1].
• ECs: no such shield; their removal rests on the CEC's recommendation [1].
• So members who are equal in voting are unequal in job security.

How it weakens the multi-member character

• Chilling effect: an EC who opposes the CEC puts their own tenure at risk, so dissent gets muted.
• Agenda control beats majority rule: the 2023 Act lets the majority view prevail [3]. But in 2026, ECs S.S. Sandhu and Vivek Joshi said work-allocation orders were issued without discussion in the Commission [4].
• Exit to the executive: instead of outvoting the CEC, the two ECs wrote to the Cabinet Secretary. The letters were treated as individual communications and copied to the CEC [4], the very person who holds removal power over them.
• Precedent: in 2019, EC Ashok Lavasa's dissents on Model Code clean chits were kept out of the final orders, showing how minority voices get sidelined.

Countervailing considerations

• The CEC's shield protects the head of the institution from executive pressure, which was the original constitutional purpose.
• All members have the same tenure (6 years or age 65) and are chosen by the same Selection Committee [2].
• That panel has a government majority [2]. It is under Supreme Court scrutiny after a split verdict in September 2026 [5] and is arguably a bigger threat to independence.

Way forward

• A constitutional amendment giving ECs equal removal protection.
• An ECI rulebook listing matters that need full-Commission approval, with dissent recorded and disclosed within a set time.
• Quick judicial settlement of the appointment challenge [5].

The unequal protection makes ECs junior partners in practice and dilutes the ECI's collegial design. Equalising job security, building collegial decision-making into rules and settling how members are appointed would make the Commission independent and seen to be independent. That would protect free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.